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ABSTRACT 
Chapter 1 investigates teacher wages in the South African labour market, in order to ascertain 
whether teaching is a financially attractive profession, and whether high ability individuals are 
likely to be attracted to the teaching force. Making use of labour force survey data for the years 
2000 to 2007 and for 2010, wage returns to educational attainment and experience are measured 
for teachers, non-teachers and non-teaching professionals. The returns to higher levels of 
education for teachers are significantly lower than for non-teachers and non-teaching 
professionals. Similarly, the age-wage profile for teachers is significantly flatter than it is for 
non-teachers, indicating that there is little wage incentive to remain in teaching beyond roughly 
12 years. The profession is therefore unlikely to attract high ability individuals who are able to 
collect attractive remuneration elsewhere in the labour market. 
Chapter 2 deals with explicit teacher incentives in education. It provides a technical analysis 
of Holstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) multitasking model and Kandel and Lazear’s (1992) model 
of peer pressure as an incentivising force, highlighting aspects of these models that are 
necessary to ensure that incentive systems operate successfully. The chapter provides an 
overview of incentive systems internationally, discussing elements of various systems that may 
be useful in a South African setting. The prospects for the introduction of incentives in South 
Africa are discussed, with the conclusion that the systems in place at the moment are not 
conducive to introducing teacher incentives. There are however models in Chile and Brazil, for 
example, that may work effectively in a South African setting, given their explicit handling of 
inequality within the education system. Chapter 3 makes use of hierarchical linear modelling 
to investigate which teacher characteristics impact significantly on student performance. Using 
data from the SACMEQ III study of 2007, an interesting and potentially important finding is 
that younger teachers are better able to improve the mean mathematics performance of their 
students. Furthermore, younger teachers themselves perform better on subject tests than do 
their older counterparts. Changes in teacher education in the late 1990s and early 2000s may 
explain the differences in the performance of younger teachers relative to their older 
counterparts. However, further investigation is required to fully understand these differences. 
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OPSOMMING 
In Hoofstuk 1 word die lone van onderwysers in die Suid-Afrikaanse arbeidsmark ondersoek 
om vas te stel of onderwys ŉ finansieel aantreklike beroep is en hoe waarskynlik dit is dat 
mense met sterk vermoëns na die onderwys gelok sal word. Met gebruik van 
arbeidsmagopnamedata van 2000 tot 2007 en van 2010 word die loonopbrengs op jare 
onderwys en ervaring vir onderwysers, nie-onderwysers en beroepslui buite die onderwys 
gemeet. Die opbrengste vir hoër vlakke van opvoeding is beduidend laer vir onderwysers as 
vir nie-onderwysers en nie-onderwys beroepslui. Netso is die ouderdom-loonprofiel van 
onderwysers beduidend platter as vir nie-onderwysers, wat dui op weinig looninsentief om 
langer as ongeveer 12 jaar in die onderwysveld te bly. Dit is dus onwaarskynlik dat hierdie 
beroep baie bekwame mense sal lok wat elders in die arbeidsmark goed sou kon verdien.     
In Hoofstuk 2 word na eksplisiete insentiewe in die onderwys gekyk. Die hoofstuk verskaf ŉ 
tegniese analise van die multi-taak-model van Holstrom en Milgrom (1991) en van Kandel en 
Lazear (1992) se model van portuur-druk as aansporingskrag, met klem op die aspekte van 
hierdie modelle wat in Suid-Afrikaanse omstandighede van nut mag wees. Vooruitsigte vir die 
instelling van insentiewe in Suid-Afrika word bespreek, met die slotsom dat die stelsels wat 
tans in plek is nie bevorderlik vir die instelling van onderwysersinsentiewe is nie. Daar is egter 
modelle in byvoorbeeld Chili en Brasilië wat effektief in Suid-Afrikaanse omstandighede sou 
kon funksioneer, gegewe hulle eksplisiete klem op ongelykheid binne die onderwys. 
 In Hoofstuk 3 word hiërargiese liniêre programmering gebruik om te ondersoek watter 
eienskappe van onderwysers ŉ belangrike invloed op studenteprestasie uitoefen. Met gebruik 
van data van die SACMEQ III studie van 2007 is ŉ interessante bevinding dat jonger 
onderwysers beter in staat is om die gemiddelde wiskunde prestasie van hulle student te 
verbeter. Verder vertoon sulke jonger onderwysers self ook beter in die vaktoetse in Wiskunde 
en taal as hulle ouer kollegas. Veranderings in onderwysopleiding in die laat negentigerjare en 
vroeë jare van hierdie eeu kan dalk die verskille in die vertonings van jonger onderwysers 
relatief tot hulle ouer eweknieë verklaar. Verdere ondersoek is egter nodig om hierdie verskille 
beter te verstaan.   
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Introduction 
 
The role of education and of teachers in South African economic development 
Education and economic development are inextricably linked. Amartrya Sen (1997) explains 
development as the ability to choose the way in which one lives one’s life and as having the 
capability to function at a certain level (Sen, 1997: 199). The process of development is 
therefore the process of enhancing the level of freedom that people have to live the life of their 
choice (Sen, 1999: 297). Different capabilities are interdependent according to this framework. 
For example, the level of educational attainment and the health status of people depend to a 
large extent on their level of income, yet the income individuals generate is governed to a large 
extent by their level of education and the state of their health (Sen, 1999: 19). In this way, 
freedom is both the means by which development is achieved as well as the ultimate objective.  
A more conventional notion of economic development incorporates an element of economic 
growth, which includes the increase in per capita income over time (Ray, 1998: 7). On its own 
this is an incomplete notion of economic development. Economic development involves 
understanding how economic growth facilitates characteristics of development – health, life 
expectancy, sanitation and literacy – and how growth in per capita income results in long-term 
social change (Meier, 1995: 7). The traditional notion of economic development therefore 
needs to be broadened to encompass Sen’s idea of development as freedom.  
The role of education in economic development is vital. To some extent, access to education is 
seen as one of the outcomes of economic development. Access to basic education has been 
achieved in most countries in the world and the challenge facing governments internationally 
is enhancing the quality of education received by their citizens. Education is also a necessary 
driver of economic development, however. Indeed, the economic growth literature documents 
the role of “human capital” in economic growth, explaining that human capital is comprised of 
skills and knowledge, and that the generation and accumulation of human capital requires direct 
investment (Schultz, 1961: 1). Innovation and productivity are enhanced with higher levels of 
human capital. This applies at an individual level, too. The human capital model hypothesises 
that investment in education (and consequently higher levels of educational attainment) 
enhances individual productivity and in turn labour market earnings. 
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Education and South African economic development 
Given its centrality in achieving a dignified standard of living as well as economic growth, 
education is one of the biggest components of government spending. In 2012, education 
comprised 20.6 percent of government expenditure in South Africa (World Bank, 2014). 
Furthermore, by far the largest expenditure item in education is teacher salaries. Personnel 
spending (comprised predominantly of teacher salaries) accounted for roughly 78 percent of 
education spending in South Africa in 2010 (Oxford Policy Management & University of 
Stellenbosch, 2012). From an economic perspective then, education is relevant and important, 
and the role of teachers is central to education.  
South Africa’s educational performance is worrying. Spaull (2013a: 53) provides a brief 
overview of South Africa’s performance in an international perspective with a discussion of 
the results of three international studies conducted at different grades in the education system 
across different years. In 2006 South Africa was one of 45 countries participating in the 
Progress in Reading Literacy Study (at grade 4 and 5 level). Some other middle-income 
countries also participated in the study, namely Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Indonesia 
and Morocco. More than three-quarters of the South African sample performed below the low 
international benchmark. This means that 78% of the South African sample may well never 
learn how to read, given their failure to achieve this basic level of competence at the grade 5 
level (Trong, 2010: 2). In 2011, an easier version of the assessment, prePIRLS, was offered. 
PrePIRLS was designed specifically for underachieving developing countries and South 
Africa, Botswana and Colombia opted to participate in prePIRLS rather than PIRLS in 2011 
(Spaull, 2013a: 53). The performance in prePIRLS was comparable to that of South Africa’s 
neighbouring country Botswana. However, the average South African child was roughly three 
years behind the average Colombian child in grade 4.  
South Africa also participated in international testing conducted by the Southern and Eastern 
African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) in 2007. This was the 
third round of such testing and is referred to as SACMEQ III.1 South Africa performed below 
the average of a number of African countries, even with lower pupil-teacher ratios, better 
qualified teachers and more resources (Van der Berg, Burger, Burger, De Vos, Du Randt, 
Gustafsson, Moses, Shepherd et al., 2011: 4).  
                                                          
1 The data used in this analysis is from SACMEQ III. A thorough description of the study is presented in section 
2 of this paper.  
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South Africa participated in the Trends in International Maths and Science Survey in 1995, 
1995, 2002 and 2011 (Spaull, 2013a: 54). Despite marked improvement in performance 
between 2002 and 2011,2 an international comparison of results reveals that South African 
grade 9 students were performing 2 to 3 grade levels below grade 8 students in countries at 
similar levels of income (Spaull, 2013b: 4). The improvement observed must therefore be 
considered in the context of excessively low performance in previous studies. In 2011, 76% of 
South African grade 9 students did not understand whole numbers, basic graphs, decimals or 
operations.  
It is clear then that South Africa’s education performance is less than desirable. Education 
performance differs dramatically across the socioeconomic spectrum, with a bimodal 
distribution characterising South African performance. Shepherd (2013: 3) explains that 
substantial and significant differences exist between historically black schools and schools 
serving other parts of the population. Van der Berg (2006: 6) reports that differences in the 
performance of rich and poor schools in South Africa far exceeded that of any other country in 
the SACMEQ II study (conducted in 2000).  
South African’s legacy of inequality in education therefore continues, with historical divisions 
still playing a major role, despite massive resource shifts towards schools with lower 
socioeconomic status. One area in which the equalisation of resources remains a challenge, 
however, is that of attracting skilled teachers to poor and often remote schools. The mid-1990s 
saw the Department of Education employing policies aimed at enhancing quality across the 
education system, an element of which included the equalisation of teacher provisions across 
schools (Crouch & Perry, 2003: 477). More teachers were employed in understaffed schools, 
and a policy of rationalisation and redeployment was conducted. Excess teachers were 
identified and were offered either posts at understaffed schools or voluntary severance 
packages. It became clear by 1998 that the areas in which there had been an undersupply of 
teachers had indeed experienced increased teacher numbers, but there was not an adequate 
reduction of teachers in areas where there was an oversupply. In order to remedy this situation, 
the DoE expedited the rationalisation process by decreasing enrolment in education training 
facilities and reducing the number of these facilities by roughly half. Teacher training colleges 
were later incorporated into universities and universities of technology (discussed in chapter 3) 
                                                          
2 An improvement of approximately one and half grades was observed for the South African sample between 2002 
and 2011 (Reddy et al., 2012). However, in 2011 only grade 9s in South Africa (compared to a mixture of grade 
8s and grade 9s in 2002) wrote the grade 8 level test. 
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(Crouch & Perry, 2003: 479). The supply of teachers was affected significantly by these 
measures.  
How best to remedy the state of education in South Africa? What can be done to improve the 
educational quality? The difficulties and nuances in education are numerous and it may be 
argued that a focus on any particular aspect of education is too narrow to realistically impact 
on the status quo. Even if one specific resource is isolated – in this case teachers – multiple 
factors determine effectiveness and quality. Furthermore, most of these factors are outside the 
scope of economics.  
Teachers and their role in improving educational outcomes  
This thesis investigates teachers in the South African education system, seeking inter alia to 
understand the attractiveness of teaching from a labour market perspective by comparing the 
wage structure facing teachers with that facing non-teachers, including non-teaching 
professionals. It then investigates the theoretical underpinning of incentives in teaching and the 
prospects for success of such incentives in South Africa. Finally, an analysis of the relationship 
between teacher characteristics and student performance is conducted.   
Teachers are one of many inputs in the education process, so why focus on this particular 
resource in isolation from the myriad of factors impacting on student performance? Vegas and 
Umanksy (2005: 14) explain that at lower levels of material resources, the teacher becomes 
increasingly important in ensuring that learning takes place, and Hanushek contends that “by 
many accounts, the quality of teachers is the key element to improving student performance” 
(Hanushek, 2009: 171). The state of South African education renders it crucial to understand 
the mechanics determining who enters the teaching profession, what is done to encourage and 
manage teacher effort and how effective teachers are identified.  
Economics provides tools which are particularly pertinent to the analysis of teachers’ role in 
education. Economists are, for instance, well placed to analyse the structure of teacher 
remuneration and to compare it to that facing other professions. Economic models of the 
theoretical aspects of incentives faced by teachers are also useful for understanding the benefits 
and potential challenges associated with explicitly incentivising student performance. Finally, 
the education production function framework widely used in the economics of education 
literature provides a useful tool with which to consider the teacher characteristics most strongly 
associated with effective student performance. These are the topics that this thesis will deal 
with. 
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To what extent do we ensure that those entering the teaching force provide high quality 
teaching? There is considerable debate about the question whether it is possible to improve the 
performance of teachers already in the profession or whether the only genuine hope of ensuring 
high quality teaching is to ensure that high quality candidates enter the profession. Although 
by no means the only motivating factor for individuals entering teaching, the primary incentive 
for doing so is whether or not the profession is well paid (Hernani-Limarino, 2005: 65). We 
can think of the wage structure facing teachers as the financial consideration in terms of the 
labour market decision to join the teaching profession.  
A profession that inherently attracts low quality teachers is catastrophic for education 
performance. To what extent does this characterise teaching in South Africa? To answer this 
question, this research investigates the attractiveness of the teaching profession from a wage 
perspective.  
The question of whether teaching is an attractive profession from such a wage perspective 
depends on how the wages of teachers compare with those of non-teachers in the labour market. 
Gustafsson & Patel (2009: 11) show that despite sizeable increases in average teacher pay in 
the 1990s (which arose as a result of the equalisation of apartheid pay scales, an ageing teaching 
force and ‘management drift’ whereby teachers move into management positions paying higher 
salaries), the ratio of teacher pay to GDP has been declining since the late 1990s. This seems 
to contradict what the relative wage data is saying and may mean that  the remuneration 
received by teachers is becoming increasingly less attractive relative to the rest of the economy. 
A comparison of the unconditional wage gap between teachers and non-teacher professionals 
in South Africa, that of developed countries the US and UK (Gould, Abraham & Bailey, 2005) 
and that observed in middle income countries in Latin America (Hernani-Limarino, 2005; 
Mizala & Romaguera, 2005) reveal that while the wage gap in South Africa is roughly in line 
with what is observed in developed countries, the wage gap is substantially larger in South 
Africa than it is in other middle income countries in Latin America, suggesting that the position 
of teachers in the South African labour market is somewhat less attractive than it is for their 
colleagues in Latin American countries (Gustafsson & Patel, 2009: 15). Therefore it appears 
that despite pay increases experienced during the 1990s, teacher wages have remained below 
those of non-teaching professionals.  
Chapter 1 updates and continues the analysis of teacher wages in South Arica. The most recent 
wage data available, the Labour Force Surveys from 2000 to 2007 and the Quarterly Labour 
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Force surveys from 2010, are used to compare the wage structure of teachers with that of non-
teachers and non-teaching professionals in the South African labour market. By making use of 
Mincerian wage functions as well as Lemieux decompositions, the returns to productive 
characteristics of teachers (education attainment and experience) are compared to those of non-
teachers and non-teaching professionals. In order to investigate what impact this has on the 
quality of individuals entering the teaching profession, the distribution of grade 12 marks for 
students enrolled at different faculties at the University of Stellenbosch are investigated.  
Whether teachers are well-paid is important to the extent that it ensures high quality teaching 
and therefore improved student performance. Although this research does not extend beyond 
an analysis of teacher pay, a further step in evaluating whether teachers are well-paid is 
therefore to consider how their pay affects student performance. The data requirements for this 
type of evaluation are extensive, but this is the question that should ultimately be answered. 
Does attractive remuneration persuade individuals best able to improve student performance to 
join the teaching profession, and does this ultimately improve education outcomes? Evidence 
from two studies – that of Menezes-Filho and Pazello (2007) using Brazilian data and a study 
using OECD data conducted by Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2011) – suggests that 
improvements in teacher wages (Menezes-Filho & Pazello, 2007) or an attractive position in 
the wage distribution for teachers relative to other professionals (Dolton & Marcenaro-
Gutierrez, 2011) is positively correlated with student performance. This may leave us 
optimistic about the prospect of improving education by attracting top-performers to the 
teaching profession. The details of these studies are discussed in chapter 1. In the case of South 
Africa, the data requirements to conduct such a study exceed data availability.  
Wages may be thought of as the implicit incentives associated with the teaching profession. It 
is also important to understand whether there is scope for the introduction of explicit, pay-for-
performance type incentives in teaching. Teacher incentives have been implemented 
internationally with the objective of ultimately improving student performance. Numerous 
examples of pay-for-performance type incentive systems exist which differ in their design, 
effectiveness and the duration of their effects. The results of such systems have been mixed. 
Chapter 2 focuses on explicit incentives in teaching. It provides a theoretical analysis of 
Milgrom and Holstrom’s (1991) multitasking and risk of distortion model as well as Kandel 
and Lazear’s (1992) model of peer pressure as an incentivising force. The chapter highlights 
key characteristics likely to render incentives successful in encouraging productive behaviour, 
provides evidence of where these systems have been successfully and unsuccessfully 
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implemented internationally and discusses the likelihood of successful implementation of 
teacher incentive programmes in South Africa. This literature on the use of teacher incentives 
seems to suggest that they tend to improve student performance. However, very little evidence 
of the long term effects of particular incentive schemes exist. Furthermore, in an education 
system fraught with the level of inequality experienced in South Africa, it is vitally important 
to ensure that incentive systems do not exacerbate the problem by rewarding those teachers 
teaching in wealthier schools in which student performance is stronger. The result of such a 
trend may be that teachers better able to achieve higher levels of student performance are drawn 
to schools with these conditions, resulting in a distribution of teacher quality that favours 
schools already better placed to achieve high levels of educational outcomes.  
Chapter 2 then considers the international literature on teacher incentives in education with a 
view to understanding whether or not the South African education system is likely to succeed 
in implementing incentive schemes for teachers, and whether or not these schemes are likely 
to result in improved student performance.  
The first two chapters therefore examine the inherent attractiveness of the teaching profession 
as determined by its wage structure and the prospects for explicit incentives in South Africa’s 
teaching profession. A final step is to consider what characteristics identify high quality 
teachers, in terms of their ability to have an effect on student learning. The challenge is to 
understand what best serves the objective of improving educational outcomes in South Africa. 
Having considered the attractiveness of the teaching profession in South Africa, it is also 
important to understand what type of individuals are likely to have the biggest impact on 
student performance.  
Investigation into the relationship between teacher characteristics and student performance has 
yielded mixed results. Numerous studies across a wide range of countries have investigated the 
impact of various teacher-level variables on student performance. Studies have investigated the 
relationship between student performance and teacher demographic characteristics (Slater, 
Davies and Burgess, 2009), different types of teacher content knowledge (Hill, Loewenberg 
Ball & Schilling, 2008), teacher training and experience (Chingos & Peterson, 2011; Angrist 
& Lavy, 2001), teaching methods (Anderson, 2000), teacher test performance (Ehrenberg & 
Brewer, 1995; Hanushek, 1992; Rowan, Chiang & Miller, 1997), amongst others. 
In the context of South Africa, Crouch & Mabogoane (1998) find a relationship between 
secondary school student performance and the number of years of post-secondary training 
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amongst teachers. Using student performance data at a grade 6 level, Gustafsson (2007) 
explains that the effect of teacher training on student performance largely reflects the effect of 
apartheid’s racially delineated teacher training institutions. For example, just 12% of white 
teachers report having received fewer than 4 years of training in comparison to some 44% of 
black teachers. Information on teacher training is largely understood to be a proxy for 
individual teacher’s ability, so in cases where this data is available, the link between teacher 
test score and student performance is significantly stronger (Gustafsson & Patel, 2009: 6). This 
link is measured by Lee, Zuze & Ross (2005) using data from the SACMEQ II study for those 
countries that also participated in the testing of teachers, and the results show a strong 
relationship between teacher test scores and student performance. As is explained later, South 
African teachers were only tested in the third SACMEQ study and was thus not included in the 
SACMEQ II study. This thesis makes use of SACMEQ III data. Of importance in terms of the 
policy process is not whether or not teacher ability impacts on student performance, but rather 
whether there are any patterns in, for example, the link between teacher ability and teacher 
training (Gustaffson & Patel, 2009: 6). Gustafsson (2007: 12) finds a significant link between 
teacher behaviour variables (specifically, teacher punctuality) and student performance, as well 
as for different teaching methodologies. Importantly, the impact of teaching methodology 
appears to act independently of teacher training.  
Chapter 3 adds to this literature by using hierarchical linear modelling to investigate which 
teacher characteristics (demographic and education background) contribute significantly to 
student performance. The relationship between teacher characteristics and student performance 
has been difficult to measure. However, significant relationships between both education and 
demographic characteristics have been found in developed and developing countries. As 
mentioned above, SACMEQ III is the first dataset in which teacher test results have been 
recorded in South Africa, allowing for different types of investigation around teacher test 
performance and teacher content knowledge than was possible in earlier studies. An interesting 
and important result found in chapter 3 is that there are important differences in the extent to 
which teachers of different ages are able to affect student performance, as well as differences 
in their performance on teacher tests. This relationship is not observed in other Sub-Saharan 
African countries participating in the SACMEQ III study (2007), nor is it observed in South 
African data from the earlier SACMEQ II (2000) study. Chapter 3 considers the possible 
explanations of this result, and also what this may mean in terms of teacher training and quality.  
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This thesis therefore provides an economic perspective on teachers in the South African 
education system. The wage structure and incentives faced by teachers may well influence first 
of all who enters the teaching profession and secondly who remains in teaching and the level 
of effort at which teachers are willing to perform. An investigation into the relationship 
between teacher characteristics and student performance may aid in identifying individuals 
most likely to enhance education outcomes amongst students. An understanding of teachers 
from an economic perspective may well provide a point of entry to investigating the processes 
that ultimately result in improved education outcomes.  
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Chapter 1 
Teacher wages in South Africa: how attractive is the 
teaching profession? 
 
 
“Attracting qualified individuals into the teaching profession, retaining those qualified 
teachers, providing them with the necessary skills and knowledge, and motivating them to work 
hard and to do the best job they can is arguably the key education challenge” (Vegas & 
Umansky, 2005). 
The above statement was written in the context of Latin American schools and opens the first 
chapter of their book Improving Teaching and Learning through Effective Incentives. It is clear 
that the question of effective teachers and their role in educational performance is considered 
pertinent internationally, and this matter becomes increasingly important as the level of 
resources in communities decrease. A substantial amount of literature exists on policies 
designed to improve teacher quality. Such policies are broadly grouped into three categories: 
i) policies that aim to improve the preparation and professional development of teachers; ii) 
policies designed to affect who enters the teaching profession and the time these individuals 
remain in the teaching profession; and iii) policies designed to affect the work that teachers 
carry out in the classroom (Vegas & Umansky, 2005). Although this chapter looks at some of 
the literature on policies aimed at improving teacher quality, its focus is on the second category, 
and comprises a labour market overview of the wage structures in the teaching profession and 
how this compares to those in non-teaching professions where similar levels of education and 
labour market experience are required. The question this chapter seeks to answer is: “How 
attractive is the teaching profession from a labour market perspective?”  
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1. The importance of teachers in achieving quality education: A case for effective 
wage incentives 
 
It is widely believed by both teachers and non-teachers in South Africa that teachers are under-
paid. Indeed, it is widely thought that well-performing teachers are under-paid, and so at the 
upper end of the teacher skills distribution, this sentiment may well be founded. However, 
when mean student performance and mean teacher pay in South Africa is taken into account, 
it can be argued that teachers may in fact be over-paid, given the apparent lack of productivity 
associated with their work. One of the fundamental problems underlying this apparent lack of 
productivity is the fact that South Africa’s teacher pay system barely differentiates between 
well and poorly performing teachers. This largely results from the fact that data on teacher 
quality are rare, if they exist at all (Taylor, Van der Berg, Spaull, Gustafsson & Armstrong, 
2011: 4)  
Internationally teachers are generally found to be under-paid relative to those employed in non-
teaching professions, given their level of educational attainment and experience in the teaching 
force. It is often argued that this is the case because of the poor productivity of the profession 
relative to other professions. In the South African context, one is hard-pressed to argue that 
teachers should be paid more. Between 2007 and 2009, teachers experienced a 15 percent 
increase in real terms in average pay, despite the financial crisis. In fact, even before this 
substantial increase, teacher pay in South Africa was exceptionally high relative to per capita 
GDP. The question therefore becomes: How should teacher pay be adjusted in order to attain 
higher performance within South African schools? What is required is a pay system designed 
to incentivise good teaching as well as linking salary increments to experience in a way that 
discourages good teachers from leaving the profession. Indeed, top-performing teachers are 
often attracted out of the teaching profession and into private sector jobs with far more 
attractive wages (Taylor et al., 2011:6).  
The importance of teachers in the South African education system should not be 
underestimated. In terms of the distribution of public resources, the proportion spent on 
teachers is immense. Gustafsson and Patel (2009:3) point out that approximately 3.0 percent 
of economically active South Africans are teachers (although this is limited to teachers who 
are publicly employed; this proportion increases to 4.5 percent if all individuals classifying 
themselves as teachers are counted), and the teacher wage bill is roughly 3.5 percent of GDP. 
In 2009 some 17.9 percent of government spending was spent on education, and 81.5 percent 
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of that education spending was spent on teacher salaries (Gustafsson & Patel, 2009: 5) – a clear 
indication that an immense proportion of public spending on education is personnel spending. 
It is therefore important to investigate and understand the performance of teachers as their 
wages constitute a considerable expenditure item in the government’s budget. 
Low teacher effort and low levels of teacher skills present a sizeable challenge in the South 
African education system. Many argue that low teacher effort is a greater challenge to 
educational performance than a low level of teacher skills, suggesting that policy response in 
terms of teachers should be focused more on designing attractive incentives rather than on in-
service training “solutions”. Indeed, high levels of absence from classrooms, poor lesson 
preparation and very low levels of interest in the progress of learners are key signs that teacher 
effort is critically low in South Africa. It is often reported that such low levels of effort result 
from weak incentive systems. Furthermore, the structure of the teacher workforce, in particular 
the exceptionally strong influence that teacher unions have in the structuring of this workforce, 
make it close to impossible to even discuss changes to the status quo (Taylor et al., 2011:5). 
In terms of teacher incentives, three key areas of empirical enquiry present themselves, namely 
the time that teachers actually spend teaching, whether or not teacher pay is considered 
adequate (as well as the structure of teacher salary scales), and the number of new teachers that 
are taken in annually (Taylor et al., 2011:6). All three are important in understanding the appeal 
of the teaching profession and the level of effort teachers are likely to provide. However, this 
chapter focuses solely on the adequacy of teacher pay. It takes a look at the earnings of teachers 
in comparison to those of their non-teaching counterparts in the South African labour force, 
investigating whether the profession is considered attractive from a labour market perspective. 
This chapter addresses the question of the adequacy of teacher pay and the attractiveness of the 
profession as follows: Section 2 discusses some interesting international evidence from two 
studies that link teacher pay to student performance, suggesting perhaps that improving the 
financial attractiveness of the teaching profession may improve educational performance. 
Section 3 presents an analysis of teacher wages in which the remuneration structures of teachers 
and non-teachers are compared. Section 4 provides a brief analysis of the academic 
performance of students enrolled for education degrees in comparison to those enrolled in other 
areas of study as a possible explanation for the differences observed in the remuneration of the 
two groups. Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary of the results.  
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2. International evidence: Teacher pay and student performance 
 
“In the 2003 PISA assessment ... Brazilian students had the lowest average outcome out of 40 
countries, with a mean score of 350 in mathematics, relative to the OECD mean of 496. 
Moreover, Brazil is one of the most unequal countries in the world and education is often seen 
as the main culprit” (Menezes-Filho & Pazello, 2007: 660). This statement may well be 
applicable to the South African context - an enormously unequal country with a faltering 
education system which perpetuates the level of inequality and poverty experienced by a 
significant proportion of the population3. In 1998, Brazil introduced FUNDEF (Fundo para 
Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e Valorização do Magistério), an 
initiative designed to redistribute resources from richer regions to the poorer regions and to 
improve the wages of teachers in the Brazilian public sector (Menezes-Filho & Pazello, 2007: 
660). A substantial amount of research exists around the issue of teacher pay and whether 
teachers are paid enough. Numerous studies of teacher pay have been conducted (Mizala & 
Romaguera, 2004; Ballou & Podgursky, 1997; Barnett, 2003; Hanushek, 2007). However, an 
important question seldom asked4 is whether increased teacher wages impacted positively on 
student performance.  
 
Menezes-Filho & Pazello (2007: 671) are able to show that increasing the wage of public 
school teachers in Brazil did impact positively on student performance. Taking advantage of 
the wage increase received by teachers in 1998, the authors instrument teacher wages with the 
municipality in which a school is located, year and schooling system (municipal or state) as 
well as their interactions. The positive impact of teacher wages on student performance seems 
largest for Portuguese, followed in turn by mathematics and science. The mechanism by which 
this works is unclear and the authors do not explore the possible channels of influence. It is an 
important relationship to understand, however, and one worth exploring in a country like South 
Africa, given its similarity to Brazil. Important to note is that the Brazilian study says nothing 
about whether new teachers were attracted to the profession as a result of higher wages. This 
is something to consider when investigating the impact of wages on student performance, i.e. 
the source of improvement. It is vital to understand whether it is possible to improve the 
                                                          
3 An important differences between South Africa and Brazil is that Brazilian teacher wages are determined sub-
nationally while the wages of South African teachers are determined at the national level.  
4 Hanushek, Rivkin and Kain (2005: 422) point out the difficulty in acquiring non-biased estimates of the impact 
of teacher wages on student performance given the influence of unobservable characteristics of students, teacher 
and schools.  
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proficiency of teachers already in the system or whether it is necessary to employ more able 
teachers to enhance teacher quality. The policy implications of these alternatives are quite 
different.  
 
Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2011) use cross-country data to test the relationship between 
teacher pay and student proficiency. Comparing teacher pay within countries is problematic. 
Cross-sectional variation in teacher remuneration is unlikely to render a measurable impact on 
student performance because each district has its own teacher supply curve (Dolton & 
Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011: 16). Furthermore, within a country teachers are likely to be paid 
according to the same or similar pay scales and are likely to be drawn from similar parts of the 
ability distribution. The result is that not enough variation in teacher wages and teacher quality 
exists to identify the relationship between teacher remuneration and student performance 
(Dolton & Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011: 16). The authors explain that only by using the variation 
in teachers’ relative position in wage distribution across countries can researchers say 
something about teacher pay.  
 
Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez hypothesize that the relationship between teacher pay and 
educational outcomes (measured by student outcomes on standardised tests) works by 
attracting highly able people to the teaching profession by higher wages and by improving the 
standing of teachers in the national income distribution by attaching a certain status or prestige 
to the profession (Dolton & Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011: 8-9). As more individuals are attracted 
towards the profession by remuneration prospects, entry into teaching will become increasingly 
competitive and individuals of higher ability will want to enter teaching (Dolton & Marcenaro-
Gutierrez, 2011: 8). The higher status of teaching will also render it a sought after profession, 
attracting a higher number of applicants and allowing training institutions to be more selective 
regarding who is admitted for teacher training, which in turn results in attracting individuals of 
higher ability to the profession. This process “facilitates the recruitment of more able 
individuals” to teaching (Dolton & Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011:9). 
 
Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez use data on teachers and education systems from the OECD’s 
Education at a Glance publications. Data from 39 countries between 1996 and 2009 for 39 
countries are used, as well as student performance data from the Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) surveys and the Trends in International Mathematics and Science 
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Study (TIMSS)5. The authors investigate whether improving teachers’ relative standing in the 
income distribution within their country improves student performance (Dolton & Marcenaro-
Gutierrez, 2011: 21)6. A strong, positive and statistically significant relationship exists between 
teacher wages and student test performance (Dolton & Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011: 41). They 
find that a 10% increase in teacher wages translate into improvements in student performance 
of 5% to 10%, and that a 5% improvement in relative position of the earnings distribution has 
a similar effect on student performance.  
 
Mehrotra & Buckland (2001: 4570) report that in most countries, teacher salary scales take 
account of teacher qualifications in the sense that a large proportion of unqualified or lower 
qualified teachers find themselves at the lower end of the teacher salary distribution. In African 
countries experiencing low and negative economic growth in the 1980s, the academic 
qualifications of teachers decreased – the result perhaps of students moving into teaching from 
higher education as this required lower levels of financial investment (Mehrotra & Buckland, 
2001: 4570).  
 
Although evidence of a positive relationship between teacher remuneration and student 
performance does exist, the conclusion that the two are positively correlated is tentative at best. 
An important element to consider in investigating teacher remuneration is the profile of 
earnings over an individual’s lifetime. If high quality teachers enter the profession, then what 
incentives exist for them to remain in teaching? Highly productive, dedicated and hard-working 
individuals are attractive in multiple occupations and so individuals must consider the 
opportunity cost of teaching when they decide whether to enter the teaching profession. Having 
entered teaching, the incentive to remain in the profession is a function of how earnings are 
expected to change over the teacher’s lifetime. An attractive incentive then to enter the teaching 
profession would be an age-wage profile that offers wage growth comparable to or higher than 
that offered in other professions. 
 
Evidence exists therefore that improving teacher remuneration or teachers’ relative position in 
the income distribution may improve student performance. 
                                                          
5 The authors make use of PISA data from 2000, 2003 and 2006 and TIMSS data from 1995, 1999 and 2005. 
6 The authors admit that they were unable to construct a consistent home background measure across countries 
(Dolton & Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011: 20) – a noteworthy omission in any analysis of student outcomes given 
the importance of family background in student performance. 
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3. Wage analysis7 
 
Hernani-Limarino (2005:65) points out that arguably the most important determinant of the 
recruitment, performance and retention of effective teachers is whether or not they are well-
paid. He points out, however, that although wages are the central point of the employment 
contract, there are important aspects of employment aside from wages that determine the 
attractiveness of a job. It is argued that the recruitment, performance and retention of teachers 
are directly related to the opportunity cost of being a teacher and that in most cases, the 
opportunity cost of being a teacher is restricted to the wage that an individual entering the 
teaching profession might have received in a profession other than teaching. However, this idea 
of the opportunity cost of teaching ignores some very important factors that may impact on 
how individuals perform their role as teachers, the incentives that teachers face to perform well 
and, importantly, the probability that well-performing teachers (and high-ability individuals) 
will remain in the teaching profession. 
Some of the characteristics of employment that affect its attractiveness include the hours 
individuals are expected to work in a particular job, the stability of the job, and the flexibility 
of schedules and non-monetary benefits (such as in-kind payments and holidays) that may not 
be easily captured by survey data collection (Hernani-Limarino, 2005: 66). However, as we 
broaden the definition of the opportunity cost of being a teacher, we also increase the 
information requirement regarding the non-wage aspects of the labour contract, and although 
this information is useful and contributes to our understanding of the attractiveness of the 
teaching profession, it complicates the analysis somewhat. The difficulties involved with the 
assignment of values to non-monetary benefits and other employment characteristics may lead 
to inaccuracies in the calculation of teaching’s opportunity cost.  
For that reason, the analysis conducted in this section focuses primarily on the wage aspect of 
teaching in comparison to other professions.   
This section makes use of data from the March and September rounds of the Labour Force 
Surveys (LFS) from 2000 to 2007, as well as the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) of 
2010. Earnings data were not collected for the 2008 and 2009 versions of the QLFS, hence the 
                                                          
7The fact that earnings data in the Labour Force Survey (to be used in this paper) is self-reported introduces 
potential for bias. In order to measure the potential bias in the self-reported earnings data, a brief analysis of the 
possibility of underreporting of wages by teachers using Persal payroll data is presented in Appendix A. It is 
impossible to ascertain whether under-reporting differs across different groups of workers, however.  
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two year gap between the surveys which are used in this analysis. Furthermore, earnings data 
were only collected in one quarter of the QLFS, so the sample for 2010 is significantly smaller 
than what is available for the 2000 to 2007 LFSs. The analysis is conducted only for employed 
workers in the South African labour market. Workers reporting real monthly earnings in excess 
of R200 000, workers employed in the informal and agricultural sectors, domestic workers and 
the self-employed are excluded from the analysis. 
The absence of wage data in 2008 and 2009 is problematic for an analysis of teacher wages. It 
is impossible to ascertain whether any wage movements particular to the teaching profession 
occurred in those years and as the results show, it appears that significant changes in the age-
wage profile for teachers took place between 2007 and 2010.   
Real hourly wages are used throughout the analysis. Hourly wages are calculated by dividing 
the reported monthly wage by the number of hours workers reported working in a week 
multiplied by four. The number of hours worked by teachers is a point of contention, and the 
major issues that arise in relation to teachers’ working hours are largely to do with the fact that 
a considerable portion of teachers’ work takes place outside of official school hours. For 
example, marking and preparation often require that teachers work a considerable number of 
hours after official working hours. Important to bear in mind then is that unclear first of all 
whether the number of hours reported by teachers are their official working hours or the number 
of hours they actually worked, and second of all whether the calculated hourly wage for 
teachers accurately captures their remuneration on an hourly basis.  
The analysis is conducted using real wages. Real values were calculated using a CPI deflator 
with 2000 as the base year. It is important to note that earnings captured in 2010 are implausibly 
high, even when deflated to 2000 prices.8 This is apparent in the constant term observed in 
table 4 below. 
Table 1 below presents the number of teachers and non-teachers9 in the data, by year.  
                                                          
8 Inconsistencies are observed amongst respondent in the 2010 QLFS (Q3) who reported the actual amount of 
their earnings as well as the income category into which their earnings fell. For example, respondents reporting 
that they earned R5 000 per month also reported that their earnings interval was R8 001 to R11 000. 19.92% of 
earners reported both the actual amount they earned as well as the income category into which their income fell. 
Stats SA has never clarified why this is the case.  
9 Table 1 presents the number of all non-teacher workers, including non-teaching professionals. For 2000 to 2007, 
the totals presented in table 1 are pooled across the March and September release of the LFS. For 2010, wage data 
was only made available in one quarter of the QLFS. There, the totals presented for 2010 are from one quarter of 
2010 only.  
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TABLE 1: Number of teachers and non-teachers 
Year Teachers Non-Teachers Percentage of Sample that are Teachers Total 
2000 606 791 14 375 968 4.05 14 982 759 
2001 612 438 14 618 009 4.02 15 230 447 
2002 639 828 14 537 369 4.22 15 177 197 
2003 853 307 14 505 334 5.56 15 358 641 
2004 846 808 14 745 809 5.43 15 592 617 
2005 880 953 15 498 690 5.38 16 379 643 
2006 853 247 16 271 182 4.98 17 124 429 
2007 946 320 16 961 273 5.28 17 907 593 
2010 403 554 7 932 889 4.84 8 336 443 
Source: LFS 2000-2007 
 
Data for the years 2000 to 2007 are pooled for the sake of succinctness. Individual models run 
for each of these years reveal only very slight differences in the results obtained, suggesting 
similar data generating processes across these year. The variables included in the Mincerian 
wage function are presented in Appendix A, along with a table containing their summary 
statistics. 
The summary statistics indicate that teachers have acquired higher levels of education than 
their counterparts in non-teaching professions. The values of experience (and therefore 
experience squared) are almost identical for the two groups and some 76 percent of teachers 
are union members compared to just 27 percent of non-teachers. The teaching force is 
considerably more female than non-teaching professions, with 64 percent of teachers being 
female versus just 41 percent in the non-teaching professions. Teachers have on average also 
remained with the same employer for longer than have non-teachers, with teachers having an 
average tenure of 11.68 years in comparison to 7.10 years for non-teachers. In terms of the 
racial composition of the two groups for which data are presented, the black and Indian 
component is almost identical for both teachers and non-teachers, the coloured component has 
more non-teachers than teachers (11 percent of non-teachers are coloured compared to 6 
percent of teachers), and the white component has more teachers than non-teachers (24 percent 
of teachers are white versus just 16 percent of the non-teachers).  
With the exception of the wage simulations presented in subsection 3.3, the analysis in this 
chapter is conducted for workers with at least 12 years of education. It compares teachers to all 
non-teachers in the labour market, as well as to non-teaching professionals. Teachers are 
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defined as teaching professionals and associate teaching professionals in primary and 
secondary schools.  Specifically, the group includes primary education teaching professionals 
and associate professionals and secondary education teaching professionals and associate 
professionals. 
A list of non-teaching professionals, as defined in the LFS and QLFS, is presented in table A3 
in Appendix A. 
3.1 Wage Differentials 
In order to determine whether or not teachers are well-paid, one possibility is to investigate the 
wages that teachers receive relative to the wages that they might have received in non-teaching 
professions. The gross (unadjusted) wage differential is a very basic measure of this 
relationship and reflects differences in wages that result from differences in both the 
remuneration structures for teachers and non-teachers, as well as differences in the productive 
endowments of members of both groups (Hernani-Limarino, 2005:68-71). The gross wage 
differential is calculated as 
         𝐺𝑇𝑁 = (
?̅?𝑇
?̅?𝑁
) − 1          (1) 
where ?̅?𝑇 is the mean hourly wage of teacher and ?̅?𝑁 is the mean hourly wage of non-teachers. 
Equation 1 is approximately equal to the mean log wage differential: 
         𝐺𝑇𝑁 ≈ ln(𝐺𝑇𝑁 + 1) = ln(?̅?𝑇) − ln (?̅?𝑁)      (2) 
In order for the gross wage differential to provide any substantial meaning, the group to whom 
teachers are compared should share similar productive characteristics.  
Under the assumption of competitive labour markets, wages are understood to reflect the 
marginal product of labour. Wages are therefore a function of the worker’s productive 
characteristics and the returns that those characteristics fetch in the labour market. If we let 
?̅?𝑇𝑂 and ?̅?𝑁𝑂 reflect the mean wages received by teachers and non-teachers, respectively, and 
if they both face the same return structure for their productive characteristics, then the mean 
productivity wage differential is given by 
         𝑄𝑇𝑁 = (
?̅?𝑇𝑂
?̅?𝑁𝑂
) − 1          (3) 
Therefore, the part of the wage differential that can be attributed to differences in the structure 
of returns faced by teachers and non-teachers – the conditional mean wage differential – will 
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be calculated by the difference between the gross mean wage differential and the productivity 
wage differential: 
         𝐷𝑇𝑁 =  [(
?̅?𝑇
?̅?𝑁
) −  (
?̅?𝑇𝑂
?̅?𝑁𝑂
)] / (
?̅?𝑇𝑂
?̅?𝑁𝑂
)            (4) 
It is therefore possible to decompose the gross wage differential into 
        ln(𝐺𝑇𝑁 + 1) = ln(𝑄𝑇𝑁 + 1) + ln(𝐷𝑇𝑁 + 1)      (5) 
In other words, it is possible to decompose the gross wage differential into a part that is 
explained by differences in productive characteristics and a part that is explained by differences 
in the way that productive characteristics are remunerated for teachers and non-teachers.  
Table 2 presents wage differentials for teachers and non-teachers and for teachers and non-
teaching professionals, respectively.  
 
TABLE 2: Wage differentials between teachers, non-teachers and non-teaching 
professionals (2000–2007 and 2010) 
 
Gross gap 
(1) 
Productivity gap 
(2) 
Conditional gap 
(3) 
 2000-2007 2010 2000-2007 2010 2000-2007 2010 
Teachers and non-teachers 1.41 0.97 0.59 0.54 0.52 0.28 
Teachers and non-teaching professionals -0.30 -0.13 -0.02 0.08 -0.28 -0.19 
Source: Own calculations from LFS (March and September) 2000 –2007 and QLFS (2020), Stats SA 
 
From table 2 we see that wage differentials favour teachers when compared to all non-teachers 
in the South African labour market. However, when teachers are compared to non-teaching 
professionals, teachers perform worse for most measures of wage differentials. As explained 
earlier, the conditional gap represents the portion of the overall wage differential that is 
attributable to differences in the remuneration structures faced by teachers and non-teachers. 
The negative conditional gap in favour of non-teaching professionals suggests that these 
professionals face a more attractive remuneration structure in the sense that the remuneration 
they receive for their productive characteristics are higher than those received by teachers.  
Comparing teachers to all other non-teachers, we observe a positive wage gap that favours 
teachers, which is associated with the higher levels of human capital endowment amongst 
teachers relative to this larger sample (of non-teachers, rather than non-teaching professionals). 
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The negative productivity gap relative to non-teaching professionals for the 2000 to 2007 
sample is associated with the observation that non-teaching professionals are in fact better 
endowed in terms of human capital than their teaching counterparts. This appears to reverse in 
favour of teachers in 2010.  
While examining wage differentials is useful to understand what is happening at the mean, it 
may also be useful to investigate how the distribution of teacher wages compares to that of 
non-teachers in the labour market. Following Gustafsson and Patel (2009:14), boxplots for real 
hourly wages have been plotted for teachers and some non-teaching professionals, allowing for 
an (admittedly superficial) investigation into how teachers’ earnings compare with those of 
others in the labour market. Figures 1 and 2 present the boxplots for the 2000 to 2007 period 
and for 2010, respectively.  
 
FIGURE 1: Boxplots of log real hourly wage (2000–2007)  
 
Source: Own calculations from LFS (March and September) 2000–2007, Stats SA  
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FIGURE 2: Boxplots of log real hourly wage (2010)  
 
Source: Own calculations from QLFS 2010, Stats SA 
 
It is interesting to observe that in the 2000 to 2007 data, the range of real hourly wages for 
teachers is largely comparable to what may be thought of as “lower order” professions. In 
comparison to professions that are considered “prestigious” in the South African context (and 
largely internationally, too), teachers’ hourly wage rate is slightly lower. We also see that the 
range of wages for teachers is narrower than it is for most other professions, highlighting the 
absence of large wage returns in the teaching profession. Again with the exception of 
individuals employed in the police force, merchants and potentially designers, teachers being 
paid the greatest wage on an hourly basis (excluding outliers) still receive hourly wages below 
that of all other professions included in the figure. 
The picture is similar for 2010, the range of teacher wages appearing to be smaller than those 
for most other professions included in the analysis. The position of teachers relative to non-
teaching professionals in the labour market remains more or less unchanged.  
Boxplots comparing the annual earnings of teachers with those of other professionals are 
presented in Appendix A. Figures A1 and A2 indicate that the annual earnings of teachers are 
largely in in line with those of a lower tier of professionals, such as nurses as opposed to a 
higher tier of professionals such as accountants, doctors and lawyers.  
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This raises the question of who should teachers be compared to when we try to find out whether 
or not teachers receive adequate pay. How would teachers classify themselves in terms of 
where they are positioned on the spectrum of professionals, and is this reflected in the 
remuneration structure they experience?  It seems likely that teachers compare themselves to 
other professionals in terms of remuneration, given their level of education.   
In order to compare the remuneration structure of teachers with that of non-teaching 
professionals in the South African labour market, the analysis is extended to investigate the 
returns to labour market characteristics. This is done in the following subsections. 
3.2 Local polynomial smoothed lines 
 
The local polynomial smoothed line is a line fitted to the data using weighted least squares. 
More weight is given to the points nearest to the point for which the response is being estimated, 
with points further away from that point receiving less weight. Such a local polynomial 
therefore enables us to observe the relationship between experience and wages without 
imposing any functional form on it, so we can see whether or not the remuneration structure of 
teachers is fundamentally different to that of non-teachers and non-teaching professionals. 
Figures 3 and 4 present the local polynomial smoothed lines for the relationship between wages 
and age – the age-wage profile – for the pooled 2000 to 2007 dataset and for the 2010 data, 
respectively.  
 
FIGURE 3: Local polynomial smoothed lines for age-wage profile (2000–2007) 
 
Source: Own calculations from LFS (March and September) 2000–2007, Stats SA 
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FIGURE 4: Local polynomial smoothed lines for age-wage profile (2010) 
 
Source: Own calculations from QLFS (March and September) 2000–2007, Stats SA 
 
The age-wage profile for teachers in the 2000 to 2007 data indicate that after age 40, returns to 
age appear to flatten out. This appears to be the case for all groups of workers in the economy 
and not exclusively for teachers. However, even when the returns to age are increasing for 
teachers, the slope of the profile in figure 3 indicates that it is increasing at a slower rate than 
is the case for non-teachers and non-teaching professionals. Figure 4 shows quite a different 
story for teachers in 2010. The slope of the age-wage profiles is steeper for teachers over most 
of the age range, flattening over the rage of roughly 42 to 55 years of age, and then increasing 
rapidly again thereafter. It therefore appears that in terms of returns to experience, the situation 
for teachers has improved somewhat in terms of the relationship between age and earnings.  
Local polynomial smoothed lines are useful to look at the shape of the age-wage profile across 
different groups of workers. However, they are purely descriptive and do not control for 
differences in characteristics across different groups of workers. Multivariate analysis is 
required in order to isolate the effect of different productive characteristics on wages. This is 
conducted using Mincerian wage functions in section 3.3. 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
25 
 
3.3 Mincerian wage functions 
 
The Mincerian wage function investigates the return to productive characteristics in the labour 
market (namely educational attainment and potential labour market experience) and takes the 
form  
         log 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 =  𝛽1(13 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +
 𝛽2(15 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +  𝛽3(16 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +
 𝛽4(17 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +  𝛽5( 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑥 13 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +
 𝛽6(𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑥 15 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +  𝛽7(𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑥 16 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +
 𝛽8(𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑥 17 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +  𝛽9(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) +
 𝛽10(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
2) +
 𝛽11(𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑥 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) +
 𝛽12(𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑥 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
2) +  𝛿𝑋 + 𝑒    (6) 
in which β1 to β12 indicate the impact that education, experience and its squared term have on 
hourly wages as well as whether this differs between teachers and non-teachers in the South 
African labour market. X is a vector of worker characteristics10, and δ is a vector of the impact 
that these characteristics have on the log of hourly wages.  
Table 3 presents the coefficient obtained for regressions run for pooled data for all the years 
between 2000 and 2007 (column 1), and for 2000, 2007, and 2010 (columns 2, 3 and 4 
respectively).  
TABLE 3: Regression estimates for augmented Mincerian wage function on log hourly 
wages (2000–2007 and 201011) 
VARIABLE 
2000 – 2007 
(1) 
2000 
(2) 
2007 
(3) 
2010 
(4) 
13 yrs education 0.530*** 
(0.006) 
0.478** 
(0.023) 
0.631*** 
(0.016) 
0.335*** 
(0.007) 
15 yrs education 0.907*** 
(0.009) 
0.803*** 
(0.031) 
1.080*** 
(0.025) 
0.472*** 
(0.011) 
16 yrs education 1.053*** 
(0.012) 
1.059*** 
(0.043) 
1.390*** 
(0.030) 
0.568*** 
(0.018) 
17 yrs education 1.227*** 
(0.027) - 
1.383*** 
(0.050) 
0.582*** 
(0.020) 
13 yrs education x teacher -0.139*** 
(0.032) 
-0.145 
(0.119) 
-0.104 
(0.079) 
-0.137*** 
(0.035) 
                                                          
10 These characteristics include race, sex, marital status, the industry in which workers are employed and the 
province in which they are employed. 
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15 yrs education x teacher -0.417*** 
(0.035) 
-0.328** 
(0.128) 
-0.357*** 
(0.089) 
-0.242*** 
(0.039) 
16 yrs education x teacher -0.562*** 
(0.037) 
-0.817*** 
(0.136) 
-0.651*** 
(0.091) 
-0.288*** 
(0.048) 
17 yrs education x teacher -1.183*** 
(0.089) - 
-0.680*** 
(0.192) 
-0.532*** 
(0.070) 
experience 0.045*** 
(0.001) 
0.048*** 
(0.003) 
0.033*** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
experience squared -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
experience x teacher 0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
experience squared x teacher 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
female -0.164*** 
(0.005) 
-0.197*** 
(0.018) 
-0.150*** 
(0.013) 
-0.109*** 
(0.006) 
married 0.153*** 
(0.005) 
0.153*** 
(0.020) 
0.155*** 
(0.014) 
0.076*** 
(0.006) 
teacher 0.338*** 
(0.047) 
0.425** 
(0.165) 
0.108 
(0.096) 
0.074 
(0.054) 
constant 1.174*** 
(0.020) 
1.229*** 
(0.069) 
1.403*** 
(0.053) 
2.782*** 
(0.100) 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.440 0.402 0.510 0.344 
No. of Observations 105 897 8 340 15 033 28 860 
Source: Own calculations from LFS (March and September) 2000–2007 and QLFS 2010, Stats SA. Race, province, year and 
industry are controlled for in these regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate that 
coefficients are significant at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The results in table 3 present important information in terms of the productive characteristics 
of teachers and how they are remunerated in the labour market. The regressions are run for 
workers with more than 12 years of education and education dummies are included for workers 
with 13, 15, 16 and 17 years of education. The education dummies are then interacted with a 
dummy variable taking a value of 1 for teachers and 0 otherwise, in order to indicate whether 
returns to education differ significantly for teachers in comparison to non-teachers. The same 
is done for experience and its squared term in order to investigate whether the returns to labour 
market experience differ for teachers and non-teachers. In terms of labour market returns to 
education, table 3 indicates that teachers are initially better remunerated than the non-teachers 
investigated here at relatively low levels of education and experience, but that these gaps 
decrease with higher levels of education, as reflected in the negative and coefficients for 
interaction effects that grows in size with more education. This highlights the fact that in terms 
of returns to educational attainment, the teaching profession is least attractive to individuals 
with higher levels of education. The size of the negative teacher effect remains fairly stable 
across time.  
In terms of the returns to experience for teachers versus non-teachers, the quadratic term 
introduced to account for possible non-linearities makes it difficult to interpret the effect of 
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experience on earnings by simply analysing the coefficients. The returns to experience have 
therefore been graphed for the results obtained in columns 2, 3 and 4 in figures 5, 6 and 7 
respectively.  
 
FIGURE 5: Returns to potential experience (2000) 
 
Source: Own calculations from LFS (March and September) 2000–2007 Stats SA 
 
FIGURE 6: Returns to potential experience (2007) 
 
Source: Own calculations from LFS (March and September) 2000–2007 Stats SA  
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FIGURE 7: Returns to potential Experience (2010) 
 
Source: Own calculations from QLFS 2010, Stats SA 
 
The figures illustrate the relative flatness of the experience profiles for members of the teaching 
profession in comparison to those of non-teachers. In 2000 the returns to experience for 
teachers are below those of non-teachers at all levels of experience, and the teacher 
disadvantage appears to grow at higher levels of experience. In 2007, the returns to experience 
amongst teachers are higher than amongst their non-teaching counterparts until roughly 28 
years of labour market experience, after which they decrease rapidly. Interestingly, it appears 
that in 2010 the difference between teachers and non-teachers in terms of returns to experience 
is in favour of teachers at all levels of experience. However, after 25 years of experience returns 
for teachers start to decrease, therefore narrowing the gap between the groups. A steeper 
gradient on the profile indicates that teacher pay increases at a faster rate as teachers gain more 
experience, but also that the returns to experience amongst teachers fall considerably faster 
than those of non-teachers at higher levels of education. Yet, returns to experience for teachers 
across all levels of experience are higher than they are for non-teachers. This suggest that 
despite evidence of little incentive in earlier years (i.e. 2000 to 2007) for teachers to remain in 
the teaching profession after a certain level of experience has been attained, it appears that 
returns to experience for teachers may have improved over the period 2008 to 2010.  
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An attempt to compare the attractiveness of wages for teachers and non-teachers across the 
range of educational attainment and potential experience is presented with a “profile” of teacher 
and non-teacher earnings drawn for different combinations of education and experience.12 This 
profile is drawn for the entire labour force, regardless of their level of educational attainment, 
as well as for individuals with at least 10 years of education. For this analysis, 10 years of 
education is chosen as this is the lowest level of educational attainment observed amongst 
teachers in the dataset. The objective is to analyse the level of education and experience at 
which teacher wages become more or less attractive, at the mean. The area shaded blue 
indicates the levels of education and experience at which teacher wages exceed those of non-
teachers, while the area shaded yellow represents the levels of education and experience at 
which non-teacher wages exceed those of teachers. The profiles are presented in figures 8 and 
9. 
 
FIGURE 8: Wage differential between teachers and non-teachers (2000–2007)  
Source: Own calculations from LFS (March and September) 2000–2007 Stats SA 
 
From figure 8 it may be seen that until 25 years of labour market experience, teacher wages are 
higher than those of non-teachers in the South African labour market for all levels of 
educational attainment. After 25 years of labour market experience, the wages of non-teachers 
become incrementally more attractive at higher levels of labour market experience. This 
                                                          
12 The coefficients of the Mincerian wage function for which these profiles are drawn is presented in Table A4 in 
Appendix A. Figures 8 and 9 are drawn using only the coefficients for Education, Experience and Experience2.  
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provides evidence of the unattractiveness of the age-wage profile in terms of returns to 
experience for the teaching profession while also highlighting the attractiveness of the 
profession for younger labour market participants. 
FIGURE 9: Wage differential between teachers and non-teachers with at least 10 years 
of education (2000–2007) 
Source: Own calculations from LFS (March and September) 2000–2007 Stats SA 
 
Figure 9 presents the profile for non-teachers with a minimum of ten years of educational 
attainment, therefore comparing teachers to a more educated sample of workers in the South 
African labour market. It is clear that for individuals with more than 14 years of education, 
teacher remuneration is never more attractive than that received by non-teachers (in terms of 
returns to productive characteristics), regardless of the level of labour market experience. For 
individuals with 14 years of education, the teaching profession is more attractive than non-
teaching professions only for the first 6 years in the labour market, while for workers with 13 
years of education the teaching profession remains more attractive until 28 years of labour 
market experience.  
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the relative unattractiveness of the teaching profession for workers 
with higher levels of education. We can see that in figure 9, drawn for a more educated sample 
of non-teachers, the teaching profession is almost always less attractive than non-teaching 
professions, while in figure 8 it is only at higher levels of labour market experience that the 
teaching profession becomes less attractive.  
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The analysis so far has highlighted the fact that teachers’ productive characteristics are not 
rewarded as attractively as those of non-teachers in the labour market. What if teachers’ 
productive characteristics were remunerated in the same way as those of non-teachers? Would 
the distribution of teacher wages be higher or lower than that of their non-teaching 
counterparts? This is investigated using a Lemieux decomposition.  
3.4 Lemieux decomposition  
 
This decomposition technique is used to create a counterfactual wage distribution for teachers 
and non-teachers in the South African labour force. The Lemieux decomposition used in this 
paper may be understood to be a generalization of the decomposition technique first introduced 
by Oaxaca and Blinder in 1973 (Lemieux, 2002). The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
decomposes the difference in the mean wage between two groups into the component explained 
by differences in productive characteristics and into an “unexplained” component (i.e. a 
component resulting from differences in how productive characteristics are remunerated 
between the two groups in question, or “discrimination”). 
Decomposing the wage gap at the mean involves estimating the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
wage regression 
 yit = btxit + uit           (7) 
where yit is the log hourly wage of individual i belonging to group t (in this case to the group 
teachers), xit is a vector of covariates, bt is a vector of parameters and uit is an error term 
constructed to have a mean of 0 and to be uncorrelated with the covariates in the vector xit 
(Lemieux, 2002). The sample average outcome y for teachers is therefore  
 ?̅?𝑡 = 𝑥?̅?𝑏𝑡            (8) 
where  ?̅?𝑡 =  ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑡  𝑦𝑖𝑡 1  
and      𝑥?̅? = ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑡1  𝑥𝑖𝑡 . 
 
The outcome for individuals belonging to the second group in the sample (in this case non-
teachers) is estimated by 
 yin = btxin + uin                   (9) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
32 
 
where yin is the log hourly wage of individual i belonging to group n (i.e. non-teachers), xis is a 
vector of covariates, bs is vector of parameters and uis is an error term constructed to have a 
mean of 0 and to be uncorrelated with the covariates in the vector xis. The sample average 
outcome y for teachers is therefore  
 ?̅?𝑛 = ?̅?𝑛𝑏𝑛                     (10) 
where  ?̅?𝑛 =  ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑛  𝑦𝑖𝑛 1  
and      𝑥?̅? = ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑛1  𝑥𝑖𝑛 . 
Calculating the difference between the mean outcomes of teachers and non-teachers therefore 
yields   
 ?̅?𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑛 = ?̅?𝑡 (𝑏𝑡 −  𝑏𝑛) +  𝑏𝑛(?̅?𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑛)                      (11) 
where ?̅?𝑡 (𝑏𝑡 − 𝑏𝑛) is the difference in wages arising from differences in the remuneration 
structures faced by teachers and non-teachers (i.e. the “unexplained” component) and 
𝑏𝑛(?̅?𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑛) is the difference in wages arising from differences in productive characteristics 
between teachers and non-teachers (Lemieux, 2002). 𝑏𝑛?̅?𝑡 may therefore be seen as the 
counterfactual mean value of y that would result if the remuneration structure of teachers was 
replaced with that of non-teachers. In other words, 𝑏𝑛?̅?𝑡 would be the wage prevalent for 
teachers if the “price” of human capital amongst teachers was equal to that experienced by non-
teachers in the labour market. 
The counterfactual wage for teachers is therefore  
 ?̅?𝑡
𝑎 = ?̅?𝑡𝑏𝑛                      (12) 
which may be used to rewrite equation 12 as 
 ?̅?𝑡 – ?̅?𝑛 = (?̅?𝑡𝑏𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑡
𝑎) + (?̅?𝑡
𝑎 −  ?̅?𝑛𝑏𝑛 ) = (?̅?𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑡
𝑎) + (?̅?𝑡
𝑎 +  ?̅?𝑡). 
Individual counterfactual wages are therefore denoted 𝑦𝑖𝑡 
𝑎 and are calculated as 
     𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑎 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑛 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝑥𝑖𝑡(𝑏𝑠 −  𝑏𝑡). 
?̅?𝑡
𝑎 may also be calculated by computing a sample mean of 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑎 : 
   ?̅?𝑡
𝑎 =  ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑡  𝑦𝑖𝑡.
𝑎
1                            (13) 
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In order to estimate what the entire distribution of teacher wages would look like (as opposed 
to just the mean wage), the probit for the probability of being a teacher is estimated on the 
pooled sample of teachers and non-teachers. The probit model produces the probability of 
being a member of the teaching force conditional on individual worker characteristics, or 
individual xs. 
 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 = 1 | 𝑥𝑖𝑡). 
The reweighting function is then calculated using the estimated probability of being a teacher 
as 
 𝛹𝑖 =  
[
1−𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑡
]
[
𝑃𝑡
(1−𝑃𝑡)
]
 
where Pt is the unconditional probability of an observed worker being a member of the teaching 
force, or the weighted share of the pooled sample who are teachers (Lemieux, 2002). The 
reweighted distribution or the counterfactual distribution is therefore  
 𝑦𝑡
𝑎 =  𝛹(𝑥𝑡𝑏𝑛) =  𝛹
′𝑦𝑛                         (14) 
where 𝛹′ =  
1
𝛹
 (Lemieux, 2002).  
The decomposition has been used by various authors to investigate wage distributions across a 
number of countries. DiNardo, Fortin & Lemieux (1996) used a precursor to the method to 
investigate the impact of labour market and institutional factors on the distribution of wages in 
the US. These authors explain that the technique provides a “visually clear representation of 
where in the density of wages these various factors exert the greatest impact” (DiNardo et al, 
1996: 1001). Using the technique, DiNardo et al (1996: 1009) are able to assess what wages 
would have looked like had particular factors taken on different values. “What would the 
density of wages have been in 1988 if workers’ attributes . . . remained at their 1979 level” 
(DiNardo et al, 1996: 1009). Shimizutani & Yokoyama (2009) analyse changes in the 
distribution of years of tenure in Japan’s long-term employment since the 1990s following a 
decade-long recession. The method is used because it allows for the decomposition of the 
changes into the part explained by changes in distribution of worker and firm attributes and the 
part explained by the effect of these attributes on workers’ tenure (Shimizutani & Yokoyama, 
2009: 318). Shimizutani & Yokoyama (2009: 318) examine what the distribution of worker 
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tenure would have been in 1995, 2000 and 2003 had worker and firm attributes remained at 
levels recorded in the 1990s.  
In this study, the technique compares the labour market prospects of teachers to those of non-
teachers in the South African labour market. The objective of the technique is investigate what 
the distribution of teacher wages would have looked like if they had the same productive 
characteristics as non-teachers or non-teaching professionals, and vice versa. Whereas the work 
of DiNardo et al (1996) and Shimizutani & Yokoyama (2009) create counterfactuals based on 
differences across time periods, the counterfactuals in this study are created across different 
groups of workers, namely teachers and non-teachers, or teachers and non-teaching 
professionals.  
The results obtained for teachers and non-teachers using this composition are presented in 
figures 10 to 15 below.  
 
FIGURE 10: Teachers and non-teachers,13 2000 
 
Source: LFS (March and September) 2000, Stats SA 
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FIGURE 11: Teachers and non-teachers14, 2007  
 
Source: LFS (March and September) 2007, Stats SA 
 
FIGURE 12: Teachers and non-teachers15, 2010  
 
Source: QLFS 2010, Stats SA 
 
Figures 10, 11 and 12 present re-weighted counterfactual distributions for teachers and all non-
teachers in 2000, 2007 and 2010, respectively. All three figures illustrate that if teachers had 
been remunerated according to the same structure as that faced by non-teachers, the distribution 
of wages would lie to the left of where it currently lies. Importantly, the counterfactual 
distribution is based purely on productive characteristics, suggesting inferior endowments 
amongst teachers relative to non-teachers.  
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FIGURE 13: Teachers and non-teaching professionals, 2000  
 
Source: LFS (March and September) 2000, Stats SA 
 
FIGURE 14: Teachers and non-teaching professionals, 2007  
 
Source: LFS (March and September) 2007, Stats SA 
 
FIGURE 15: Teachers and non-teaching professionals, 2010 
 
Source: QLFS 2010, Stats SA 
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Figures 13, 14 and 15 present the counterfactual distributions for teachers and non-teaching 
professionals. The left hand panel of the figures indicates that if non-teaching professionals, 
given their productive endowments, were remunerated according to the same structure as 
teachers, they would experience lower wages. If teachers, given their productive 
characteristics, were remunerated according to the salary structure of non-teachers in the South 
African labour market, they would experience a wage distribution that is roughly similar to 
their current structure, with the exception of the right panel in figure 13. From figure 13 it 
appears that had teachers been remunerated in 2010 according to the salary structure faced by 
non-teaching professionals, they would have received lower wages than what they received as 
teachers. This is an important observation, particularly when considered together with the local 
polynomial smoothed line presented for the age-wage profile faced by teachers in figure 4.  
3.5 Conclusion 
 
From the wage analysis above we can see that teacher wages are more similar to the wages of 
“lower order” professionals than they are to wages of individuals working in what might be 
considered “prestigious” professions. This is confirmed by the negative teacher premium for 
teachers when compared to non-teaching professionals. Furthermore, the level of returns to 
education and experience for teachers are considerably lower than they are for other 
professionals in the labour market.  
So how does one interpret the results obtained in the wage analysis? The fact that teachers 
receive relatively unattractive remuneration in comparison to non-teaching professionals may 
be explained by various situations. Firstly, it may be the case that individuals who choose to 
become teachers may have higher preferences for the non-wage benefits implied by the 
teaching profession. For example, they may be attracted by the job security, shorter working 
hours or perhaps simply a love of children and the activity of teaching. A second possibility is 
the perception that private sector wages are likely to be driven by productivity, inducing 
individuals with lower levels of unobservable productivity to enter the teaching profession. 
Finally, we may find that impatient individuals enter the teaching force as a result of the fact 
that teaching yields higher returns earlier in the life cycle. If the second of these explanations 
is in fact driving individuals to enter the teaching force, we have reason for concern.  
So who is entering the teaching force? Are individuals who choose to become teachers 
inherently less productive than those who choose other professions? Section 4 investigates 
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whether there are differences in the “productive potential” of individuals training to become 
teachers compared to those who are educating themselves in a different direction. It makes use 
of data on the grade 12 performance of university entrants into different faculties.  
4. Academic performance of future teachers 
 
This section provides a brief analysis of the academic ability (as measured by performance in 
grade 12 exams) of students enrolled for first year studies in Education (Bachelor of Education, 
or BEd) and in other fields in one university. The overall objective is to ascertain whether or 
not a notable difference in performance is observed for BEd students in comparison to students 
enrolled in other degrees, and if so, how BEd students perform relative to other students. 
4.1 Data 
 
The data used for this analysis were obtained from the University of Stellenbosch and contain 
information on the grade 12 marks obtained for each subject written by students enrolled in 
first year programmes at the university. For the purpose of this analysis, first language and 
mathematics scores were used to gauge student performance and to assess the extent to which 
BEd students differed from others.  
4.2 Performance across faculties 
 
The proportion of students who took higher grade mathematics as a subject in grade 12 as well 
as mathematics and language performance in grade 12 are used as proxies for the academic 
ability of students entering university. In terms of handling differences in performance on the 
basis of higher grade (HG) and standard grade (SG), the marks of students who wrote standard 
grade mathematics were weighted down by 0.25. Simkins16 (2010) explains that in terms of the 
National Senior Certificate (NSC) introduced in 2008, the department of education envisaged 
a mark of 40 percent for higher grade mathematics prior to 2008 to be equivalent to 50 per cent 
for the NSC mathematics. Similarly, a mark of 72 per cent for mathematics literacy was deemed 
equivalent to 50 per cent for mathematics under the National Senior Certificate.  
Mathematics marks were therefore adjusted according to the following formulas: 
                                                          
16 Prof. Simkins was commissioned to conduct a study comparing the Senior Certificate exams written prior to 
2008 and the National Certificate introduced in 2008. 
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 SG mathematics = 0.75 x HG mathematics 
 NSC mathematics = 0.8 x HG mathematics 
 Mathematics literacy = 0.44 x HG mathematics 
For students who took more than one language as a first language, the mean language mark 
across the languages was calculated. 
The proportion of students who took higher grade mathematics in grade 12 are presented in 
figures 16 for 2005, 2006 and 2007 combined. This is an admittedly crude measure of student 
ability. 
 
FIGURE 16: Percentage of students who took higher grade mathematics, 2005-2007 
 
Source: Data for students enrolled at the University of Stellenbosch in first year programmes 
 
From figure 16 it is observed that with the exception of the humanities faculty, the lowest 
proportion of students who wrote higher grade mathematics were those enrolled in the Faculty 
of Education. If we assume that higher-ability individuals are more likely to take higher grade 
mathematics than individuals with lower levels of ability, the data from figure 16 suggests the 
possibility of lower levels of academic ability amongst individuals enrolling for degrees in the 
Education Faculty.  
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An analysis of the distribution of marks for students enrolled in different faculties is presented 
in figure 17 and 18 for mathematics and language, respectively. 
 
FIGURE 17: Performance in mathematics, 2005-2009 
 
Source: Data for students enrolled at the University of Stellenbosch in first year programmes 
 
Figure 17 shows that the distribution of mathematics marks for students enrolled in the 
Education Faculty lies to the left of the distributions for students enrolled in most of the other 
faculties. At higher levels of achievement (roughly 75 percent and upwards), the distribution 
of education students lies below that of all other students. Similarly, at low levels of 
achievement (40 percent and lower), the distribution of Education students lies above those of 
students enrolled in most other faculties (with the exception of Humanities, which shows very 
low levels of achievement), indicating that the maths performance of students enrolled in the 
Faculty of Education is weaker than that of students enrolled in other faculties. Figure 18 
presents the distribution of marks for first language scores. 
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FIGURE 18: Performance in language, 2005-2009 
 
Source: Data for students enrolled at the University of Stellenbosch in first year programmes 
 
The distribution of marks for first language performance for Education students does not lie as 
far to the left as it does for mathematics. However, we see that the distribution for Education 
students at higher levels of achievement is below those of students enrolled in other faculties. 
The difference in performance does not appear to be as stark as it is for mathematics. 
Some evidence exists of weaker academic performance amongst students enrolled in the 
Faculty of Education relative to students enrolled in other faculties. It must, however, be 
acknowledged that the data used to obtain this result came from one university. It is therefore 
questionable whether these results are applicable to other institutions or to South Africa as a 
whole. Yet it still suggests that it may well be individuals with lower levels of academic 
achievement who are entering the teaching force – a worrisome prospect for a country facing 
such low levels of educational performance.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
This paper investigated the remuneration structure for teachers in the South African labour 
force and how this compares to that of non-teachers. In comparison to non-teaching 
professionals with higher levels of educational attainment, the remuneration structure of 
teachers is unattractive, but relative to all non-teachers in the South African labour market, the 
remuneration structure for teachers is more appealing. The wage profiles drawn in section 3 
revealed that teacher wages are attractive to individuals with lower levels of educational 
attainment, with the profession becoming less attractive as individuals enhance their level of 
educational attainment and as labour market experience increases. A worrying aspect of teacher 
remuneration in South Africa is the flatness of the age-wage profiles faced by teachers. 
However, it appears as if this may be changing slowly, becoming comparable to what is 
observed for individuals employed in other professions, therefore potentially eroding some of 
the relative unattractiveness of the wage structure faced by teachers. In addition, Irving (2012: 
394) explains that in South Africa’s apartheid era, teaching was considered an opportunity for 
upward social mobility in a labour market context in which certain race groups were not 
allowed to enter other professions. In 1986, teacher salaries were equalized along racial and 
gender lines and teaching therefore became a very attractive choice of profession for black 
South Africans, particularly for black women, given the rapid rise in salaries (Irving, 2012: 
394). However, since 1994 professional opportunities for black South Africans have expanded 
dramatically and skilled black South Africans qualified for positions from which they had been 
previously excluded. This is likely to have dramatically increased the opportunity cost of 
teaching relative to other professions (Irving, 2012: 394).  
 
The brief analysis of the academic quality of students enrolled for first year studies at the 
University of Stellenbosch revealed that students enrolled in the Faculty of Education perform 
somewhat worse than their counterparts in other faculties in mathematics, and to a lesser degree 
in language, too. If we assume that wages are driven by productivity, then this may explain the 
relative unattractiveness of teachers’ wage structure in comparison to that received by non-
teaching professionals. Either way, the prospect is worrisome for the South African education 
system. Further research to ascertain what motivates individuals to become teachers would 
prove extremely useful in understanding who is drawn to the teaching profession, and 
potentially also how high-ability individuals can be attracted to the profession. The current 
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remuneration structure relative to that of non-teaching professions seems unlikely on its own 
to ensure that top-ability individuals would follow a career in teaching. 
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Chapter 2 
Teacher incentives in South Africa: A theoretical 
investigation of the possibilities 
 
 
1. Introduction: Teacher quality in South Africa and the possibility of incentives 
 
For the country’s level of development and the proportion of the budget that is spent on 
education, South Africa performs substantially below what is expected of it in terms of 
educational performance (National Education Evaluation and Development Unit, 2012: 13). 
Performance amongst learners in this country is markedly worse that amongst learners in 
countries which are poorer than South Africa. In the third round of international tests conducted 
by the Southern African Consortium for the Measurement of Educational Quality (SACMEQ) 
in 2007, South Africa performed worse than most of the participating countries in both 
mathematics and language (Spaull, 2011a: 43), managing only to outperform Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Uganda, Malawi and Zambia. In reading, South Africa was tenth of the fifteen 
countries measured. In mathematics, South Africa ranked eighth out of the fifteen countries 
(Spaull, 2011a: 24). Educational quality in South Africa therefore leaves much to be desired.  
Poor teacher quality and low levels of teacher effort are often cited as major drivers of South 
Africa’s education crisis. The question then is why South African teachers are performing as 
poorly as they do. NEEDU’s National Report of 2012 suggests that teachers are unable to 
ensure high quality education for students either because they won’t or because they can’t 
(NEEDU, 2013: 20). Where teachers and schools won’t provide quality education, poor 
performance is the result of a lack of discipline amongst staff member and any remedial action 
should focus on changing behaviour. Where teachers can’t provide quality education 
intervention should focus on improving and enhancing the knowledge base of teachers to equip 
them with the skills necessary for quality teaching and learning to take place in classrooms 
(NEEDU, 2013: 20).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
45 
 
This chapter focuses on the potential to change teacher behaviour in a way that enhances 
student performance.  
Many argue that the lack of effort amongst teachers is the greatest hindrance to the development 
of student skills in South Africa, suggesting that the appropriate policy response should be 
directed towards designing attractive incentives for teachers. High levels of absenteeism from 
school and from classrooms, poor lesson preparation and lack of interest in the progress of 
learners are key signs that teacher effort is critically low in South Africa, and it is often reported 
that such low levels of effort result from weak incentive systems. 
This problem is not particular to South Africa. Low levels of teacher effort are observed 
internationally. Teacher motivation is often explained as being driven by factors other than 
financial incentives, for example a love of children, passion for their subject or a drive to 
interact with students. However, Bennell (2004: 16) points out that in economic conditions in 
which teachers and their families struggle to make ends meet, remuneration is likely to be a 
significant factor in motivating teachers and indeed in attracting individuals to the profession. 
Research in low income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia indicate low levels of 
teacher motivation. The cause of low levels of motivation vary by country, but factors such as 
low morale, lack of job satisfaction, low levels of incentives, and inadequate behavioural 
sanctions feature across education systems (Bennell, 2004: 22).  Furthermore, the expectations 
associated with teachers’ work are unrealistic given the environment in which teachers are 
expected to teach and live, the monetary rewards associated with teaching and the workloads 
with which they contend (Bennell, 2004: 20). Importantly, the conditions in which teachers in 
low income countries are expected to teach have special demands for which teachers may not 
be sufficiently trained. A prominent example is widespread multi-grade teaching in Sub-
Saharan countries – an exceptionally demanding skill. Most teachers are simply not prepared 
for the demands associated with such practices (Bennell, 2004: 21). 
International research findings indicate that an important source of service delivery failure in 
education is the teacher. The principal-agent problem in education is complicated because of 
the nature of service provision in education (Bruns, Filmer & Patrinos, 2010: 10-11). The 
interaction between teachers and learners is discretionary (in that it is the teacher’s own 
judgement that will determine what is taught and how it is taught), variable (in that teachers 
are required to tailor their teaching style to a diverse group of students) and requires repetition. 
It is exceptionally difficult to define beforehand what type of behaviour and actions teachers 
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must take. It is challenging therefore to write a contract according to which they are expected 
to conduct themselves as well as to monitor their behaviour (Green, 2011: 16).  
A further concern regarding the teaching force in South Africa and internationally is the rate 
of attrition. The non-pecuniary aspects of teaching (probability of employment, holidays, class 
sizes, status of the profession, to name a few) play a significant role in the decision to teach 
(South Africa Council of Educators (SACE), 2010: 4). It is important to understand what 
convinces teachers to leave the profession. The rate at which teachers leave the profession may 
be thought of as indicating the attractiveness of the teaching profession. Higher rates of teachers 
leaving the profession are intuitively associated with a less attractive profession. If highly able 
teachers are also the most likely to leave the profession, then high levels of teacher turnover 
have significant implications for teacher quality (Harris and Adams, 2007: 325). Important to 
consider when investigating teacher turnover is the proportion that can be attributed to 
retirement. In a country like South Africa, that has what can be considered an ageing teaching 
force, this may constitute a considerable proportion of teacher turnover. Indeed more than half 
of South African teachers (56%) were older than 40 in 2005 (Department of Education, 2005: 
61). More recent numbers obtained from government payroll data show that the modal age for 
teachers in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 is older than 40 years of age, and that this increases 
very slightly in each year. Age distributions for the years 2009 to 2012 are presented in figure 
19 below.  
FIGURE 19: Age distribution of teachers, 2009 – 2012 
 
Source: Persal October Downloads, 2009–2012 
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Harris and Adams (2007: 336) point out the importance of understanding the role of retirement 
in teacher turnover. In the USA teachers tend to retire earlier than workers in non-teaching 
professions, so if teacher turnover is to be used as a measure of the appeal and “health” of the 
teaching profession, caution must be exercised. 
Teacher turnover may also differ according to teacher specialisation. Murnane, Singer and 
Willet (1989: 32-33) find evidence in North Carolina that the median “lifetime” of secondary 
school teachers differs according to subject speciality, with chemistry and physics teachers as 
well as biology teachers having significantly shorter lifetimes within the schooling system than 
do their colleagues in English, social science and mathematics17. The authors explain that a 
possible explanation for this is the higher mean starting salaries for occupations in the field of 
physics, chemistry and biology (Murnane et al., 1989: 333). The authors have no persuasive 
explanation for the peculiar result that mathematics teachers have the longest median lifetime 
but suggest that this may be due a “mismatch” between the skills required amongst 
mathematics professionals in the business and industry and the skills acquired by mathematics 
teachers (Murnane et al., 1989: 334). They refer to computer skills as an example. Despite the 
fact that the results obtained are from a US context, there does appear to be evidence that the 
opportunity cost of teaching is higher for teachers of subjects that may be considered “scarce 
skills” in the sense that they are likely able to command higher remuneration in non-teaching 
professions.  
Falch and Strøm (2005) attempt to quantify the impact of non-pecuniary factors on teacher 
attrition in Norway18. This study is possible in the Norwegian context given the fact that teacher 
wage setting is completely centralized and schools may not offer wages different to what has 
been stipulated by teacher unions (Falch & Strøm, 2005: 612). This eliminates identification 
problems that may arise as a result of compensating wage differentials which means it is 
possible to interpret teacher behaviour as a response to non-pecuniary factors. They find that 
high proportions of minority students (i.e. non-Norwegian students) and special needs students 
are associated with a higher quit rate amongst teachers (Falch & Strøm, 2005: 628) and school 
                                                          
17 The observed lifetimes for chemistry and physics, biology, English, social studies and mathematics teachers 
are 5.9, 6.3, 6.5, 7.6 and 10.1 years respectively (Murnane et al., 1989: 333). 
18 Norway is admittedly a weak compactor country for South Africa. However, very few studies attempt to 
quantify the impact of non-pecuniary aspects in the form of school characteristics (i.e. student composition, 
school size) of teaching.  
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size is also positively and significantly associated with teachers quitting (Falch & Strøm, 2005: 
627). These results pertain to movements between schools within the same district, movements 
between districts as well as departures from the education sector.  
From an economic perspective, it may be difficult to measure the effect of non-pecuniary 
characteristics of teaching on teacher turnover in South Africa, as economics assumes that 
wages will adjust to reflect the non-pecuniary aspects of teaching. The Norwegian example is 
useful (and possible to measure) due to the fact that deviations from the national salary structure 
do not occur. This is not the case in the South African context. In South Africa, schools may 
offer teachers wages that differ from what has been stipulated centrally. Many schools employ 
and remunerate additional teachers or supplement the wages of teachers with privately raised 
funds. This differs somewhat from the Norwegian case.  
Hall, Altman, Nkomo, Peltzer and Zuma (2005) conducted a study into the reasons for teacher 
attrition in South Africa. The study was conducted in order to “determine the impact of job 
satisfaction, morale, workload and HIV/AIDS on South African teachers who are thinking 
about leaving the profession” (Hall et al., 2005: 5). The study was conducted on a nationally 
representative sample of 24 200 teachers from 1 766 schools across South Africa. Table 4 
below presents the reasons given for wanting to leave the teaching profession by those who 
indicated they considered doing so and the proportion of this group who stated the respective 
reasons. 
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TABLE 4: Reasons for wanting to leave the teaching profession 
FACTOR PERCENTAGE 
Teaching outside South Africa 4.1 
Teaching at a private institution 3.9 
Change to another career 24.6 
Go back to university/college to study something different 4.4 
Better salary 52.3 
Other 9.2 
Unknown  1.5 
Source: Hall et al., 2005 
 
Apart from higher remuneration, the most widely stated reason for wanting to leave the 
teaching profession was to pursue an alternative career path. A large proportion of teachers 
(more than three quarters of those wanting to leave the profession) cited lack of career 
development opportunities in teaching (Hall et al., 2005: 8). These proportions also varied 
according to the level of education attained by teachers, with better educated teachers more 
likely to state the lack of career development opportunities as reason to leave (Hall et al., 2005: 
9). 
A further drain on South Africa’s teacher supply is South African teachers opting to work 
abroad in other education systems. The poor image of the profession is often mentioned as one 
of the factors explaining teachers’ opting to work in other education systems (Centre for 
Development Enterprise (CDE), 2011: 12). Estimates of South African teachers leaving the 
country between July 1997 and July 2006 are at 10 000 South African teachers migrated to the 
United Kingdom alone (CDE, 2011: 12). 
It appears then that teaching in South Africa is not appealing from a professional point of view. 
Furthermore, the conditions in which a large number of teachers are expected to work are 
undesirable. So what can be done to attract highly able individuals to the profession? Aside 
from increasing teacher wages, how is it possible to convince people best able to affect student 
outcomes to the teaching profession? What type of incentives exist?  Incentives can be thought 
of as being comprised of two different types: incentives that are inherent to the teaching 
profession and those that are explicitly imposed on the profession. From a labour market 
perspective, incentives inherent to the teaching profession are those that exist in the wage 
structure faced by teachers discussed in chapter 1. Explicit incentives include incentive 
schemes rewarding good performance. To the extent that incentives may render the teaching 
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profession more financially attractive as well as present opportunities for professional 
development, they may discourage teachers who would otherwise leave the profession to stay.  
Many advocate the implementation of incentives for teachers as a possible channel through 
which to enhance student ability and skills development. An important motivation for 
implementing incentives for teachers is that they explicitly state the results that are valued by 
the education authority and therefore of teachers, thereby enhancing their accountability. The 
agreement between authorities and schools is enhanced because expectations with regard to 
service provision are explicitly specified. Bruns et al. (2010: 19-20) discuss pay-for-
performance as a possible avenue to provide incentives to teachers and ensure accountability. 
Pay-for-performance largely leaves the teacher salary scale untouched while creating 
incentives at the margin. Unlike salaries, this kind of incentive pay rewards teachers for what 
they actually do or achieve during a specified period, rather than for what their qualifications 
and training suggest they are capable of doing. The correlation between the observable 
characteristics of teachers and the level of achievement attained by their students is weak 
(Bruns et al., 2010: 20).  
Examples exist of incentive schemes which have succeeded in improving student performance. 
Ballou (2001) investigates the implementation of incentive schemes in private and public 
schools in the USA. Ballou finds that private schools employ incentive schemes for teachers 
more often than do public schools. Ballou (2001: 57) explains that different “market sanctions” 
are at play in the private school sector surrounding performance. Private schools’ survival 
depends on their ability to “retain the kinds of teachers that sustain the school’s reputation” 
(Ballou, 2001: 57). Schools place themselves at a significant disadvantage if they are unable to 
retain a staff of teachers considered by parents to be “cream of the crop”. Attracting highly able 
teachers through implementing incentive systems therefore renders a school attractive to 
prospective clients and ensures that enrolment is high. This aspect of incentives systems in 
private schools suggests that incentives may be experienced as beneficial for all teachers within 
a particular private school, resulting in private school teachers being more inclined to support 
the implementation of incentive schemes (Ballou, 2001: 57). In other words, in private school 
settings the prestige of the school is to some extent dependent on the perceived quality of the 
teachers. It seems then that when teacher quality is important, administrators make use of 
incentives. Ballou (2001: 60) concludes that it is not the nature of teaching that renders teacher 
incentives ineffective, but rather the conditions and incentives of the public school sector.  
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Figlio and Kenny (2007: 903) also find a positive influence of teacher incentives on student 
learning. They offer two possible interpretations for this result. The first is understanding that 
teacher incentives could result in higher levels of effort amongst teachers, which translates into 
improvement in student performance. The second is that schools that implement teacher 
incentives are most effective in unobservable ways, suggesting spurious results for teacher 
incentives (Figlio & Kenny, 2007: 903).  
Podgursky and Springer (2010) conducted a review on teacher performance pay in the US 
education system from kindergarten to senior secondary school and find an overall positive 
relationship between the use of teacher incentives and student performance, but they explain 
that there is less clarity surrounding the exact form that incentives schemes take.   
This paper examines the theoretical characteristics of incentive systems, detailing the potential 
for distortion as well as the conditions under which peer pressure is effective as an 
accountability- and performance-enhancing force. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
incentives in economic theory and specifically in education. Section 3 presents theoretical 
models of incentive systems and investigates the characteristics of such systems while section 
4 draws up a brief framework from the theoretical models presented in section 3 according to 
which international incentive systems are evaluated in section 5. Section 6 analyses the 
potential for the introduction of incentive systems in South Africa and explores incentives 
inherent to the South African teaching profession.  
2. Economic theory and incentives  
 
This section serves as an introduction to thinking about incentives in an economic context with 
specific reference to education. The objective is to sketch the broad framework in which the 
theoretical models of section 4 are situated.  
Research on the use of incentives in organizations generally makes use of an economic 
framework which analyses the difference in the objectives of different individuals who make 
up an economic organization. Specifically, the objective of the organization as a whole (which 
is characterized by the objective of the owner or “principal” of the organization) is contrasted 
with the objectives of workers within the organization, i.e. the objectives of the “agent”. 
Differences in these objectives imply that workers will not necessarily behave in a way that 
maximizes the objective of the organization as a whole or with the principal’s objectives for 
the organization, therefore rendering it less productive and worsening the situation for workers 
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in the long run by diminishing either productivity or employment. Incentives may therefore be 
used to encourage workers to work towards the objectives of the organization as a whole. 
A classic example of such incentives is what is referred to as a “piece rate” – a rate paid to 
workers based on their level of productivity or the number of “pieces” they produce as opposed 
to a salary based on the number of hours workers work. Increased profits will result from 
workers producing more per hour, so incentivizing this production directly may have a greater 
positive impact on productivity than would be the case if workers were paid by the hour (Hout 
and Elliott, 2011: 21).  
The efficiency of incentives is, however, very much dependent on the social relations that 
evolve around “piece work”. Complexities beyond simply paying for productivity instead of 
paying hourly arise when dealing with incentives, and these require some understanding of 
how incentives work in different contexts and for different people. Five complexities requiring 
attention are: 
1. Finding performance measures 
2. Different incentive effects on different people 
3. Uncertainty and control 
4. Effects of working in groups 
5. Weighing the costs and benefits of incentives. 
These complexities are each considered below. 
2.1 Finding performance measures to use with incentives 
 
In most jobs, output cannot be counted in any meaningful way, making it difficult to measure 
the contribution of each worker. Often the qualitative aspects of the job performed are more 
important than the aspects that can be quantified. The difficulties inherent in quantifying 
incentives are a major constraint to providing them, and the gap between the measures available 
for the measurement of incentives and the actual value of the output has important implications 
for the operation of incentives. “Objective” measures of performance obviously focus on the 
quantifiable aspect of the job at the expense of qualitative aspects, given the difficulty in 
measuring these. It is not surprising then that when incentives are attached to the quantifiable 
performance measures, workers focus on these aspects of the job and neglect those that do not 
affect the performance measure. This is problematic when performance measures are not 
closely aligned with the true value of the work being done. The performance measures are said 
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to be “distorted” when they result in behaviour that is detrimental to the true value of the 
organization or simply fail to enhance the value to the firm (Hout & Elliott, 2011: 22-23). 
Defining the underlying goals that performance measures should reflect can be highly 
problematic. In the case of education, schools are required to ensure that students meet some 
minimal standard of academic performance, but are also held responsible for developing 
cognitive skills, ensuring physical and emotional development, preparing students to enter the 
workplace and society and for students’ health and safety. Whilst these goals are not 
inconsistent they compete for limited resources, forcing schools to make difficult trade-offs. 
Ideally each goal would have one performance measure, but this is simply not practical to 
implement and so further trade-offs in the selection of performance criteria are needed (Dixit, 
2002: 712). Once performance measures have been selected, further decisions need to be made 
regarding how each performance measure will be weighted in the overall incentive scheme. 
Agreeing on a performance measure to be implemented is therefore a considerable challenge.  
A theoretical analysis (Baker, 2002 – discussed below) shows that more important than 
correlation between the performance measure and the value of the organization is whether 
behaviour that improves the performance measure also enhances genuine value; in the case of 
education, this would be genuine learning amongst students. This distinction is important 
because a performance measure may be correlated with a wide range of outcomes-absent 
incentives (i.e. high levels of the performance measure is correlated with high overall 
performance). However, once incentives are attached to the performance measure, behaviour 
that increases the performance measure at the margin may not enhance overall performance at 
all. This is known as “gaming” the system (Koretz, 2008: 24).  
In the field of education, the strength of incentives currently in place is not straightforward. 
Studies of cheating by teachers show that even when incentives are small, some teachers react 
quite strongly in a distorting way while others genuinely increase their level of effort (Hout & 
Elliot, 2011: 26). As mentioned before and as will be discussed below, the behavioural impact 
of a given incentive or set of incentives will cause different people to behave in different ways 
and will depend largely on the context in which individuals work.   
Incentives systems therefore inevitably have some level of distortion in them and so the 
objective of evaluating incentive systems is not to ascertain whether incentives exist, but rather 
whether the costs involved in minimizing the distortion are outweighed by the benefits of 
implementing the incentive system.  
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A possible alternative to using student test scores to evaluate teachers is requiring school 
principals to rank teachers according to their perceived performance. Some may again question 
the fairness of this measure given its subjectivity. However, Jacob and Walsh (2011: 447) find 
evidence that principals’ rating of teachers correlates strongly with teacher characteristics that 
are strong predictors of student performance. For example, they find positive associations 
between ratings and experience for the initial years of teaching, but no association for 10 years 
of teaching experience and higher. They find a negative association between teacher absence 
and ratings and positive correlations between characteristics of teachers’ educational 
background19 and ratings (Jacob & Walsh, 2011: 435)20. The authors admit that their analysis 
does not provide a direct link between ratings and student performance, but given the 
relationship between teacher ratings and correlates of teacher productivity, there is reason to 
be optimistic about the ability of principals to recognise teacher quality.  
2.2 Different effects of incentives on different people 
 
Economic theory postulates that different people are likely to respond differently to incentive 
structures. Amongst people for whom the target is easily attainable, incentives are likely to 
result in greater levels of effort relative to those for whom the target is difficult to achieve 
(Lazear, 2003: 186). This means that people who are able to reach the target are likely to be 
attracted to and remain at the organization while those who are likely to be unsuccessful will 
become discouraged and leave. This may enhance productivity since low-productivity workers 
will leave the organization and be replaced by more productive workers. An application of this 
to the area of teaching by Lazear (2003) applies a model in which teachers have different 
abilities to raise student test scores and produces the result that some teachers increase their 
effort while others leave the teaching profession. The fact that the teachers that left the 
profession are the teachers who are less able to raise test scores would be an enhancement in 
the overall effectiveness of teaching over time.  
A variation of this model is one in which teachers respond to incentives by either increasing 
effort or by increasing effort in test preparation (assuming test scores are the performance 
measures upon which the incentives are based). The performance for teachers engaging in both 
                                                          
19 Whether teachers majored in education, maths, English or social sciences (Jacob and Walsh, 2011: 440). 
20 Jacob and Walsh (2011: 447) point out that the association between principals’ ratings of teachers and attributes 
linked to higher student proficiency is stronger at the upper and lower end of the “ability distribution”. Principals 
seem less able to identify teacher quality in the middle section of the ability distribution.  
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forms of behaviour will increase student test scores, but actual learning will only take place 
amongst students taught by teachers in the first group. This type of distortion is discussed in 
detail in section 3.3.   
2.3 Effects of uncertainty and control in providing incentives 
 
In almost all jobs, a worker’s actual performance and the performance measure may be affected 
by factors outside of the worker’s control. In the case of pay-for-performance incentives, it is 
likely that payoffs received by workers as part of the incentive scheme will depend both on the 
workers’ effort and factors beyond their control. As a result, in situations where their pay is 
going to be affected by factors beyond their control, they will require compensation for this 
uncertainty in the form of higher levels of pay (Hout & Elliott, 2011: 27).  
Theoretical analysis shows that optimal incentive schemes will allocate less weight to measures 
that are more dependent on factors beyond the worker’s control (Baker, 2002: 3) since these 
incentive schemes require greater average pay levels in order to compensate workers for the 
greater level of uncertainty in their pay relative to what they might have received in another 
job (without incentives). Ultimately then, although productivity is enhanced by the use of 
incentives, the higher level of average pay that workers require is costly (Baker, 2002: 4-5).  
There are numerous factors beyond the control of schools and teachers that impact on student 
learning. In particular, characteristics of students’ home environments result in substantial 
variation in the performances of students and a student’s performance over time – one of the 
primary reason for the strong opposition to incentives based on student performance amongst 
teachers.  
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2.4 Effects of groups in providing incentives  
 
Trade-offs in performance available performance measures are inevitable in environments 
where the value of work done depends on cooperation amongst workers. Performance measures 
that consider only individual worker production will neglect the contribution made by 
individual workers to the productivity of the entire team, while measures of the productivity of 
the team will provide a vague and possibly inaccurate indication of an individual worker’s 
performance because they are determined by the contributions of the entire team. Whether 
team-level or individual-level measures of performance should be incentivized is dependent on 
the relative importance of cooperation and on the uncertainty inherent in such performance 
measures (Hout & Elliot, 2011: 30).  
Education is a prime example of a field requiring cooperation amongst workers. Research in 
fields other than economics points out the importance of understanding how schools function 
as organizations i.e. understanding the extent of cooperation required amongst teachers. For 
example, sociological research looks at understanding incentives in a setting where 
consequences are not explicitly defined, investigating how incentives are communicated in an 
informal way between workers (Meyer & Rowan in Hout & Elliott, 2011: 30. The combination 
of economic and other research indicates the importance of considering the impact of incentives 
beyond those directly relevant to the individuals within an organization. Furthermore, the 
degree to which work in done jointly and the degree to which the direct effect of incentives 
will be transmitted to other members of the organization must be considered (Hout & Elliott, 
2011: 31).  
An organizational structure as complicated as a school requires one to consider the different 
roles and interactions between individuals working at the school. There may well be value in 
incentivizing individuals relatively high up in the hierarchy who have the capability to transmit 
the incentives in ways that result in cooperative behaviour (or at least encourage such 
behaviour). It is important to note that the extent to which the diffusion of incentives is 
imperfect requires that the behaviour which one is trying to adjust, as well as the ability of 
members in different roles within the organization to adjust the behaviour, should be 
considered carefully.  
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2.5 Weighing the costs and benefits of incentives 
 
Ballou (2001: 51) examines teacher incentives in different settings (i.e. in the context of public 
and private schools) and provides a useful summary of some of the complications involved in 
implementing incentive schemes. He explains that the majority of literature on teacher 
incentives reports that they do not translate into long term improvements in student 
performance for a number of reasons. The first of these is that it is difficult to observe teachers’ 
output, largely because educational output is the product of cooperative behaviour and so the 
isolated contribution of any individual teacher is difficult to measure. Secondly, the 
relationship between teaching and learning is quite obscure and it is often difficult for those 
tasked with administering incentives to explain why one teacher qualifies for the incentive and 
others do not. It is therefore difficult to stipulate criteria for awarding incentives and teachers 
often become frustrated and disillusioned with the process. Thirdly, education output is 
difficult to measure. Awarding incentives based on observable measures of output may result 
in distortive “gaming” behaviour. Finally, incentives may create a culture of competition 
amongst teachers, resulting in non-cooperative and opportunistic behaviour – a situation that 
is likely to affect education outcomes negatively (Ballou, 2001: 51). It seems therefore that the 
ineffectiveness of teacher incentives is largely due to the nature of the process of education (i.e. 
how teaching is translated into learning) and the nature of the teaching profession. If the process 
of education was in fact what rendered incentives ineffective, then incentive systems would be 
used (or avoided) to the same extent in both private and public schools. However, if these 
systems are employed to differing extents across the public and private schooling systems, then 
it important to understand how differences between the two sectors affect the effectiveness of 
incentives (Ballou, 2001: 52).  
The fact that distortion occurs with performance incentives does not mean that they should not 
be used at all. Distortion will mean that it is more difficult to measure the benefits associated 
with incentives and that some parts of the organization may function less efficiently than they 
might have in the absence of incentives. It may, however, still be true that the benefits resulting 
from the implementation of incentives are greater than the costs. Improvement in cognitive 
skills is associated with improvements in income distribution, individual earnings and 
economic growth (Hanushek & Woessman, 2008) and an incentive system that produces true 
learning gains may well produce a sizeable net benefit. However, unless one accounts for the 
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level of distortion in such test-based incentives the size of the benefit is likely to be grossly 
exaggerated.  
Incentives can therefore prove useful in the context of education, despite the problems inherent 
in their implementation. Section 3 provides a theoretical analysis of incentives in the teaching 
profession.  
3. Theoretical models of teacher incentives  
 
Section 2 placed incentives in the context of economic theory and discussed some of the 
complexities involved in making use of incentives. This section looks at particular models of 
incentives in the context of teaching.  
3.1 Incentives based on input and output 
 
The payment of incentives on the basis of inputs or outputs is a central question in the literature 
on teacher incentives. The risk inherent in rewarding workers on the basis of what they produce 
means that output-based incentives are not always fair. As discussed above, this characteristic 
of output-based pay is particularly relevant in education. In some cases therefore, it may be 
necessary and preferable to reward workers on the basis of input. Lazear (2003) explains input- 
and output-based pay.  
3.1.1 Output-based pay 
 
The most important objective in an education system is the education of the population so as 
to ensure productivity, allowing individuals to generate skills and thereby an earning to sustain 
themselves and in turn generate economic growth. It may therefore be said that generating and 
developing earning capacity is the central objective of education (Lazear, 2003: 183).  
Earnings, however, are only observed some time after individuals have left the schooling 
system, rendering it impossible to determine teacher pay on this basis. As a result, student 
achievement test scores are usually used as proxies.  
When test scores are used as the basis for teacher pay, it is difficult to distinguish the increases 
in test scores resulting from teacher efforts and those resulting from the activities of others. 
Furthermore, improved test scores may result from distortive behaviour on the part of teachers 
as opposed to genuinely enhanced effort levels.  
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3.1.2 Input-based pay 
 
The advantage of paying workers based on input is that it removes the risk inherent in output-
based pay, therefore discouraging teachers from focussing exclusively on the performance 
metric according to which they are paid.  
Input-based pay may be seen as a solution to the problem of “teaching to the test”, or distortion 
in the context of the incentives literature (Baker, 2000; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). In the 
extreme case, a perfect measure of the disutility of working21 would be used as the measure 
according to which workers were paid. In this case, there would be no incentive to focus on 
one area of the curriculum at the expense of others. Teachers would receive full compensation 
for their efforts and would likely be willing to do what is in the best interest of their students, 
regardless of the level of effort required. Using disutility as the basis for compensation would 
ensure that teachers remained indifferent to which areas of the curriculum they emphasise and 
hopefully induce them to make sure that all areas are covered. This results from the fact that 
providing payment on the basis of disutility ensures that they receive enough to compensate 
them for teaching the “disagreeable” subjects.  
Input-based pay works well insofar as hours worked are a proxy for the disutility of teaching. 
However, when teachers care about what activities they engage in while teaching, input-based 
pay will no longer be effective at eliciting sufficient effort from teachers. The non-teaching 
labour market deals with this problem to some extent by compensating different occupations 
differently. Lazear (2003: 195) explains that “[institutions are prevented from] hiring 
professors of accounting at the same wage that can attract professors of organisational 
behaviour” due to the fact that “[the wage] difference is compensation for perhaps less pleasant 
or more difficult work”.  
3.1.3 What works better? 
 
The literature on teacher incentives favours output-based pay for two reasons. The first 
advantage (the “informational” part) is that output-based incentives clearly signal to teachers 
what is valued and required. The second advantage (the “alignment” part) ensures that the 
                                                          
21 It is assumed that different aspects of teaching or teaching different parts of the curriculum have different 
disutilities. 
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objectives of teachers closely parallel those of society as a whole. It may well be the case that 
teachers work hard, but that there is disagreement about which areas of the curriculum are 
important. By tying teacher compensation to an agreed-upon metric, it is possible to ensure that 
the education provided by teachers results in the accumulation of agreed-upon skills amongst 
learners (Lazear, 2003: 209). Finally, there may be some divergence between the preferences 
of teachers and the best interests of their students. Lazear (2003: 182-183) gives the example 
of teachers deciding against giving assignments because of burden of grading, even though 
they are fully aware that their students would benefit from completing the assignments. 
Therefore compensation based on students’ performance on the assignment may induce 
teachers to behave in a way that is beneficial to their students. 
If incentivising teacher performance is thought to be effective in enhancing the quality of 
education, then it is important to understand the mechanism through which the improvement 
is likely to occur. Section 3.2 explains two possible avenues of influence through which teacher 
incentives are likely to impact on student performance – an “incentive effect” and a “sorting 
effect”. 
3.2 Sorting versus incentive effects and the likelihood of success 
 
The “selection” aspect of compensation is arguably the most important aspect in the context of 
education. The individuals attracted by various compensation schemes determine the quality 
of individuals within a profession. It is widely accepted that teacher quality is critical to quality 
education and so the question of who is likely to enter the profession is crucial.  
When teachers are faced with an incentive based on student performance, they must improve 
student performance in order to be rewarded. Sorting refers to using incentives in order to 
attract individuals who are better able to improve test scores to the teaching profession, 
resulting in a teaching force that is better able to improve student performance. Payment based 
on output therefore attracts individuals who are best able to enhance student performance and 
may discourage weak teachers from continuing in the profession given the relatively lower 
levels of pay they will receive as a result of their inability to improve student performance. 
Sorting therefore results in better teachers replacing less able teachers. This differs from the 
effect of incentives, as in the case of incentives the individual is not replaced but adjusts his or 
her behaviour (Lazear, 2003: 187). 
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Teachers able to raise student performance therefore do better on a performance-based 
schedule while those unable to do so will do better on a fixed wage schedule. Pay based on 
student performance therefore favours teachers who are able to increase student performance 
relative to those who are unable to do so. 
Is teacher quality and teacher productivity therefore driven primarily by teachers’ innate ability 
or does the level of effort put into teaching influence the level of teacher productivity? Neal 
(2011) discusses the importance of distinguishing whether teacher quality is dependent on 
teacher effort, teacher ability or a combination of both. He maintains that it is only if teacher 
quality is a function (at least in part) of teacher effort that incentives are likely to influence 
student performance. Ignoring teacher effort as a contributing factor in educational quality 
counters much of the empirical literature on the subject of teacher productivity; if poor teachers 
are teachers who are unable to master the skill of teaching well, then incentive provision is 
unlikely to improve student performance in any significant way. However, if poor teachers are 
unmotivated and “lazy” teachers, then the introduction of well-designed incentives may well 
contribute to improved student performance. The extent to which teacher productivity is driven 
by effort determines to some degree the likelihood of success in the implementation of 
incentives (Neal, 2011: 8). 
It is undeniable that teachers vary substantially in their levels of productivity, in South Africa 
and internationally. The fact that differences in productivity exist says nothing about whether 
teachers provide efficient effort given their level of talent. Teachers may well operate according 
to different “effort norms”. It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether or not productivity is 
likely to change if effort is incentivized, and this means ascertaining whether or not 
productivity depends on teacher effort.  
3.3 Moral hazard and the risk of distortion 
 
“I come to the following pessimistic laws. . .: The more any quantitative social indicator is used 
for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt 
it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor” (Campbell, 1976). 
This section discusses the risk involved in incentivising teacher performance. It discusses the 
risk of encouraging sub-optimal behaviour and how this comes about with the introduction of 
incentive schemes.  
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3.3.1 Multitasking and the risk of distortion 
 
A criticism often levelled at performance-based incentives is that if incentives are used in order 
to encourage teachers to provide higher quality education to their students, teachers may 
improve test scores (according to which payments are made) without actually enhancing 
learning – behaviour known as distortion. Distortion may also occur when the sorting effect is 
at play. If we believe that education is valuable to individuals because of its impact on future 
earnings and we are using student test performance as a measure of learning, it may well happen 
that teachers who are able to increase student test scores without influencing their learning are 
drawn into the profession (Lazear, 2003: 187).  
Neal (2011: 10) uses a special case of the multi-tasking model of Holstrom and Milgrom 
(1991), a model often used to explain the behaviour of teachers in various merit pay schemes. 
Assume that in an education system teachers allocate their effort between two tasks. The 
amount of time the teacher allocates to task 1 and task 2, respectively, is denoted by t1 and t2. 
The human capital production function is given by 
   ℎ =  𝑓1𝑡1 +  𝑓2𝑡2 +  𝑒         (1) 
where human capital acquired by the student as a result of teacher effort is (h – e) (Neal, 2011: 
10). h denotes additional student skill and it is measured in dollars. f1 and f2 are constants and 
e is a random error term that captures factors affecting a student’s rate of learning beyond the 
teacher’s control. h, t1 and t2 are not observable by the authority, but the authority is able to 
observe a statistical measure of teacher performance p, 
𝑝 =  𝑔1𝑡1 +  𝑔2𝑡2 +  𝑣        (2) 
where g1 and g2 are constants and v is a random error influencing measured performance (Neal, 
2011: 10-11). v and e are shocks and are independently drawn with mean zero. They are also 
assumed to be independent of t1 and t2. The teacher’s utility function is  
𝑈 = 𝑋 − 𝐶(𝑡1, 𝑡2)         (3) 
where the teacher’s expected income is given by X and the cost associated with any pair (t1, t2) 
is given by C(t1, t2). An optimal compensation contract is designed by the education authority, 
given by  
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𝑤 = 𝑠 + 𝑏𝑝          (4) 
in which s is the base salary and the bonus measure b is paid according to the measure of 
performance p (Neal, 2011: 11). Given b, a salary s can be chosen to result in a given level of 
teacher effort based on some utility option U0.  
The optimal bonus rate solves 
max
𝑏
𝑓1𝑡1(𝑏) + 𝑓2𝑡2(𝑏) − 𝐶(𝑡1(𝑏), 𝑡2(𝑏))      (5) 
subject to 
[𝑡1(𝑏), 𝑡2(𝑏)] = arg max
𝑡1,𝑡2
         𝑠 + 𝑏(𝑔1𝑡1 + 𝑔2𝑡2) − 𝐶(𝑡1, 𝑡2)           
The optimal bonus rate therefore maximizes the difference between the human capital that 
results from the teacher’s actions and the cost to the teacher of those actions (Neal, 2011: 11). 
Teachers will respond to any bonus rate b by choosing actions that maximize utility given b. 
The cost function for teacher effort is given by 
𝐶(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =  0.5(𝑡1 −  𝑡1̅)
2 +  0.5(𝑡2)
2      (6) 
where 𝑡1̅ is a norm for the amount of effective instruction. This is considered fixed and not 
affected by the incentive system and so is taken as given in the calculation of the optimal 
incentive structure. Importantly, it is stipulated by the education authority and is therefore 
assumed to be observable by them. This assumption is relaxed shortly. From the cost function 
is can be shown that the optimal bonus rate is 
𝑏∗ =  
𝑓1𝑔1+𝑓2𝑔2
𝑔1
2+𝑔2
2 =  
‖𝑓‖
‖𝑔‖
 cos 𝜃        (7) 
with θ the angle between vectors (f1, f2) and (g1, g2) (Neal, 2011: 12).  
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FIGURE 20: Angle between vectors (f1, f2) and (g1, g2)
 
 
The formula for b indicates that the alignment factor θ is important for the optimal bonus rate. 
If the vectors are orthogonal, such that (f1 = 0, f2 > 0) and (g1 > 0, g2 = 0), then cos θ  = cos 90 
= 0 and b* = 0. In the case of perfect alignment cos θ = cos 0 = 1.  
3.3.2 The efficiency of incentive pay in education  
Neal (2011: 13) discusses whether the presence of at least some incentive pay is optimal in this 
model, i.e. whether b* > 0 is optimal. The version of the model presented above indicates that 
incentive pay is optimal as long as f1g1 + f2g2 ≠ 0. In cases where b* < 0, it is possible for the 
authority to institute b* > 0 by simply specifying a new performance measure p’ = -p.  
As long as all of the constants (f1, f2, g1, g2) are non-negative and at least three are strictly 
positive, then the condition that f1g1 + f2g2 > 0 will hold. In other words, as long as  
i) one of the teacher’s activities contributes to output as well as the performance 
measure,  
ii) the other task contributes to output or the performance measure or both, and  
iii) neither task is detrimental to either the performance measure or real output,  
then b* > 0 is optimal (Neal, 2011: 13). If t1 are activities that generate genuine increases in 
human capital, and t2 are activities that may be considered “gaming the system”, such as 
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teaching to the test or changing the answers of students before the assessment is graded, then 
it is widely assumed that the impact productive behaviour on genuine human capital 
accumulation amongst students is positive (f1 > 0), that this behaviour improves the 
performance measure (g1 > 0), that gaming behaviour improves the performance measure (g2 
> 0), and as long as gaming activities do not diminish human capital amongst students, then 
their impact will not diminish human capital amongst students (f2 ≥ 0). Optimal policy should 
always then include b*> 0. The separability of the cost function is an important assumption for 
this framework. b* is only optimal to the extent that teachers can consciously and willingly 
decide on the combination of t1 and t2, implying that they are able to distinguish between which 
of their actions genuinely enhance the skills of students and which of them simply enhance 
their performance measure. Without this assumption, the optimal policy of b*> 0 is not a robust 
feature of the multi-tasking model (Neal, 2011: 13).  
Given that education requires the time of both students and teachers, and given the restricted 
nature of students’ attention and energy, it may be worth considering cost functions that take 
the form  
𝐶(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = 0.5(𝑡1 + 𝑡2 − 𝑡)̅
2        (8) 
In this cost function, t1 and t2 are perfectly interchangeable and 𝑡̅ is a total effort norm that 
impacts on teacher costs. It is assumed that teachers choose t1 = 𝑡̅ and that t2 = 0 when no 
incentives exist. Given this setting, if the education system chooses b > 0, then teachers will 
choose t1 = 0 as long as g2 > g1 and as long as there are many combinations of 𝑡̅, f1, f2 and g2 
that would result in b = 0. So when f1 > f2 and f1𝑡̅ are baseline outputs, an incentive scheme 
that results in teachers substituting a small amount of t2 for t1 will lower human capital gains 
to students without affecting teacher remuneration costs (Neal, 2011: 13-14).  
However, if 𝑡̅ is low enough, the result may still be an increased total surplus. Since t1 can 
never be negative, the diminished output associated with the loss of t1 = 𝑡̅ may be compensated 
for by the benefits associated with increasing t2 far beyond 𝑡̅. Therefore, whether or not an 
optimal bonus rate (b*) exists depends on what type of instruction happens in the classroom 
(effective teaching or “gaming” behaviour) and on the norm 𝑡̅ within the education system 
(Neal, 2011: 14).  
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The nature of teacher activities denoted by t2 that result from the introduction of incentive 
schemes is important to consider, as well as the relative values of f2 and g2 given the assumption 
that g2 > g1. Equally important, however, is considering whether increased t2 activities result 
in increased teacher effort or whether it is simply substitution away from effective teacher 
behaviour t1. If teacher effort is directed away from effective teaching practices towards 
gaming behaviour, the effect this will have on learning depends on the level of productive effort 
initially. In education systems where very little effort was directed towards effective teaching 
practices, an increase in gaming practices will increase the overall performance of the system 
because of the overall increase in teacher effort. In education systems in which the level of 
effort devoted to t1 is high, incentives systems which result in less effective teaching practices 
and more gaming practices will result in a decline in the overall output of the system (Neal, 
2011: 14). For example, it may be argued that in a system where teacher effort is extremely 
low, a change from no teaching to “teaching to the test” still represents an increase in the 
amount of teaching and learning compared to what was happening before, albeit only in areas 
which are likely to be tested and therefore impact on the performance measure. Therefore the 
overall output of the education system has increased. However, in the case where effective 
teaching and learning are taking place and students’ skill bases are being expanded in all areas 
and not just those related to material likely to be tested, a movement towards “teaching to the 
test” and away from genuine skills-enhancing teaching will diminish the output of the 
education system. Furthermore, although it is possible to say that enhancing t2 in systems 
characterised by extremely low levels of 𝑡̅ may still enhance overall output of the education 
system, the long-term implications of encouraging such behaviour are significant and the 
development of a hard-working teaching force which contributes in a meaningful way to 
students’ skills development becomes less likely.  
The question is therefore whether incentive systems lead to improvements in student 
performance that result from increases in student skills, or whether the improvement in 
performance is the result of gaming behaviour which improves the measure of student 
performance without enhancing students’ skills to the same extent that quality skills-enhancing 
teaching would.  
3.3.3 Contamination and hidden actions 
Coaching is not an optimal allocation of teacher effort, but some positive skills enhancement 
may result from certain forms of coaching. Indeed if coaching reflects a reduction in leisure 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
67 
 
time on the part of teachers rather than a reduction in effective teaching time, then teacher 
performance under an incentive scheme may well be enhanced relative to what it would have 
been under an accountability programme alone. However, teachers respond in ways other than 
coaching that constitute what Koretz (2008) refers to as cheating and which are unequivocally 
wasteful from the perspective of public welfare. 
Jacob and Levitt (2003) give evidence of behaviour of Chicago teachers that clearly constitutes 
cheating: the teachers altered the answers of the students on high-stakes22 assessments. This 
type of cheating is usually quite easy to detect because the performance of students being taught 
by cheating teachers is significantly out of line with their performance in other areas. In 
addition, the performance of these students reflected significant increases from the previous 
year, but only small increases (if any at all) in the year following the cheating.  
Figlio and Winicki (2005) present evidence from Virginia that on the day that an assessment 
took place, the sugar content of the meals given to students was increased. It appears that school 
officials were responding to literature on the positive correlation between academic 
performance and glucose intake. This is a prime example of agents’ behaviour which enhances 
their performance measure but does not actually have a real impact on skills enhancement.  
The multi-tasking model underlines the possibility that inefficient teaching behaviour may 
result from the implementation of incentive schemes. However, it also draws attention to the 
fact that in situations where the level of teacher effort is very low, even teaching practices that 
enhance only the performance measure may result in an overall increase in teacher effort, 
leading to an overall increase in welfare within the education system. In terms of the long term 
objectives of education (the improvement of students’ skills), it is clear that teaching behaviour 
that enhances the performance measure without actually altering the level of human capital 
generated amongst learners is undesirable. This emphasizes a problem with using measures of 
student performance as the basis upon which incentives are paid. The fact that it is susceptible 
to “gaming” highlights the difficulties faced by the education authority with regards to 
monitoring teacher responses to incentive programmes. A possible remedy to the issue of 
monitoring is the use of partnerships and peer pressure amongst teachers to elicit appropriate 
teaching behaviour in the presence of an incentive programme. Subsection 3.4 analyses the 
                                                          
22 “High-stakes” refers to the fact that either incentives are awarded or sanctions are imposed on the basis of the 
outcome of the assessments. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
68 
 
channels through which peer pressure and partnerships are likely to influence behaviour under 
incentive schemes.  
3.4 Peer pressure and partnerships  
 
The creation of partnerships and profit-sharing arrangements stems from the need for internal 
motivation which arises mainly because of the prohibitive cost of monitoring employees, as 
well as the problem of the the accuracy of observable performance measures. By rewarding 
and punishing workers as a team, sufficient incentive may be provided for workers to supply 
an adequate level of effort. The idea is that team members are in a better position to control 
and discipline one another while simultaneously having a real incentive to do so, given that the 
overall payoff and therefore their individual payoff is contingent on producing a level of output 
that is only attainable with a certain amount of effort from each individual worker (Kandel & 
Lazear, 1992: 802).  
This subsection explores the conditions under which peer pressure operates.  
3.4.1 Free-rider effects and peer pressure 
 
Suppose that a group of identical workers produces output f(e), so that output is a function of 
the individual effort of each worker ei. Therefore e is an N-dimensional vector of the levels of 
workers’ effort with N workers. f(e) is assumed to be non-separable in ei ensuring a reason for 
partnerships. This would be tantamount to saying that pupil education depends on the effort of 
all of their teachers and that overall effort is non-separable (Kandel & Lazear, 1992: 803). 
The cost of effort is denoted C(ei) with C` > 0 and C`` > 0. The worker seeks to maximize  
max
𝑒𝑖
𝑓(𝒆)
𝑁
− 𝐶(𝑒𝑖)         (9) 
with first-order conditions 
 𝑓𝑖(𝒆)
𝑁
− 𝐶′(𝑒𝑖) = 0.         (10) 
Efficient production requires the maximization of total surplus 
max
𝑒1,𝑒2,….𝑒𝑁
𝑓(𝒆) − ∑ 𝐶(𝑒𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1         (11) 
with first-order conditions 
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𝑓𝑖(𝒆) − 𝐶
′(𝑒𝑖) = 0    ∀ 𝑖.        (12) 
Given that C`` > 0, e*, the solution to (12), is therefore larger than e`, the solution to (10), for 
all N > 1. The level of effort chosen in a partnership is below the efficient level (Kandel & 
Lazear, 1992: 804).  
When effort is observable, the best solution would be to pay workers a + be where b = fi(e*). 
However, the root of the problem is the observability of effort. Payment on the basis of effort 
is therefore ruled out and we investigate the effect of peer pressure on effort. 
The “peer pressure” function is written as 
𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 =  𝑃(𝑒𝑖;  𝑒𝑗 , . . . , 𝑒𝑁 , 𝑎𝑖, . . . , 𝑎𝑁)      (13) 
The pressure felt by worker i is dependent on his or her own efforts (ei), the effort of peers (ej, 
. . . ,eN) and other actions taken by peers (ai, aj, . . . , aN). The actions of workers
23 have no 
effect on output, but they do involve some cost to the workers. Cost is therefore redefined as 
C(ei, ai). The general maximization problem for worker i then becomes  
max
𝑒𝑖,𝑎𝑖
𝑓(𝒆)
𝑁
− 𝐶(𝑒𝑖, 𝑎𝑖) − 𝑃(𝑒𝑖; 𝑒𝑗 , … , 𝑒𝑁 , 𝑎𝑖, … , 𝑎𝑁)     (14) 
Peer pressure differs from the cost of effort in the sense that it is social and dependent on the 
effort and actions of others, so it is to some extent external to the worker. That is, 𝑃(∙) is subject 
to manipulation by the group in which the worker works. C(e) is not. We may therefore think 
about C(e) as the exogenous part of the utility of effort (in the sense that it is determined 
independently of the effect that peer pressure may have on utility) and 𝑃(∙) as the part that is 
endogenous and cultural (Kandel & Lazear, 1992: 804). Introducing the peer pressure function 
is an attempt to explain differences in preferences and work ethics amongst workers. Making 
explicit assumptions about 𝑃(∙) allows us to make statements about the tastes that drive 
particular behaviour.  
The Cournot-Nash assumption that the actions of all other workers are taken as given is used. 
Each worker receives 
𝑓(𝒆)
𝑁
 in a pure partnership of size N. The actions of other workers (the 
a’s) are assumed to have no effect on P and are therefore set to zero. The worker’s problem 
becomes 
                                                          
23 These are discussed in more detail later. 
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max
𝑒𝑖,𝑎𝑖
𝑓(𝒆)
𝑁
− 𝐶(𝑒𝑖, 𝑎𝑖) − 𝑃(𝑒𝑖, … )       (15) 
with first-order conditions 
𝜕𝑓/𝜕𝑒𝑖
𝑁
−  𝐶1 −  
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑒𝑖
= 0         (16)  
given that ai is set to zero. 
Peer pressure implies that 𝜕𝑃/𝜕𝑒𝑖 < 0 (the disutility associated with peer pressure diminishes 
as workers exert more effort), which means that the level of effort that solves (16) is greater 
than the level of effort that solves (10). That is, effort is higher with peer pressure than without 
peer pressure. The 𝑃(∙) function implies that workers get utility from effort. This has only been 
assumed, however. Workers working in an environment in which peer pressure exists may be 
worse off because of it. Peer pressure may increase effort, but it does not necessarily mean 
higher utility because pressure itself is a cost that is borne by all firm members. Despite the 
higher output that results from peer pressure, workers may not enjoy working in a high-
pressured environment (Kandel & Lazear, 1992: 805).  
3.4.2 Creating peer pressure 
 
Considering the actions of organizations in the peer pressure function allows us to analyse how 
peer pressure is created and how partnerships result in higher effort levels.  
The effectiveness of peer pressure as a motivator is conditional on two things: first of all, the 
effort of member i must affect the well-being of other team members in order for them to have 
the incentive to exert pressure on him. Secondly, team members must be able to affect the 
choices of member i. Profit-sharing in some form (or sharing of the incentive in the case of 
teachers) is required in order for the first component to hold. If workers are paid straight 
salaries, their level of effort does not impact on the salaries received by any of their peers, 
removing the incentive for workers to exert pressure on their peers since they are not concerned 
with the level of effort they choose. Profit-sharing is therefore necessary for peer pressure to 
provide motivation for workers to influence their peers’ behaviour. However, it is not 
sufficient. Even if workers have reason to influence the behaviour of their peers, they need to 
be able to exert pressure for peer pressure to actually provide incentives. Both components are 
assumed to be created and manipulated to some extent by the education authority (Kandel & 
Lazear, 1992: 806).   
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Pressure can be classified as either internal or external. Internal pressure exists when workers 
feel disutility from hurting others, regardless of whether others are able to identify the offender 
or not. Sociologists call this “guilt”. External pressure or “shame” occurs when disutility is 
dependent on others being able to identify the worker hurting others. The lack of observability 
implies that only guilt or internal pressure will be an effective form of pressure. Shame or 
external pressure requires that workers are able to observe one another’s efforts. If aj denotes 
the monitoring ability of workers, shame requires aj > 0, while guilt would create pressure 
effectively for aj = 0. Therefore 
𝜕𝑃(𝑒𝑖;  𝑒𝑗, … , 𝑒𝑁 , 𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗 , … , 𝑎𝑁)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
< 0 
holds only when aj > 0 in the case of shame, but holds for aj = 0 in the case of guilt. The 
implication is that investment may be required to create guilt (Kandel & Lazear, 1992: 806 - 
807).  
Another aspect contributing towards the effects of incentives is empathy; if workers are 
monitored by people who are not members of the profit-sharing group, it is unlikely that 
workers will be motivated to behave efficiently.  
N* denotes the number of profit sharers that the individual cares about. The peer pressure 
function is defined P(ei, . . . , 0) = 0, indicating that if the individual worker does not care about 
any peers, there is no relevant pressure. The maximization problem then becomes 
max
𝑒𝑖
𝑓(𝒆)
𝑁
− 𝐶(𝑒1, … ) − 𝑃(𝑒𝑖, … , 𝑁
∗)       (17) 
where N is the number of individuals sharing the reward. N may consist only of members of 
the education authority. If workers do not empathise with them, then N* = 0, in which case P 
= 0 and peer pressure would be useless as a motivating force. Allowing only the individuals 
with whom workers care to share in the rewards results in maximum motivation. 𝑃(∙) therefore 
becomes endogenous in the sense that it becomes dependent on N*, and it may be worthwhile 
to invest some resources in altering 𝑃(∙) in order to improve incentives faced by teachers. The 
environment in which initial investments in loyalty are likely to be most effective and necessary 
is characterized by two features, namely the unobservability of workers’ efforts and the 
complementarity of production (Kandel & Lazear, 1992: 807 - 808). 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
72 
 
3.4.3 Mutual monitoring 
 
In addition to exerting effort, workers are able to monitor each other and are able to penalize 
other workers caught shirking. For now, the punishment is assumed to be nonpecuniary (so it 
takes the form of physical or mental harassment) (Kandel & Lazear, 1992: 811). In this case, a 
can be thought of as peer monitoring. The expected penalty of being caught shirking now 
becomes 
𝑃(𝑒𝑖;  𝑎𝑗 ,   … , 𝑎𝑛, 𝑁).  
All workers are considered to be identical and so the monitoring decision of worker k is 
identical to that of worker j, which means the penalty may be written 
𝑃(𝑒𝑖, (𝑁 − 1)𝑎𝑗). 
The assumption of identical workers in the output function implies that i’s maximization 
problem becomes 
max
𝑓(𝒆)
𝑁
−  𝐶(𝑒𝑖, 𝑎𝑖) −  𝑃(𝑒𝑖, (𝑁 − 1)𝑎𝑗)      (18)  
with first-order conditions  
𝑓𝑖(𝒆)
𝑁
−  𝐶1 −  𝑃1 = 0        (19a) 
and 
𝑁−1
𝑁
𝑓𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑗
𝜕𝑎𝑖
− 𝐶2 = 0.        (19b) 
 
The choice of monitoring level a for each worker must satisfy (19b), according to which other 
workers respond to worker i’s choice of a. Workers generally believe that their co-workers will 
respond to their increased monitoring effort. Differentiating (19a) with respect to aj will show 
the response of worker j’s level of effort to worker i’s choice of ai, given that the problem is 
symmetrical across workers: 
𝜕𝑒𝑗
𝜕𝑎𝑗
|
(19𝑎)
=  
−𝑃12
(
𝑓𝑖𝑖
𝑁
)− 𝐶11− 𝑃11
.               (20)  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
73 
 
The denominator of (20) is unambiguously negative, which means that the sign of the 
expression will be the opposite of the sign of the expected punishment, P12. The expected 
punishment is related to the accuracy of detection – an increase in monitoring will presumably 
increase the accuracy of the measurement of co-worker effort, in which case those workers’ 
levels of effort will increase, resulting in P12  < 0. P2 does not enter, indicating that simply 
increasing monitoring efforts has no effect on the level of punishment. It is the interaction of 
increased monitoring and increased effort that accounts for P12 < 0, and simply increasing 
monitoring without allowing for this interaction (i.e. the worker’s ability to avoid the higher 
punishment level by increasing their work efforts when co-workers increase their monitoring 
efforts) will have no effect. If we believe that increased monitoring will have no impact on 
worker efforts, then peer pressure loses its value as an incentive (Kandel & Lazear, 1992: 812). 
The success in using peer pressure to incentivise teachers depends on the measure of success 
of the education authority in creating “guilt” amongst teachers. As the model shows, the 
number of workers that the individual cares about or who will share in the profits will influence 
the level of effort contributed by the individual. In the context of education, we may understand 
this to mean that when an incentive is provided for a whole school and not just for individual 
teachers, it is likely that the monitoring activities of teachers will be effective in enhancing the 
effort levels of their peers. Important to acknowledge when peer pressure creates incentives for 
workers is that it is only likely to results in increased effort levels if joint performance 
evaluation (as opposed to relative performance evaluation) is used to measure performance 
(Che & Yoo, 2001: 526). With relative performance evaluation workers are compared to their 
colleagues and are relatively worse off when their colleagues perform well given that relative 
performance evaluation rewards the highest performing workers within the organization. It 
therefore compares co-workers and so increased effort from one worker will “disadvantage” 
their colleagues. Relative performance evaluation therefore penalizes workers when their 
colleagues succeed (Che & Yoo, 2011: 529).  
In settings where workers are likely to have “repeated interactions”, or settings in which long 
term contracts are in place, the implicit incentives created by joint performance evaluation may 
prove useful. The implicit incentives arise as a result of the fact that workers are rewarded on 
the basis of both their own performance and that of their colleagues (Che & Yoo, 2001: 529), 
so hardworking co-workers increase the likelihood of reward which is not the case under 
relative performance evaluation. Furthermore, the possibility that shirking in the current period 
may be “punished” with shirking by co-workers in the next period or at a later stage is “self-
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
74 
 
enforcing” in the sense that workers “punishing “ shirking co-workers in subsequent periods is 
not stipulated in any incentive contract and therefore does not need to be enforced by the 
education authority. Che and Yoo (2001: 231) explain that this is an endogenous characteristic 
of the relationship in a setting of joint performance evaluation and is likely to ensure that 
workers actually work (as opposed to shirk).  
3.5 Return to distortion 
 
The model discussed above indicates that introducing monitoring amongst teachers will in 
theory enhance their level of effort. However, it is not clear whether the expected increased 
earnings will result in an increase in human capital-enhancing teaching behaviour or behaviour 
that may be considered distortion. Therefore peer pressure does not necessarily result in 
improved long-term outcomes for students – the ultimate objective of implementing teacher 
incentives. Although peer pressure as an incentivising instrument may enhance the level of 
effort in a setting in which observability is limited, it does not remedy the problem of distortion 
in teaching behaviour.  
Which features of the theoretical models discussed above should therefore be considered most 
important to successfully incentivise teachers to enhance their students’ performance? Section 
4 puts together a brief framework of the characteristics that enable incentive systems for 
teachers to result in improved performance for their students. Section 5 then presents 
international examples of teacher incentive programmes and analyses them according to the 
characteristics mentioned in section 4.  
4. Characteristics of successful incentive programmes 
 
Three aspects of incentive programmes need to be investigated when evaluating the likelihood 
of success: whether or not incentive programmes are likely to improve student outcomes 
through sorting or through enhanced effort; the risk of distortion that arises with the 
introduction of incentive programmes; and, in the case of low observability of worker effort 
(which is certainly the case in the teaching profession), whether an internal source of 
performance monitoring and accountability can be utilised to provide incentives (i.e. peer 
pressure). Each of these is discussed briefly below. 
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4.1 Sorting versus incentives 
 
Whether or not incentive programmes are likely to result in improved performance depends on 
whether the programme results in higher levels of effort amongst teachers (assuming that 
increased teacher effort will result in improved student performance) or whether individuals 
better able to enhance student performance will be drawn to the teaching profession. Whether 
incentive programmes are likely to result in sorting or enhanced effort is an important question 
to consider because it is possible that the introduction of incentive programmes may have 
negative implications for poorly performing schools. Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor and Diaz (2004) 
examine this question in detail, using data from North Carolina. This aspect is discussed in 
more detail in section 5.  
4.2 Potential for distortion 
 
Another aspect to consider is the likelihood of distortion. The extent to which the introduction 
of incentives results in genuine improvements in learning as opposed to improvements in 
performance measures as well as the long term effects that incentives will have on student 
learning are important considerations. Neal (2011: 14) points out that even distortive behaviour 
may be a net gain in the case of extremely low productivity, in other words that teaching to the 
test may be better than no teaching at all. The risk for gaming behaviour as well as potentially 
short-term benefits should be investigated.  
4.3 Possibility for peer pressure 
 
The likely success of using peer pressure to incentivise teachers is dependent on teachers being 
able to monitor one another as well as being able to impose a penalty on workers who are found 
to be shirking. The combination of monitoring and penalising is important for this method of 
incentivising to be effective. Importantly, it requires that incentives be provided for the school 
and not for individual teachers.  
How do incentive systems measure up internationally when evaluated according to the features 
highlighted in this section? Do they result in sorting or in enhanced teacher effort, and does 
this in turn result in improved student performance? Where improvement occurs, is this 
genuine human capital development or is it the result of gaming behaviour by teachers? Do the 
incentive systems in place enable the use of peer pressure as an incentivising mechanism? 
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Section 5 discusses incentive systems used in India, Israel, Kenya, Brazil, Chile, the USA and 
Finland, and analyses whether they are likely to fulfil the criteria outlined above. 
5. International examples of incentive programmes 
 
As mentioned above, this section discusses incentive systems implemented internationally. The 
last three incentive systems discussed in this section – those of the USA, Chile and Finland – 
are not analysed in terms of the framework laid out in section 4, but serve as examples of the 
risks associated with implementing incentive programmes (USA); the success with which 
pragmatic incentive programmes can be implemented in the context of a developing country 
(Chile); and the potential benefit that comes from incentivising the teaching profession through 
factors such as selectivity, prestige and relatively attractive compensation (Finland).  
5.1 Andhra Pradesh, India (2005 – 2007)  
 
A random control trial (RCT) conducted in India is an example of performance pay on an 
individual level based on student learning outcomes. In this study, individual teacher bonuses 
were awarded in 100 schools, bonuses were awarded to groups of teachers in 100 schools, an 
extra contract teacher was provided in 100 schools and a school grant was awarded to 100 
schools. A further 100 schools were also included as a comparison group. The study was 
conducted over 2 years, and performance bonuses were promised to teachers at the beginning 
of the following school year (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011). Bonuses were awarded to 
any teacher or school managing to increase student test scores by at least 5 percentage points, 
with higher increases being awarded with larger bonuses. Individual and group-level bonuses 
were paid at the beginning of the next school year, and block grants and extra contract teachers 
were provided unconditionally at the beginning of the school year. 
At the end of the two year programme significant differences existed between individual- and 
group-level bonuses, as well as between schools receiving teacher bonuses and those receiving 
either block grants or extra contracted teachers. Individual incentives increased student 
performance on tests by 0.27 standard deviations (roughly 9 percentage points) in comparison 
with an increase of 0.16 (roughly 5 percentage points) for group incentives. Input strategies 
(block grants and extra contracted teachers) also improved student performance, but by a 
substantially smaller amount – 0.08 standard deviations. 
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During the study teachers were monitored by observers through unannounced classroom visits 
as well as interviews (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011: 67). Teachers were monitored 
during 20 to 30 minute classroom observations in which enumerators coded whether or not 
certain actions took place in the classroom from a position at the back of the class, without 
interfering with proceedings. Teachers were then interviewed about their teaching methods and 
practices. The interviews took place at the end of the school year after testing had taken place 
but before results were available. Teachers were asked open-ended questions about how their 
teaching practices differed over the school year (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011: 67 – 
68). Although differences in classroom observations were not significant between treatment 
and control schools, teachers teaching in schools which received the incentives were 
significantly more likely to have given extra classes after school hours, to have focussed 
additional attention on weaker students, to have assigned more class work and more homework 
and to have given more tests as practice for exams. It is true that self-reported behaviour is less 
credible than classroom observations. However, the authors found a positive and significant 
relationship between teachers’ self-reported behaviour and the performance of their students, 
suggesting that the teachers’ reports were credible (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011: 68). 
They conclude that although there was no difference in the proportion of teachers captured as 
“actively teaching” by classroom observers, it is likely that teachers increased the intensity of 
their teaching efforts (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011: 69).  
This study therefore provides evidence that teacher effort was enhanced by the introduction of 
incentives. The brief framework constructed in section 4 lists three criteria according to which 
incentive systems can be evaluated; whether incentive systems are likely to improve student 
performance through sorting in the teaching profession or enhanced teacher effort or both, 
whether incentive systems are likely to introduced distortion into teacher behaviour and 
whether peer pressure is a likely channel through which incentives can be implemented. 
Evaluating the incentive system introduced in Andra Pradesh according to this framework 
reveals that the incentives were effective in enhancing student performance through enhanced 
teacher effort. From the reported results it is difficult to see whether the performance gains 
were long-lasting and reflecting genuine skills development, or short term and reflecting an 
improvement in the performance measure. Although the gains were observed at the end of both 
years in the programme, students were not tested after the incentive programme had ended, and 
therefore it is not clear whether the effects of the programme outlasted its duration. The fact 
that teachers reported higher levels of practice tests and more extra tuition suggests that 
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“coaching” may have been responsible for enhanced student performance. However, an 
increased focus on weaker students indicates higher levels of effort directed towards improving 
student human capital. Regarding the ability of group incentives to render peer pressure a viable 
channel through which incentives can be implemented, it is not clear whether teachers in Andra 
Pradesh used any kind of pressure or punishment to achieve increased effort levels. What we 
can see is that individual level incentives improved student performance by a greater margin 
than group level incentives, indicating that individual level incentives were more effective, 
although the group level incentives did also result in improvements in test scores.  
5.2 Israel (2001)  
 
Lavy (2009) presents evidence from a tournament-type bonus programme introduced in Israel 
in 2000. In 18 schools, teachers were ranked within schools based on their value-added 
contributions to the predicted matriculation marks of their students after controlling for 
socioeconomic characteristics, grade level, their level of study and school-level fixed effects. 
A control group of 18 schools was also included (Lavy, 2009: 1980). Teachers were ranked 
according to the deviation of the mean residual of the pass rate achieved by the students in their 
class, as well as the mean residual of the score that students achieved in various subjects (Lavy, 
2009: 1983). Students who did not take the examination were assigned a score of zero but not 
excluded from the sample. The four top-ranked teachers in each subject (English and Maths 
were the core subjects, with awards being offered in other optional subjects) received an award 
that amounted to a substantial proportion of their salary (25% for teachers ranked first, 19.2% 
for teachers ranked second, 11.7% for teachers ranked third and 5.8% for teachers ranked 
fourth) (Lavy, 2009: 1983). Significant positive effects on student achievement were observed, 
with increases observed in test-taking amongst high school seniors, average scores and average 
pass rates in both mathematics and English. Although test-taking was optional, students who 
appeared on enrolment lists but did not take the test were given a score of zero but not excluded 
from the sample, therefore diminishing the incentive to discourage weak students from taking 
the exam (Lavy, 2009: 1983). Furthermore, given that the incentive programme was only 
revealed to teachers in the middle of the year (December 2000, with exams being written in 
June 2001), it is unlikely that teachers were able to influence the composition of their classes 
in order to ensure a stronger group of students (Lavy, 2009: 1982 – 1983). Teachers in schools 
for which the incentives were offered reported interesting modifications in their behaviour 
compared to teachers in control schools. Teachers in treatment schools were significantly more 
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likely to track students by ability in the classroom (Lavy, 2009: 2004), to offer extra classes 
after school (Lavy, 2009: 2004) and to adjust their methods of instruction to the individual 
needs of the students (Lavy 2009: 2004). As a result, an increased proportion of students took 
the mathematics exam in schools in which the incentive was offered relative to to those in the 
control group.  
Interestingly, it was observed that teacher effectiveness (as measured by their success in 
obtaining the bonus on offer) was not correlated to their observable characteristics (such as 
education level, gender, age, years of experience or certification level) but was correlated to 
the calibre of university that the teacher had attended (Lavy, 2009: 2004-2005). A significantly 
higher level of effectiveness was observed amongst teachers who graduated from top-ranked 
Israeli universities in comparison to those who attended teacher colleges or less prestigious 
universities.  
This incentive programme is interesting to analyse in terms of the framework described in 
section 4. The results indicate that student performance did improve. Lavy (2009: 2004) reports 
that ability tracking, extra classes and focus on the specific needs of students was observed 
amongst teachers in both control and treatment schools, but that this behaviour was more 
prevalent amongst teachers who were offered the incentive. This suggests that the incentive 
programme encouraged increases in genuine effort and not merely “gaming behaviour”. It is 
therefore unlikely that improvements in student performance resulted from gaming behaviour 
(Lavy, 2009: 2004). The observation that teachers who qualified at more prestigious 
universities performed better is an interesting and potentially important one. If individuals with 
the ability to perform well academically were the ones who attended prestigious universities, 
this may well indicate that there may be a potential to draw high ability individuals into the 
teaching profession through substantial monetary rewards attached to performance, as they are 
most likely to benefit from such a programme. This provides some support to the hypothesis 
that teacher incentives may enhance student performance through a process of sorting.  
5.3 Kenya (1997) 
 
Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2010) present evidence from an incentive programme run in 50 
rural schools (with a control group of 50 schools) in Kenya. In-kind prizes (such as bicycles), 
which were valued at a significant proportion of a typical fourth to eighth grade teacher salaries, 
were awarded for improvements in average student performance over two years (Glewwe et 
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al., 2010: 14). The prizes were awarded as group incentives, and performance was measured 
as improvements in baseline test scores obtained in Kenya’s district-wide government exams. 
Prizes were awarded for “top-performing” schools and for “most improved” schools, schools 
being eligible for awards from only one of these categories. Three prizes each were awarded 
for first, second, third and fourth place, resulting in 24 out of 50 schools receiving prizes during 
the two years in which the programme was run. Teachers therefore felt that the reward was 
obtainable (Glewwe et al., 2010: 14).  
A higher proportion of students in schools for which rewards were available compared to 
control schools achieved gains in test scores. By the second year, an average gain of 1.4 
standard deviations was observed in treatment schools, with the largest effects being observed 
in geography, religion and history (roughly 0.34 standard deviations in the first year, and 0.20 
standard deviations in the second year of the programme), followed by mathematics and 
science (with improvements of 0.20 and 0.15 standard deviations respectively) (Glewwe, Illias 
& Kremer, 2010: 29). However, these improvements did not persist. Differences in test 
performance had disappeared a year after the programme had ended. Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer 
(2010: 33) speculate that the introduction of rewards resulted in a short-run focus on improving 
test performance. They suspect, for example, that teachers may have focused more on short-
term approaches such as increased coaching in test-taking techniques rather than an increased 
focus on pedagogical adjustments that may have resulted in longer-term learning gains. No 
evidence of behavioural changes was observed, with teacher absenteeism failing to decline 
over the period for which the rewards were offered (Glewwe, 2010: 20). There was also no 
evidence that more homework was assigned relative to the baseline year (Glewwe et al., 2010: 
21). However, during the second year of the programme, schools that were eligible for rewards 
were more likely (by 7.4 percentage points) to conduct extra exam preparation classes (Glewwe 
et al., 2010: 22). Interestingly, when researchers changed the format of the exam from the 
format in which the government exams were presented, there was no difference in the 
performance of schools who were eligible for performance bonuses and control schools, 
suggesting that the benefits of increased exam preparation classes was limited to performance 
in the government exam, i.e. the target that teachers were aiming at (Glewwe et al., 2010: 30). 
It did not extend to more general learning. The authors report that there was no evidence of 
outright cheating amongst schools who received the incentive (Glewwe et al., 2010: 26). 
However, the fact that there was no significant difference between the performance of students 
in schools who received the incentive and those who did not when students wrote a different 
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exam (one for which incentives were not provided) provides strong evidence that the improved 
student performance amongst students in the incentivised schools was probably not the result 
of genuine human capital development. Furthermore, the fact that improved performance did 
not continue after the termination of the incentive programme is a clear indication of the short-
term focus of teacher effort (Glewwe et al., 2010: 29). There is therefore strong evidence of 
distortion in this incentive programme. The incentive programme did achieve improvements 
in student performance on the performance measure, but not on any other measure. The 
increased efforts of the teachers seem to have been directed towards gaming behaviour. 
5.4 Pernambuco, Brazil (since 2008) 
 
The Brazilian government’s establishment in 2007 of the Index of Basic Education 
Development (IDEB) is central to Brazil’s incentive structure that awards schools for 
improvements in student performance as well as other characteristics. IDEB captures school 
performance on Prova Brasil test results (a national assessment conducted every two years for 
all fifth, ninth and twelfth grade students in maths and language) as well as administrative data 
on enrolment, repetition and grade promotion (Fernandes in Bruns, Evans & Luque, 2012: 9). 
Importantly, IDEB results are reported widely in the Brazilian media and targets for each 
school within the 26 state and 5564 municipal school systems have been established by the 
federal government.  
The state of Pernambuco implemented an incentive system in 2008 which rewarded school 
staff for the attainment of school improvement targets (Bruns, Filmer & Patrinos, 2010: 169). 
All teachers in schools achieving at least 50 percent of the target set by the federal government 
received bonuses proportional to their schools level of achievement. The size of the bonus is 
substantial by international standards since state education departments budget an additional 
month’s payroll for the programme each year, and so if less than 100 percent of schools achieve 
the bonus, the mean bonus for those who do receive it will be greater than an additional month’s 
salary. Schools achieving less than 50 percent of their target receive no bonus. School 
principals have no say in the distribution of the bonus, and the teachers in the school receive 
equal percentage bonuses on their monthly salaries (Parandekàr, Amorim & Welsh, 2008: 2). 
The initial targets are established according to the quartile of the performance distribution into 
which schools fall, with performance targets being more or less ambitious according to the 
quartile. The differentiation of targets allows for an analysis of how achieving targets in one 
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year impacts on the likelihood of achievement in subsequent years, as well as of how the 
achievement of targets and receiving a bonus is likely to impact on teacher behaviour 
(Parandekàr et al., 2008: 2). 
The programme was widely accepted by schools in Pernambuco, where 64 percent of school 
principals indicated that the programme was appropriate and 66 percent indicated that they 
experienced the policy as having a positive impact on their schools, regardless of whether or 
not they received the bonus. Furthermore, schools for whom targets were more ambitious 
achieved greater student progress than those with less ambitious targets. Indeed, learning levels 
across the state increased substantially, with language score improving for the eighth and 
eleventh grade by 0.44 and 0.57 standard deviations over the period of a year, respectively. As 
the programme was applicable across the entire state, these gains are raw score gains and not 
gains relative to any comparison group. Schools that narrowly missed achieving the bonus in 
2008 improved more in 2009 than did schools who barely achieved it. It therefore appears that 
not receiving the bonus improved school motivation and performance. Finally, schools in 
which teachers spent a larger proportion of time on instruction had a much greater likelihood 
of achieving the bonus (Bruns et al., 2010: 172).  
Overall, teachers in schools achieving bonuses spent considerably less time on activities other 
than teaching and were also observed (in unannounced visits to the school) to make greater use 
of classroom resources (Bruns et al., 2010: 166). However, because of a lack of a “control 
group”, the causality of “better” teacher behaviour cannot be inferred from the analysis 
conducted on the schools in Pernambuco. It is not clear whether the change in teacher behaviour 
reflects greater incentive to perform well or whether students in schools achieving the bonus 
are better students and easier to teach and manage. However, the fact that bonus achievers came 
from all parts of the performance distribution, including a substantial number of low-
performing and low-income schools, suggests that the performance bonus may well induce 
improved teacher behaviour (Bruns et al., 2010: 174).  
When the incentive scheme in place in Pernambuco is evaluated in terms of the framework 
introduced in section 4, it does not appear that sorting takes place. It is impossible to analyse 
whether individuals with higher ability entered the teaching profession. However, 
improvements were observed across the distribution of schools. This is probably the result of 
individualised targets for each school – a feature that should seriously be considered in the case 
of South Africa. When the possibility of distortion is considered, it seems fair to say that 
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increased teacher effort may be directed towards ensuring improvements on the performance 
measure according to which teachers are evaluated. However, the fact that the performance 
measures are not limited to student test performance eliminates the possibility of distortive 
behaviour to some extent. It is possible that principals were dishonest in the reporting of 
enrolment and repetition rates, but the fact that these elements are included in the IDEB 
performance measure mitigates the risk of distortion to the extent that performance is not 
measured exclusively according to the Prova Brasil test results. The potential to make use of 
peer pressure as an incentivising force is heightened by the fact that incentives are awarded to 
a school and not to individual teachers. However, whether or not teachers are realistically able 
to monitor each other’s behaviour and enforce punishment in the case of shirking is unclear 
from the results reported above. Group incentives do, however, heighten the probability that 
this will occur.   
5.5 Chile (since 1991) 
 
The System for Measuring the Quality of Education (SIMCE) was introduced in 1990 
(Gustafsson, 2006: 3). The objective of SIMCE is the identification of schools in special need 
of intervention. The test is conducted yearly and involves the testing of an entire grade 
(approximately 300 000 learners) in either grade 4, 8 or 10 (alternated cyclically), ensuring that 
each grade is tested every three years (Gustafsson, 2006: 3). Importantly, the tests are marked 
at a single national centre and reports on the performance of individual schools are made 
available to the public (Delannoy, 2000: 17). Schools are compared within their region and 
within their socioeconomic category. It is argued that this encourages school principals to over-
state the school’s poverty level, therefore enabling the school to compete against poorly 
performing schools. Furthermore, poorly performing learners may be discouraged from 
attending school on the day that the testing takes place (Delannoy, 2000: 17). Teacher 
incentives in the Chilean education system have been introduced in phases. The first phase was 
introduced in 1991 with the Teacher Statute. It introduced a system designed to reward 
continued service as a teacher. Part of the monetary incentives introduced in Chile in 1991 
were directed towards teachers in difficult-to-teach urban schools and remote rural areas 
(Gustafsson, 2006: 4). A 2003 regulation of the 1991 Teacher Statute details a 12 point index 
of school remoteness or difficulty, attaching various values to each indicator in order to 
ascertain the size of the incentive necessary to compensate for the remoteness and difficulty of 
the school. Provincial authorities then distribute earmarked funds as incentives through teacher 
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salaries to those teaching in the most remote rural and otherwise difficult schools (Gusstafsson, 
2006: 5).  
The National Performance Evaluation System (SNED) was introduced in 1996, according to 
which all teachers in a well-performing school are rewarded. SNED is conducted biannually 
and is heavily reliant on learner performance data provided by SIMCE. Schools are compared 
within regions (of which there are 13) and within socioeconomic groups (of which there are 5), 
resulting in 65 groups in which SNED comparisons are made. The top 20 percent 
(approximately) of schools in each group are considered to be outstanding performers and 
receive additional funding for 2 years, 90 percent of which is paid to teachers as a monetary 
incentive, and 10 percent of which is allocated to schools and which may be spent according 
to the schools’ own development plan. The money rewarded to teachers in outstanding schools 
amounts to approximately a month’s salary, effectively providing a thirteenth pay cheque for 
them (McMeekin, 2000: 12).  
SNED is based on a number of indicators and not solely on the learner performance data gained 
from SIMCE. These include value added (improvement in SIMCE scores since the last 
evaluation), school governance features and learner retention and graduation rates (Gustafsson, 
2006: 5). Roughly half of all schools have received SNED incentives at some stage which 
means that the perceived likelihood of receiving an award is quite high. Rau & Contreras (2009: 
24) provide evidence that student performance only improved in the portion of the schooling 
system which had received the reward.  Student performance in large parts of the Chilean 
schooling system is unaffected by the teacher incentives system in place. Further research is 
necessary in order to understand how best to design incentive systems in a way that affects a 
larger proportion of students (Rau &Contreras, 2009: 25). 
The Teacher Evaluation System was put in place in 2000. Evaluation occurs every four years, 
and involves four items: documentation from the teacher related to learner assessment, a series 
of the teacher’s lesson plans, reflective notes produced by the teacher and a 40 minute video 
recording of a lesson. University-based evaluators then assess the material and classify teachers 
as excellent, competent, basic or unsatisfactory (Gustafsson, 2006: 5). A number of non-
monetary incentives exist for good performance in the Teacher Evaluation System, one being 
the eligibility of good performers to participate in the Ministry’s overseas experiential learning 
programme.  
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The Pedagogical Excellence Award (AEP) was also introduced during this phase. This award 
is a monetary incentive and it is relatively independent of the Teacher Evaluation System. 
Teachers are divided into four segments according to their years of teaching experience, with 
teachers in the first segment having between 2 and 12 years of teaching experience, teachers in 
the second segment having between 12 and 21 years of experience, and so on. A quota of AEP 
is established for each region, and the competition involves teachers submitting a portfolio of 
their methodology and writing a test covering both subject content knowledge and 
methodology. Winners receive a monetary award roughly equal to a month’s salary for all the 
years in which they had been in their segment (Gustafsson, 2006: 6) Only a small group of 
teachers actually receive the award – 1500 received it in 2004 and 722 in 2005. It is clear, 
therefore, that the AEP has a very small reach. Teachers do not seem to consider it worthwhile 
to enter the competition. In addition to its role as an incentive programme, the AEP serves as 
a selection system for the Network for Teachers’ Mentors, which is a remunerated programme. 
AEP recipients may therefore be seen to have a double monetary incentive, namely the 
financial award received for good performance as well as the opportunity to earn additional 
money as part of the Network for Teachers’ Mentors (Gustafsson, 2006; Mizala & Romaguera, 
2004).  
Since 2005, teachers who achieve an “excellent” or “competent” rating on the Teacher 
Evaluation System can take a test administered on one day of the year at a national level (the 
same day as the AEP evaluations), according to which the Variable Allocation for Individual 
Performance (AVDI) is awarded for good performance. The AVDI amounts to between 
approximately 15 and 25 percent of the Minimum Basic National Pay. Teachers who are not 
yet eligible to be evaluated for AVDI may still apply for AEP (Gustafsson, 2006: 6). 
Finally, a very interesting and controversial incentive in place in Chile is the Demerit List 
system. According to this system, a teacher receiving unsatisfactory ratings in the Teacher 
Evaluation System for three consecutive years, despite having received rigorous professional 
support and the assistance of an assigned tutor, will be dismissed and will receive a dismissal 
package. Importantly, teacher unions have agreed to this (Gustafsson, 2006: 6).  
5.6 Incentive systems: What does the evidence say? 
 
The incentive systems discussed above all provide evidence that introducing teacher incentives 
results in improvements in the measured performance of students. In the case of Andra Pradesh 
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important adjustments in teacher effort were observed, although it is not possible to see whether 
the improved performance lasted beyond the duration of the incentive programme. An 
important result of the programmes is an increased focus on weaker students. In the case of 
Israel, teacher efforts were also found to increase. Interestingly, correlation between the 
positive effect of the incentive programme and student performance was observed most 
strongly for teachers from elite universities, suggesting the potential for more able individuals 
to benefit most from such incentive systems. Although improvements in the performance 
measure were observed after the introduction of teacher incentives in Kenya, the improvement 
could not be generalized to tests that were not included as part of the performance measure 
according to which teachers were rewarded. Furthermore, the improvement in test performance 
disappeared once the incentive system had been removed. Both of these observations suggest 
that gaming behaviour in the form of “teaching to the test” took place, rather than genuine skills 
development. The cases of Pernambuco and Chile illustrate the value of creating individualised 
incentives for schools. The fact that schools achieved improvements across the socioeconomic 
status distribution indicates the potential for system-wide improvement when the 
socioeconomic context of schools is taken into account. The Chilean example illustrates the 
possibility of introducing an element of fairness to incentive programmes by comparing 
schools within their socioeconomic status and within their region. In addition to ensuring fair 
competition, this also ensures that a large number of schools receive the award, therefore 
increasing the probability of receiving it. The fact that the AEP and the AVDI do not include 
measures of student performance may be perceived by teachers to increase the fairness of 
performance pay since their achievement is not affected by student performance which is 
widely known to be affected by numerous factors outside the teacher’s control. However, while 
this eliminates the possibility of teachers behaving in a distortive way in order to qualify for 
rewards, it also means that teachers are rewarded on the basis of inputs rather than outputs. It 
is therefore possible that despite the fact that teachers perform well on these measures, they 
may not be able to enhance student performance. The AEP and AVDI are nevertheless useful 
programmes to enhance teacher pedagogical and content knowledge.  
The two incentive programmes (from North Carolina in the USA and Finland) discussed below 
present examples of the potential risks and benefits associated with different incentive systems. 
The final example discussed – that of Finland – is presented as an example of an education 
system in which the absence of incentive pay does not compromise the performance of that 
education system.  
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5.7 North Carolina, USA 
 
Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor and Diaz (2004) present evidence from North Carolina in the United 
States of America. The purpose of analysing the accountability system introduced in North 
Carolina is to highlight some of the risks associated with the introduction of incentive systems. 
North Carolina introduced an accountability system entitled ABC (A for accountability, B for 
basic skills and C for local control) in the 1996 – 1997 academic year (Clotfelter et al., 2004: 
254). The accountability programme involves evaluating the gains in Maths and Reading scores 
from year to year, as well as the proportion of students performing at or above the grade 
appropriate level (Clotfelter et al., 2004: 255). Making use of the gain scores mitigates the 
disadvantages experienced by schools catering for students from low socioeconomic status 
communities, because it does not consider the level of test scores. Rewards are distributed at 
the level of the school, and a school’s performance is evaluated relative to its expected gain for 
each year. This is calculated by adjusting the state average for the initial level of proficiency 
of the school’s students as well as for mean reversion (Clotfelter et al., 2004: 255). A school is 
classified as having met its expected growth if the mean score of the students attending the 
school is at least as large as the calculated expected gain. Schools in which the mean student 
score is 10 percentage points higher than the calculated expected growth are classified as 
“exemplary”, and schools not reaching their expected gain are classified as either “no 
recognition” or “low-performing” schools. “Low-performing” schools differ from “no 
recognition” schools because in the former, less than 50 percent of students performed at the 
appropriate grade level, whereas in “no recognition” schools at least 50% of the students 
performed at the appropriate grade level (Clotfelter et al., 2004: 255). Growth standards are 
therefore school-specific and low-performing schools are those that reached neither their 
school-specific growth standard, nor the 50 percent of grade appropriate performance standard. 
Financial bonuses of $1500 are awarded to teachers in “exemplary” schools (Clotfelter et al., 
2004: 255). Schools results are made public on the ABC’s website.  
As mentioned earlier, this study provides interesting evidence of the potential negative 
implications of introducing incentive programmes. Clotfelter et al. (2004: 256) report that 
schools labelled as “low-performing” experienced a higher teacher turnover in the years 
following the introduction of the accountability system and subsequent classification. 
Interestingly, in weak performing schools in which less than 50 percent of students performed 
at the appropriate grade level but in which student test performance had met the expected test 
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performance (and who were therefore not labelled as “low-performing”), teacher turnover did 
not change (Clotfelter et al., 2004: 258).  
This example illustrates that labelling low-performing schools as such imposes additional 
“costs” on them in the form of higher teacher turnover. Higher teacher turnover makes it 
difficult to create continuity and momentum in reform efforts. This represents a challenge 
associated with rewarding some schools and not others: it may incentivise teachers to migrate 
away from weak performing schools towards better performing schools in which performance-
related rewards are more likely. The extent to which this is a real risk depends on the ease with 
which teachers are able to move in and out of schools, and the extent to which teaching posts 
are available in schools classified as exemplary.  
5.8 Finland 
 
The Finnish education system is characterised by a very high level of equality, with schools 
performing in the lowest decile achieving average marks higher than the OECD median. It is 
therefore clear that educational quality is high throughout the Finish education system (August, 
Kihn & Miller, 2010: 18).  
Selection into the teaching profession in Finland is highly competitive, and once candidates 
have been selected to enter the profession, they are required to obtain a master’s degree in a 
five-year programme. Students must fall within the top 20 percent of their secondary school 
academic cohort. Students qualifying to apply to teach are examined in a first round of 
screening, after which only the top performers are invited to write an exam based on education 
literature. This is a further round of selection, after which top performers in the second exam 
are interviewed and screened on “softer” skills in order to ascertain whether they are likely to 
excel in the teaching profession. This third round of screening includes a “micro-teaching 
exam”, in which students are evaluated in a classroom-like setting so that examiners are able 
to observe whether students work well with children (August, Kihn & Miller, 2010: 19).  
Compensation for Finnish teachers is surprisingly modest, with teachers earning approximately 
81 percent of per capita GDP (August, Kihn & Miller, 2010: 19). Performance pay and bonuses 
are not given to teachers. Graduate level training for teachers is paid for by the Finnish 
government, and students receive a living stipend. Interestingly, the complete absence of union 
politics within the Finnish teaching profession differentiates it quite substantially from the 
profession in other countries (Simola, 2005: 460).  
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Prestige is widely believed to account for the popularity of the teaching profession amongst 
top-performing students. Indeed, traditionally favoured professions such as lawyers, 
psychologists, physicians, engineers and journalists all trail teaching in terms of the number of 
applications at Finnish universities (Simola, 2005: 459). It is said that “people know that if 
you’ve been trained as a teacher you must be something really special” (Pasi Sahlberg in 
August, Kihn & Miller, 2010: 19). As a result of this signal of high quality emanating from the 
teaching profession, teachers have a substantial amount of autonomy in their work and are well-
trusted by the public and the political and economic elite (Simola, 2005: 460). Teachers have 
a significant amount of authority in school policy and school management, textbook selection, 
course content, student assessment and budget allocations within schools and importantly, are 
left to teach the prescribed curriculum in the way that they see fit (August, Kihn & Miller, 
2010: 19-20).  
5.9 Potential costs of incentive systems and alternative solutions 
 
The last two examples of international incentive systems (or in the case of Finland, a 
description of the factors that contribute towards the attractiveness of the teaching profession) 
have pointed out the possible risk associated with the introduction of incentive programmes to 
the teaching profession. In North Carolina the higher teacher turnover that resulted from the 
labelling of schools as low-performing schools with the introduction of the accountability 
programme had a negative effect that may not have been anticipated by the education authority. 
High teacher turnover makes it difficult to achieve any continuity and gather any momentum 
in school reform, therefore hindering the opportunity of these low-performing schools to 
improve their performance. This is a useful demonstration of the possibility that negative 
externalities may be associated with the introduction of incentives. In the case of North 
Carolina, “punishing” poor-performing schools may worsen their situation.  
The Finnish example illustrates the possibility of ensuring high quality teaching without 
offering pay-for-performance incentives. The prestige of the teaching profession in Finland 
ensures that it remains a highly selective profession, admitting only high performing 
individuals into teacher training courses. Possibly as a result of this selectivity, teachers enjoy 
a high degree of trust and respect and have a large degree of autonomy in how the curriculum 
is taught. The superior performance of the Finnish education system is a testament to the high 
quality of teachers in Finland. The degree of selectivity and prestige observed in the Finnish 
teaching profession may be what is required for the achievement of the performance standards 
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observed in that education system, and it is debatable whether their modus operandi is  
replicable in the context of a developing country context.  
Section 6 discusses incentives systems from around the world, from both developed and 
developing countries. The first five examples of specific incentive systems provide evidence 
of their impact on student performance and teacher behaviour, while the last two provide 
examples of the potential costs associated with implementing incentive systems as well as an 
example of incentives inherent in the teaching profession (as opposed to those introduced 
through the implementation of an incentive scheme). These inherent incentives provide an 
example of sorting into the teaching profession. Are incentives likely to be effective in 
improving educational quality? What lessons can South Africa learn from these examples? 
What can we learn from international experience?  
6. South Africa: where do we stand? 
 
This section explores the lessons that South Africa might learn from international experience 
and analyses of the incentives inherent in the teaching profession in this country. It looks at the 
prospects for professionalising the teaching profession as a means of enhancing accountability 
within the profession and it examines the performance monitoring system currently in place in 
the South African education system, the Integrated Quality Management System (IQMS).  
6.1 Lessons from international experience 
 
The first four incentive systems analysed in section 4 (those of Andra Pradesh, Israel, Kenya 
and Pernambuco) illustrate the possibility for improvements in student performance through 
the implementation of incentive systems. In all cases, measured student performance improved 
with the introduction of the incentive system and the authors of the various studies (with the 
exception of the Kenyan case) indicated that the improvements appeared to result from genuine 
increases in teacher effort. The only study in which results were reported when the incentive 
system was no longer running (the Kenyan example) showed, however, that improvements in 
performance did not persist beyond the time period of the incentive system. Whether or not 
improvements in test scores were the result of gaming behaviour or genuine increases in teacher 
effort is therefore debatable. It still appears as if there is something to be said for incentives for 
teachers based on student performance. 
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An interesting aspect of incentive systems in place in Brazil and Chile, and one that is pertinent 
to the South African context, is dividing the education system into subsections in the setting of 
incentives. In the case of Chile, schools compete within their regional socioeconomic 
categories. In the case of Pernambuco in Brazil, school targets are set according to where they 
perform on the performance distribution. Given the extent of inequality in South Africa, 
comparing schools across socioeconomic quintiles would be grossly unfair. The educational 
and socioeconomic backgrounds of both students and teachers render comparison within 
socioeconomic groups a much fairer format for incentives used in South Africa. An appealing 
feature of the IDEB targets in place in Pernambuco is that they account to some extent for 
school-specific characteristics by setting targets at the level of the school. Consideration for 
the different circumstances across schools is crucial in the context of South Africa and should 
be part of any incentive programme if at all possible. 
The unexpected outcomes of labelling poor performing schools as such are illustrated in the 
example of North Carolina’s ABC accountability framework. Attracting teachers to teach in 
undesirable locations is already a problem in South Africa. Labelling schools as under-
performing will probably exacerbate the problem, particularly if rewards are promised to 
teachers in schools that are publically recognised as performing well.  
The Finnish example of illustrates the possibility of ensuring a high quality teaching force 
without explicitly introducing an incentive system. One of the key elements in the success of 
the Finnish education system is the prestige associated with the teaching profession. Section 4 
details the competitiveness of teacher training courses in Finland, the high quality teachers that 
result from these courses and as a result, the high degree of trust and autonomy enjoyed by 
teachers. Perhaps the most startling feature of the teaching profession in Finland is the modesty 
of teacher wages relative to per capita GDP. This highlights the importance of the prestige 
associated with the teaching profession in ensuring a high-quality teaching force and brings to 
the light the “inherent” incentives in the Finnish teaching profession. .  
The following section analyses the consequences of the lack of incentives for teachers in the 
South African teaching profession. Ironically, whereas the prestige of the teaching profession 
in Finland results in the profession’s attractiveness despite the relatively low levels of 
remuneration, the relatively low levels of remuneration and prestige associated with the 
teaching profession render it a relatively less prestigious profession in the South African 
context.  
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6.2 Incentives inherent in the South African teaching profession 
 
Although this chapter deals predominantly with explicit incentive programmes implemented 
to enhance student performance, it is important to recognise the incentives implicit in the salary 
structure of the teaching profession. Earlier sections discussed the possibility of attracting high-
ability individuals to the profession through the implementation of incentives as part of an 
explanation for the “sorting” effect of incentives. Equally, if not more, important for the 
possibility of attracting high-ability individuals to the profession is their earning potential over 
the entire span of their career. An exploration of teacher incentives should therefore include a 
discussion of the incentives inherent in the profession, independent of those introduced with 
the express purpose of enhancing teacher effort.  
An additional year of service in the teaching profession in South Africa is associated with 
approximately 1% increase in remuneration (Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC), 
2011: 14). This appears to be the case “across the board” with every additional year of service. 
This is a point of contention amongst stakeholders. Each salary notch is 1% higher than the 
previous one. An REQV level 14 qualified teacher is employed at notch 85. It is possible for 
that individual to progress at a rate quicker than 1%, but if an REQV level 14 qualified educator 
remains a classroom based educator (post level 1). He or she will only have progressed to notch 
125 after 40 years of service (ELRC, 2011: 14). Despite improvements in notch level 
progression24, the slow rate at which teachers progress up the salary scale is problematic and 
will probably continue to cause dissatisfaction amongst educators.  
The implication of this slow progression up the salary scale plays out in the type of individuals 
attracted to the teaching profession. Lortie (1975) explains the phenomenon of staging in 
remuneration for different professions. Staging refers to individuals within a profession 
receiving different levels of remuneration at different stages of their career. He explains that 
fields in which an individual’s income increases substantially from one stage to the next usually 
reflect a significant change in status between different stages of the career. In contrast, in fields 
in which remuneration does not change significantly from one stage or phase to the next, 
differences in the status of individuals at different stages in their careers are less prominent and 
                                                          
24 Collective Agreement number 4 of 2009 allowed for notch progression based on years of service which saw an 
improvement in the salary progression of teachers who had been teaching for longer. For example, in 2007 
teachers who had been teaching for 40 years with an REQV level 14 qualification earned just 29% more than 
entry-level teachers. The agreement saw these teachers earning 62% more than entry-level teachers in 2010. 
Similarly, educators with 11 to 15 years of teaching experience who were earning just 8% more than entry-level 
teachers in 2007 earned 26% more than this group in 2010 (ELRC, 2011). 
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in many cases, altogether absent for all practical purposes (Lortie, 1975). Teaching (particularly 
in the South African case) is significantly un-staged. This has particular effects on the 
occupation as a whole. 
Remuneration for teachers may be considered “front-loaded” in the sense that very little 
progression from the initial salary notch happens over time. The salary level at which teachers 
begin is therefore high relative to their eventual earnings potential. In comparison to many 
other professions requiring a degree for entry (such as law, accounting and engineering), 
teaching can be described as being relatively “career-less” given that there is relatively little 
opportunity for upward mobility in terms of building a career. The status of a young entry level 
teacher is also not markedly different from that of a teacher with some experience in the 
profession (ELRC, 2011: 15). 
Overall the structure of teacher salaries (i.e. the lack of staging or marked progression up the 
salary scale for South African teachers) has consequences for the type of individuals who enter 
the teaching force. If staging remuneration within professions does indeed play the roles 
described above, then it becomes important to understand the probable impact that this will 
have on the profession as a whole. Evidence of this statement is provided by statistics about 
first year students enrolled in different faculties at the University of Stellenbosch (see figures 
21 and 22).  
 
FIGURE 21: Distribution of grade 12 mathematics marks for first years enrolments, 
2005 – 2009 
 
Source: Data on first year enrolment at the University of Stellenbosch, 2005 - 2009 
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FIGURE 22: Distribution of grade 12 language marks for first years enrolments, 2005 – 
2009 
 
Source: Data on first year enrolment at the University of Stellenbosch, 2005 - 2009 
Figures 21 and 22 respectively show the performance in matric Mathematics and Language for 
students enrolled in the first year of university studies in the Education faculty and in the other 
faculties between 2005 and 2009. The figures show that the distribution of marks for students 
enrolled in the education faculty lie to the left of those of students enrolled in other faculties, 
indicating weaker performance in both mathematics and language amongst students enrolled 
for education training.  
The inherent incentive in the salary structure of the teaching profession in South Africa does 
little to attract high ability individuals to the profession. The slow rate of progression through 
the salary scale provides little motivation for teachers to remain in the profession, particularly 
those with high earnings potential in non-teaching professions. In terms of sorting, therefore, 
it is unlikely that high-ability workers will be attracted to the teaching profession in South 
Africa.  
6.3 Prospects for peer pressure as an incentivising force: Professionalising teaching 
 
In terms of using peer pressure to incentivise teachers into exerting an acceptable amount of 
effort, section 3 referred to the possibility of professionalism within teaching as a vehicle 
through which “guilt” can be created. This subsection examines professionalization in the 
teaching profession, with a specific focus on the context of South African teachers. 
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Bennell (2004: 3) explains that in many low-income countries, teachers have a “semi-
professional” status relative to occupations such as lawyers, engineers and doctors. This is 
largely the result of lower levels of education, relative to such professions, as well as a result 
of the size of the teaching force. “[T]he sheer size of the teaching force militates against 
professional exclusivity” (Bennell, 2004: 3). In many Sub-Saharan African and South Asian 
countries, teaching is considered “employment of last resort” and as a result, a fair number of 
teachers do not consider staying in the profession long term.  
The ELRC’s Revised Salary Structure Proposal of 2011 indicates that teachers feel that their 
social and economic status have been eroded (ELRC, 2011: 28). There is a strong need amongst 
teachers to be recognised as professionals. There is a strong belief that the knowledge and skills 
requirements for teachers are equal to what is required in other professions, and that this is 
likely to be the case increasingly given that teaching now officially requires a degree for entry 
into the profession (ELRC, 2011: 28).  
Pratte and Rury (1991: 64) describe professionalism as “an ideal to which individuals and 
occupational groups aspire, in order to distinguish themselves from other workers”. The 
characteristics of a profession from which professionals derive their prestige are a) mastery of 
a distinctive body of knowledge, b) the control of membership of the profession and c) a 
commitment to the well-being of their client.  
Professionals are expected to have expert knowledge in their field and the profession is largely 
based around identification with a distinctive body of knowledge. Organisations employing 
professionals function largely as communities of associates as opposed to being based on 
supervisory authority. The expertise of the professionals is the basis of their professional 
autonomy and authoritative power (Pratte & Rury, 1991: 66).  
In terms of controlled access to the profession, the creation, diffusion and implementation of 
the professional standards of practice are assumed collectively by members of the profession. 
The licensing and to some extent the education of members is controlled by members of the 
profession and entrance into the profession (typically graduate level university study) is 
rationed to those achieving a minimum level of competency in their education up to that point. 
Having completed the academic programme, candidates are required to pass demanding tests 
of their theoretical knowledge as well as complete a kind of internship during which they are 
continuously evaluated. The function of controlling the membership of the profession therefore 
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serves the function both of controlling induction into the profession and ensuring that the 
acquisition of knowledge is standardised across the profession (Pratte & Rury, 1991: 66).  
Finally, professional practitioners commit to the pursuit of the welfare of their clients, usually 
through the acceptance of codes of ethics established by professional peers. Client 
dissatisfaction with the service of professionals is therefore dealt with through the initiation of 
a legal process rather than by reporting to the supervisor of the professional (Ambroise & 
Harley, 1988).  
Lortie (1975) explains that the educational preparation of teachers is relatively general by 
comparison to that required by individuals entering into what are typically regarded as 
professions in the labour market. Teacher education does not require the same degree of 
intellectual rigour required in professions such as law, medicine or engineering. Education 
lacks the scientific roots or scholarly development that characterise those professions (Lortie, 
1975); furthermore, teacher education and training takes place largely in the format of lectures 
and discussions, whereas traditional professions often require candidates to master the skills 
necessary for their professions in special settings such as laboratories. Teaching therefore does 
not require mastery of distinctive body of knowledge to the same extent that other widely 
recognised professions do.  
Controlling access to the teaching profession in South Africa is not characteristic of “an ideal 
to which individuals and occupational groups aspire, in order to distinguish themselves from 
other workers” (Pratte & Rury, 1991: 72). Charles Simkins (2010: 11) reports that some 45% 
of new teacher registrations with the South African Council of Educators (SACE) in 2009/10 
were provisional registrations given to teachers with less than the required qualifications. 
Therefore, a very large portion of individuals entering the occupation and being allowed to 
practise as teachers did not have the legally required qualifications (Simkins, 2010: 11). This 
stands in stark contrast to the pursuit of prestige and exclusivity inherent in controlling access 
to a profession.  
South African teachers are exposed to approximately 150 to 160 practice teaching days (in the 
case of a 3 year teaching qualification), 200 to 220 practice teaching days (in the case of a 4 
year teaching qualification) or 50 to 55 days (in the case of a 1 year postgraduate teaching 
qualification) over the duration of their teacher education (University of Stellenbosch, 2012). 
This is justification for Lortie’s (1975) observation that “one of the striking features of teaching 
is the abruptness with which full responsibility is assumed.” By comparison to professions 
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requiring extensive residency or clerical work once formal education has been completed, the 
“internship” required by teachers is significantly less rigorous.  
It seems then that teaching in South Africa (as in many other countries) is ill-fitted to 
professionalization. The nature of the knowledge required to enter the occupation and the 
absence of the rigorous entry procedures that exist for other professions make it difficult to 
justify a call for the professionalization of teaching in its current state. The teaching profession 
would have to be “recast” as one requiring rigorous preparation and one which holds a fair 
amount of prestige. Countries in which teaching is considered a prestigious profession have, 
however, achieved phenomenal educational success.  
In the absence of strong professionalism, peer pressure may incentivise teachers if ways can be 
found in which teachers can monitor one another’s behaviour and exert pressure on teachers 
who do not exert the required amount of effort, and if this pressure is likely to result in a change 
in behaviour.  
Section 6.4 explores the monitoring system currently in place amongst South African teachers 
and considers the probability that such monitoring would result in increased effort amongst 
teachers. 
6.4 Mutual monitoring: The Integrated Quality Management System 
 
In the absence of professionalization, peer pressure is created through mutual monitoring of 
workers. The use of peer pressure to enhance effort levels requires that monitoring by peers 
actually results in enhanced effort. The possibility of imposing punishment on team members 
who do not pull their weight should therefore exist.  
Currently, the system whereby teacher performance is measured and recorded in South Africa 
is the Integrated Quality Management System (IQMS). The IQMS handles teacher evaluation 
through self-evaluation by teachers and through a development support group (DSG) (ELRC, 
2003). The self-evaluation and the evaluation conducted by the development support group use 
the same instrument so that teachers are familiar with the criteria according to which they are 
to be judged. The DSG is comprised of the teacher’s immediate senior (i.e. head of department, 
or deputy principal in the case of a head of department) and one peer in their field of 
specialisation. They may choose which of their peers they would like to be part of the DSG. 
Teachers are graded according to 12 performance standards and both the self-evaluation and 
the evaluation conducted by the development support group are considered in the overall 
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evaluation. The evaluation happens once every year and its primary objective is to help teachers 
develop growth plans (ELRC, 2003). Teachers are therefore involved directly in monitoring 
the performance of their peers. The procedure is intended to have a nurturing and 
developmental role, however, and is most definitely not designed to enable teachers to apply 
any kind of pressure or disciplinary actions against their peers. Furthermore, the fact that 
teachers are allowed to choose the peer who will form part of the DSG provides the opportunity 
for teachers to influence the type of assessment they may receive from the group members. 
Although it is stipulated that educators must appoint peers from their field of specialisation, 
there are no other requirements or restrictions on who teachers may choose to be part of the 
group. It is therefore possible that teachers will choose peers most likely to provide them with 
a good assessment. In this way, distortion may occur as a teacher is able to influence the 
outcome of the performance measure, albeit indirectly.  
Peer pressure as a mechanism for incentivising teachers is unlikely to prove effective in the 
present system. Because it is a once-yearly exercise and because teachers choose their 
assessors, it is highly unlikely that teachers will be able to exert any kind of pressure on their 
co-workers, or that increased monitoring will result in higher effort levels.  
6.5 Inequality prevails 
 
A common problem with teacher incentives and one which is particularly relevant in the South 
African context is that evaluation depends on student performance on standardised tests. A 
strong argument against using such measures for evaluation is that student performance is 
significantly affected by many factors outside the classroom and the school and therefore 
outside the teacher’s control. It is seems grossly unfair to rank and reward teachers according 
to a measure that is to a large extent outside their control. Also important in South Africa is the 
issue of inequality and fairness. South Africa’s history of inequality, particularly in the 
education sector, resulted in substantial differences in the quality of the training received by 
teachers from different race groups (Van der Berg, 2006: 3). Furthermore, the endurance of the 
apartheid legacy in educational quality means that awarding incentives based on student 
performance is simply not fair. Teachers cannot be judged on the performance of their students 
alone.  
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Chapter 3 
The impact of teacher characteristics on student 
performance: An analysis using hierarchical linear 
modelling 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The impact of teacher characteristics (both qualifications and demographic characteristics) is 
important for education policy. Ensuring that teachers best suited and most able to enhance 
student performance are employed is a key responsibility for policymakers. Wayne and Youngs 
(2003: 89) explain that a large body of literature about teacher characteristics and education 
outcomes exists. The focus on the studies vary between questions about teacher quantity and 
turnover and issues surrounding teacher quality. In many countries (South Africa included) 
certain qualifications need to be obtained before teachers are permitted to enter the teaching 
force. Much of the literature surrounding teacher characteristics and student performance is 
comprised of analyses of the impact of these and other qualifications. Attempts have been made 
to identify trends in the quality of teachers, and the question whether characteristics of teachers 
in different parts of the schooling system exist is often investigated (Wayne & Youngs, 2003: 
90).  
The relationship between teacher characteristics and student performance is surprisingly 
elusive, however. Researchers have found it difficult to find aspects of teacher training that 
correlate with student performance in a statistically significant way (Chingos & Peterson, 2011: 
449). Conflicting or indeterminate results occur often. Summers and Wolfe (1977) investigated 
the impact of teacher scores on “Philadelphia’s National Teacher Evaluations” on performance 
amongst primary schools students in that state, finding a negative relationship between teacher 
performance and student scores on standardised tests. Anderson (2000) investigates the 
determinants of student performance in mathematics and language in Mexico and finds a 
positive and statistically significant impact in both mathematics and language for teachers 
making use of a more interactive approach to teaching as opposed to a traditional approach in 
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which lessons are dominated by teachers talking and instructing (Anderson, 2000: 144). She 
also finds evidence of a positive relationship between hours spent teaching and performance in 
both subjects25 (Anderson, 2000: 145). Teacher effort variables therefore impact positively and 
statistically significantly on student performance. An interesting and important result is the 
positive and significant impact on both language and mathematics observed for teacher training 
during the year in which the study was conducted (Anderson, 2000: 146). Angrist and Lavy 
(2001) find positive estimates of the impact of in-service teacher training on both mathematics 
and language in secular primary schools in Jerusalem. They report that their results are robust 
to a number of estimation techniques, namely regression, difference-in-difference techniques 
as well as matching techniques. The fact that the effect is only observed in secular schools may 
be due to the fact that the training programme was introduced later and on a smaller scale in 
religious schools (Angrist & Lavy, 2001: 365).  
Ferguson (1998) used data from the “Texas Examination of Current Administrators and 
Teachers” to evaluate the impact of student performance at all levels of the schooling system. 
Contrary to the results obtained by Summers and Wolfe, Ferguson found a positive correlation 
between student performance and teacher test scores.26 The relationship between teacher 
performance on tests in the subject they teach and student performance in that subject has also 
been tested extensively. Positive associations between teacher test score and student 
performance are observed in some studies across a range of subjects (Ehrenberg & Brewer, 
1995; Hanushek, 1992; Rowan, Chiang & Miller, 1997), while others find a negative impact 
of teacher test scores on student outcomes (Murnane & Phillips, 1981). It seems then that the 
evidence regarding the impact of teacher content knowledge on student outcomes is mixed. 
Results obtained for formal teacher qualifications were also mixed, with the majority of studies 
conducted returning indeterminate results. Amongst those that did return results, both negative 
and positive impacts were observed (Wayne & Youngs, 2003: 101-103). The existing research 
therefore leaves us with few answers to questions about the relationship between teacher 
qualifications and student performance. Indeed, are teacher qualifications important at all? 
                                                          
25 Anderson notes that this variable is self-reported (Anderson, 2000: 145) and may well be over-reported. 
However, if this is the case, it likely that the coefficient on this variables is a lower bound of the effect of time 
on task of student performance.  
26 Important to note is that Ferguson’s study aggregated data to the district level. Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor  
(1996: 616) explain that aggregating data to a “higher” level (i.e. school, district or state level) increases the 
likelihood of obtaining positive results.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
101 
 
Evidence from Pakistan suggests that teacher qualifications are indeed important for student 
performance. Arif and Saqib (2003) control for the individual and family characteristics of 
students, the characteristics of the schools they attend, geographic characteristics as well as a 
range of teacher characteristics and find that whether a teacher has a bachelor’s degree or higher 
is positively and statistically significantly associated with student performance in language, 
mathematics and general knowledge as well as a measure capturing performance in all three 
(Arif & Saqib, 2003: 19-20). An earlier study conducted in Pakistan (Behrman, Kahn, Ross & 
Sabot, 1997) construct teacher quality indices for language and mathematics. These indices are 
linear functions of teacher performance on literacy or numeracy tests, educational attainment, 
and teaching experience and its squared term (Behrman et al., 1997: 131). Controlling for 
student demographic characteristics and family background, school characteristics, student-
teacher ratios and student ability, they find a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the teacher quality index and student performance in both numeracy and literacy 
(although the effect seems to be larger in literacy – an interesting result, since an effect, if 
observed at all, is usually stronger in the case of mathematics) (Behrman et al., 1997: 133).  
Another study that finds a relationship between observable teacher characteristics and student 
performance was conducted by Slater, Davies and Burgess (2009) using UK data for 7 000 
students (14 year olds) writing GCSE Keystage 4 examinations.27 Slater et al. (2009) 
investigate whether the observable characteristics of teachers are correlated with measures of 
teacher effectiveness. Teacher effectiveness is measured as the effect that teachers have on 
student performance on the examinations. The observable characteristics available are teacher 
gender, age, educational attainment and teaching experience. None of these characteristics are 
statistically significant in explaining teacher effectiveness (Slater et al., 2009: 12). Interesting 
to note, however, is that Slater et al. (2009: 13) find a correlation (albeit weak) between the 
ability of students and teacher effectiveness, suggesting non-random allocation of students 
within a school. Allocating students to teachers in such a way that places less able students 
with more effective teachers may well enhance the positive impact of teacher effectiveness.  
 
                                                          
27 Keystage 4 examinations are compulsory examinations dictating entrance to post-secondary education. These 
are written at age 16. Keystage 3 examinations are written at the beginning of Keystage 4 programme during the 
year that students turn 14 (Slater, Davies & Burgess, 2009: 4). Keystage 3 examinations are often used as a 
“pre-test” measure in education research, or an as indication of prior attainment.  
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Raudenbush, Eamsukkawat, Di-Ibor, Kamali and Taoklam (1993) investigate whether in-
service training affects student performance significantly. They measure in-service training by 
including a variable capturing the amount of exposure (in terms of days) of in-service training 
as well as a variable controlling for the number of times that teachers received internal 
supervision (Raudenbush et al., 1993: 286). They also include a measure of whether a teacher 
has a bachelor’s degree. They come up with a very interesting result: although in-service 
training does not appear to have any significant effect on student performance, internal 
supervision (by the school principal or another teacher at the school)28 has a large and 
significant effect. They explain the effect of intensive internal supervision as being as large as 
a teacher obtaining a bachelor’s degree (Raudenbush et al., 1993: 294). It appears then that 
although formal in-service training does not appear to improve teacher quality, a type of 
mentoring and “coaching” approach does. Results from a study conducted using Cambodian 
data (Marshall, Chinna, Nessay, Hok, Savoeun, Tinon & Vaesna, 2009: 406) show positive and 
significant effects (as well as inequality reducing effects) on the performance of grade 6 
students on language tests. High levels of mathematical content knowledge amongst teachers 
also showed a positive and significant effect on grade 6 mathematics performance and high 
levels of mathematics pedagogical content knowledge had a significant impact on grade 3 
mathematics performance (Marshall et al., 2009: 406). The authors did not control for formal 
teacher qualifications or teaching experience separate to content knowledge. Luschei and 
Carnoy (2010: 175) find no significant impact for teachers’ postgraduate education on student 
performance in mathematics or language in a study conducted using Uruguayan data. 
Interestingly, however, high levels of teaching experience (10 years and above) are positively 
and significantly associated with both mathematics and language performance (Luschei & 
Carnoy, 2010: 175-176).  
Another study that finds a statistically significant relationship between teaching experience and 
student performance is that of Clotfleter, Ladd and Vigdor (2007). These authors use North 
Carolina data to investigate the relationship between teacher characteristics and student 
performance. Since the early 1990s, the state of North Carolina has administered standardised 
mathematics and reading tests to all students between grades 3 and 8 (Clotfelter et al., 2007: 
675). Furthermore, it is possible to match students to their teachers for each year. The authors 
are able to identify the teachers of at least 75% of grade 3, 4 and 5 students in the state’s 
                                                          
28 This is in contrast to external supervision by a district official (Raudenbush et al., 1993: 294) which shows no 
significant impact on student performance.  
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education system between 1993/1994 and 2003/2004, rendering it possible for them to conduct 
analysis on the impact of teacher characteristics on both the levels of mathematics and English 
performance and the gains in performance from year to year (and therefore controlling for 
various student and school-level effects, the gains that may be tentatively associated with the 
teacher) (Clotfelter et al., 2007: 675). The authors find a positive and statistically significant 
impact for teacher experience on student performance in both mathematics and English 
(Clotfelter et al., 2007: 676).29 The size of the coefficients indicate that the majority (or more 
than half) of the returns to teaching experience occur within the first two years of teaching. An 
issue often raised when investigating returns to teaching experience is the possibility that 
positive returns to experience are overstated if it is likely that underperforming or weaker 
teachers will leave the profession after their initial year (Rockoff, 2004: 248). The authors test 
for this possibility by adding a variable controlling for whether a teacher remained in the 
profession in North Carolina for at least three years. They interact it with the categorical 
variables controlling teachers with 1 to 2 years of teaching experience. If weaker teachers leave 
the profession after their early years as teachers, a positive coefficient on the variable 
controlling for those who remain in the profession is expected. However, the opposite is 
observed. In the case of mathematics, a negative and statistically significant coefficient is 
observed in both the levels and gains model, suggesting that those who leave teaching are not 
less able than their counterparts who remain in the profession. Furthermore, the interaction 
term is not statistically significant in either subject, suggesting that it is not differential attrition 
that drives the increasing returns to teaching experience observed in the data (Clotfelter et al., 
2007: 676).  
“By many accounts, the quality of teachers is the key element to improving student 
performance” (Hanushek, 2009: 171). The impact of being taught by a good teacher is 
quantified by Hanushek (2011: 42) where he estimates that students who perform a standard 
deviation above average (as measured by performance on high school tests) earn between 10 
and 15 percent more per annum than average – an estimate he deems conservative as it is 
measured in the early years of their career (before they have reached their full earning potential) 
and it does not account for the possibility that higher performance at high school level probably 
                                                          
29 Teacher experience is captured by categorical variables denoting 1 to 2 years of experience, 3 to 5 years of 
experience, 6 to 12 years of experience, 13 to 20 years of experience, 21 to 27 years of experience and more than 
27 years of experience. They therefore control for non-linear returns to teaching experience (Clotfelter et al., 2007: 
676). The returns observed are higher for mathematics than they are for English – a finding largely in line with 
what is found in the literature about teaching experience and student performance.  
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results in higher educational attainment (Hanushek, 2011: 42). The home background and 
motivation of the student obviously contribute significantly to the level of success that students 
are able to achieve, but rigorous research has isolated the impact of effective teaching on 
student performance. Hanushek (2011: 42) reports that studies have consistently shown that 
high-performing teachers (performing 1 standard deviation above the mean, or at the 84th 
percentile of the distribution) result in student grades that are at least 0.2 standard deviations 
higher at the end of a school year. Although these gains diminish over time, it is estimated 
(although somewhat less conclusively) that the long term benefit of being taught by an effective 
teacher is 70 percent of the immediate gain, and so consecutive years of high quality teachers 
result in student outcomes markedly higher than they would have been had students been taught 
by teachers at the 50th percentile of the distribution (Hanushek, 2011: 42). It is clear then 
teacher quality and teacher effectiveness have a considerable effect on the lifetime earnings of 
students.   
Evidence of the impact of teacher quality in later life also exists. Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff 
(2011) find evidence of fairly sizeable impacts of teacher quality on adult earnings of their 
students. Teacher quality (measured by value added) improves the probability of college 
attendance, the quality of college attended by students (measured by the earnings of former 
students of colleges) as well as future earnings of students (Chetty et al., 2011: 2).  
How then should we measure teacher quality? To what extent are we “missing the point?” An 
important aspect of teacher quality and teacher effectiveness to consider is the extent to which 
the education received by teachers is well-suited to enabling them to teach. A significant 
literature (some of which is discussed above) exists around whether teaching is an attractive 
profession to highly able individuals endowed with skills that fetch a high price in the labour 
market. It is important to understand whether or not those skills are likely to translate into 
positive outcomes for students or whether there is “something else” required of teachers that 
does not necessarily guarantee that highly able individuals will be effective teachers. One way 
to approach this question is to investigate the specific knowledge requirements of teachers.  
The National Council of Teachers of Mathematics in US (NCTM) refers to teacher’s 
knowledge of their students as students as being central to their ability to influence their 
performance (NCTM, 2000: 17). This broadly refers to teachers being able to identify 
“preconceptions and background knowledge that students typically bring to each subject” 
(National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS), 2012: vi). This is essentially 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
105 
 
what is referred to as Pedagogical Content Knowledge (PCK) (Hill, Loewenberg Ball & 
Schilling, 2008: 373). Although its importance in improving student outcomes is widely 
acknowledged, very little exists in the way of empirical evidence and understanding of this 
relationship. Hill et al. (2008: 373) believe that this results from two factors. Firstly, there is an 
absence of studies that are able to prove that teachers possess such knowledge, and secondly, 
measures to assess programmes which aim to develop this knowledge and its impact on student 
achievement have not yet been developed. In the absence of such measures, it may be difficult 
to measure the aspect of teacher quality that truly affects student performance. 
Research that does investigate the type and depth of subject (and other) knowledge required to 
teach presents some very important results. The mathematical knowledge required of 
mathematics teachers is extensive (Ball, Thames & Phelps, 2008: 399). The tasks involved in 
teaching mathematics require “significant mathematical knowledge, skill, habits of mind and 
insight” (Ball et al., 2008: 399). What is referred to as common content knowledge is the 
mathematical knowledge that teachers require to perform their job. Teachers also require 
specialised content knowledge – mathematical knowledge and skills particular to teaching. This 
type of mathematical knowledge is not particularly useful (or even desirable) outside the 
context of teaching and requires a certain “unpacking” of mathematical knowledge. Examples 
of this kind of mathematical content knowledge would be the analysis of student errors or 
evaluating whether a nonstandard approach to calculation would work in general (Ball et al., 
2008: 400). A third domain, knowledge of content and students, involves understanding and 
therefore anticipating how students will interpret and understand the work and where they will 
experience difficulty (Ball et al., 2008: 401). The fourth domain, knowledge of mathematics 
and teaching, refers to an understanding of how mathematics should be taught. For example, 
the sequencing of topics and examples would fall under this category of mathematical 
knowledge (Ball et al., 2008: 401). The authors point out that the mathematical knowledge 
required of teachers (and indeed teachers across different fields and subjects) includes and 
extends beyond that of other professions requiring mathematical knowledge. This is important 
to acknowledge this when evaluating the importance of the profession in society.  
A rare study in which the impact of different kinds of mathematics knowledge amongst 
teachers (based to a large extent on the findings of Ball et al. discussed above) was tested 
amongst students attending schools in rural Guatemala (Marshall & Sorto, 2012) presented 
encouraging results. Using hierarchical linear modelling, they test the impact of different kinds 
of teacher knowledge in different areas of mathematics performance. Interestingly, they find 
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coefficients of very similar size to those observed in US studies. Marshall and Sorto (2012: 
188) find significant results for what they call “mathematics knowledge for teaching” (as 
opposed to common content knowledge and specialised content knowledge). Interestingly and 
importantly, the coefficients for mathematics knowledge for teaching are largest and most 
significant for areas of the mathematics test that have the highest degree of cognitive demand 
required of students (Marshall & Sorto, 2012: 191). This makes intuitive sense – the more 
difficult the content, the more specialised a teacher needs to be to ensure that student learning 
takes place.  
In a South African context, Fleisch (2004: 264) finds inconclusive results regarding the 
relationship between higher levels of teacher resources and student performance. However, 
Fleisch explains the importance of understanding the absence of the relationship. Indeed, if 
education policy aims to improve the state of education through changes around teacher policy, 
then caution must be exercised when considering this policy (Fleisch, 2004: 264). Qualitative 
research on what happens in schools is required in order to understand how teachers can be 
best utilised to improve education outcomes. Other South African research by Crouch & 
Mabogoane (2001: 64-65) finds a strong correlation between teacher qualifications and student 
performance on matric (grade 12) examinations. As a result, these authors suggest the 
possibility of upgrading teacher qualifications as a means to improve student outcomes (Crouch 
& Mabogoane, 2001: 75).  
This chapter aims to investigate which characteristics of South African teachers, both 
demographic and in terms of qualifications and teaching experience, impact on student 
performance. The chapter is organised as follows: section 2 defines the research question, 
introduces the dataset that will be used in the analysis, SACMEQ III, and provides the 
descriptive statistics of the variables that will be included in the model. Section 3 discusses the 
necessity for hierarchical linear modelling, while section 4 presents the model that will be 
specified in attempting to answer the research question. Section 5 presents the results obtained 
from the model, and section 6 concludes with a discussion of the possible driving factors behind 
these results. 
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2. Research question and data 
2.1 Defining the research question 
 
As indicated, this research aims to answer the question of whether teacher characteristics (both 
demographic and human capital) impact student performance. As explained, South Africa’s 
educational performance is weak. The question we attempt to answer in this chapter is whether 
this weak performance can be explained by observable teacher characteristics. In order to 
measure the impact of these characteristics, the fact that students share “teacher characteristics” 
with the students in the same class means that the assumptions that would render ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression coefficients accurate (i.e. that students are drawn from a random 
sample) are violated. The multi-level nature of the data requires that this element be controlled 
for and modelled in the investigation. This is discussed at length in section 3. In summary, the 
confidence intervals that would result from OLS would be deceptively narrow as a result of 
inaccurately small standard errors (Arnold, 1992: 62). Students being taught by the same 
teacher not only share “teacher characteristics”, but are also more likely to be more similar to 
one another than to students taught by different teachers. This further violates the assumption 
of students being drawn at random (Arnold, 1992: 62). 
The following subsection explains the data used to conduct the analysis – the third study 
conducted, in 2007, by the Southern and Eastern African Consortium for Monitoring 
Educational Quality (SACMEQ III).  
2.2 Data: SACMEQ III 
 
The paper makes use of data collected by the third study conducted by SACMEQ in 2007. 
SACMEQ was launched in 1995 with the objective of conducting research and providing 
training that enables policy makers to monitor and improve their education systems (Moloi and 
Strauss, 2005: 12). SACEMQ undertook 3 major surveys (referred to as SACMEQ I, II and III) 
in 1995, 1998 and 2007 respectively. 15 countries participated in SACMEQ III, namely 
Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Tanzania (Mainland and Zanzibar), Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Spaull, 2011b: 
4).  
SACMEQ III involved administering 3 tests to grade 6 students - a reading test, a mathematics 
test and a health test (aimed largely at measuring the level of knowledge about HIV/AIDS). In 
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South Africa, 9 038 grade 6 students in 392 schools were tested, along with 498 mathematics 
teachers, 498 reading teachers and 492 health teachers (totalling 1 488). All the teachers 
completed a health test, and reading and mathematics teachers completed a test in the subject 
that they taught (Spaull, 2011b: 5).  
The data obtained from SACMEQ III comprise the most extensive nationally representative 
sample available for the South African education system.30 Importantly, the testing was only 
conducted in English and Afrikaans. It is therefore highly likely (if not certain) that a significant 
proportion of the students writing the tests were disadvantaged in terms of understanding the 
mathematics questions, given that neither English nor Afrikaans was their first language. The 
extent to which English is spoken outside of school is controlled for at the student level but the 
dataset did not contain the corresponding variable for Afrikaans. It is worth noting, however, 
that the aforementioned language disadvantage applies to the majority of students tested in 
South Africa (Moloi and Strauss, 2005: 67).  
Importantly, in any analysis of performance in education making use of cross-sectional data 
that does not contain a pre-test score, unobservable characteristics of students (such as 
motivation or intelligence) which influence their performance on mathematics tests are 
therefore not controlled for. It is also important to bear in mind that the impact of teachers on 
students’ education is cumulative. The results observed in grade 6 therefore reflect the impact 
of teachers throughout students’ educational “career” and cannot be attributed only to the 
teachers by whom students are taught in that year. Having said that, we do not have a pre-test 
score and we are therefore not able to control for students’ ability or level of performance 
before their exposure to their current teacher.  
2.3 Variables included in the model 
 
Table 5 below provides a brief explanation of the variables included in the investigation as well 
as the means and standard deviations. The dependent variable, 𝑍𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗, is the z-scored 
(standardised) mathematics score of student i in classroom j. Z-scoring the dependent variable 
centres the variable around a mean value of 0 and gives the variable a standard deviation of 1. 
                                                          
30 Mullens, Murnane and Willett (1996: 140) explain the need for longitudinal data in assessing the impact of 
teachers on student learning. In the majority of studies investigating this topic in the developing world, 
longitudinal data are not available and so researchers have no choice but to use cross-sectional data. Cross-
sectional data can only tell us about the level of student achievement and not about the progress that takes place 
(i.e. the actual learning). However, data on changes in achievement are necessary to truly evaluate the 
effectiveness of teachers (Mullens et al., 1996: 140).   
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The interpretation of coefficients on independent variables for z-scored dependent variables is 
the standard deviation change in students’ mathematics performance. 
 
TABLE 5: Description and descriptive statistics for variables included in the model 
Variable Mean  Standard deviation 
STUDENT LEVEL VARIABLES 
Continuous variables:   
Mathematics score (z-scored; standardised 
to the mean within the South African 
dataset) 
0.00 1.00 
SES (z-scored; standardised to the mean 
within the South African dataset) 
0.00 
 
1.00 
   
Dummy variables (takes a value of 1 if 
true; takes a value of 0 if not true) 
 
  
Overage (born earlier than 1994) 0.19 0.39 
Female (reference value: 0) 0.51 0.50 
Mother has completed matric  0.51 0.50 
Attended less than 1 year of preschool 0.05 0.21 
Attended 1 year of preschool 0.33 0.47 
Attended 2 years of preschool 0.15 0.36 
Attended 3 or more years of preschool 0.2 0.40 
Speaks English at home sometimes 0.61 0.42 
Speaks English at home most of the time 0.08 0.49 
Speaks English at home always 0.07 0.26 
Repeated a grade once 0.20 0.40 
Repeated a grade twice  
0.05 
 
0.22 
Repeated a grade three times 0.03 0.17 
Repeated grade 6 0.09 0.29 
Receives extra tuition 0.09 0.29 
TEACHER LEVEL VARIABLES 
Continuous variables:   
Days of in-service training 13.04 46.04 
Average class size (of the school) 40.79 12.6 
Teacher maths score (z-scored; mean of 0 
and standard deviation of 1) 
0.00 1.00 
Average classroom SES (z-scored; 
standardised to the mean within the South 
African dataset) 
0.18 0.80 
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Dummy variables:   
30 to 39 years of age 0.39 
 
0.49 
40 to 49 years of age 0.44 0.50 
50 to 59 years of age 0.14 0.34 
60 years and older 0.01 0.09 
School is in a rural area 0.38 0.49 
Private school 0.05 0.22 
Trained to teach mathematics 0.67 0.47 
Parents sign students’ homework 0.59 0.49 
Test 2 to 3 times per term 0.52 0.50 
Tests 2 to 3 times per month 0.22 0.42 
Tests at least once per week 0.15 0.36 
Completed junior secondary education 0.02 0.15 
Completed senior secondary education 0.09 0.29 
Completed A-levels31 0.16 0.37 
Completed a degree 0.51 0.50 
Received less than 1 year of teacher 
training 
0.01 0.08 
Received 1 year of teacher training 0.02 0.15 
Received 2 years of teacher training 0.07 0.25 
Received 3 years of teacher training 0.34 0.47 
Received more than 3 years of teacher 
training 
 
0.56 
 
0.50 
Experience: 6 to 10 years 0.11 0.31 
Experience: 11 to 15 years 0.25 0.44 
Experience: 16 to 20 years 0.18 0.39 
Experience: 21 to 25 years 0.13 0.34 
 Experience: 26 to 30 years 0.05 0.22 
 Experience: 31 to 35 years 0.03 0.18 
 Experience: 36 to 40 years 0.01 0.09 
 Experience: 41 plus years 0.00 0.04 
Source: SACMEQ III (SACMEQ, 2007). 
 
3. Hierarchical linear modelling: The necessity of the method 
 
Social science contains countless examples of hierarchical data structures. This means that 
although variables capture characteristics of individuals, these individuals also exist within 
                                                          
31 A-levels is not available in the South African education system. It is likely that teachers misunderstood the 
question and equated A-levels with having completed matric. The variable is retained for the sake of completeness 
since 16% of teachers reported having completed A-levels.  
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larger groups and a set of variables describe the groups (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002: xix). A 
classic example of hierarchical data structure is education data. Students are grouped according 
to the schools they attend, so individual or learner-level variables describe individual students, 
and school-level variables describe schools. Although school-level variables may be 
independent of the students (for example, the type of buildings or the geographical location of 
the school), school-level variables may also represent aggregated learner-level data (for 
example, the racial or gender composition of the school or the average socioeconomic status 
of the students attending the school). The school probably consists of smaller groups such as 
classrooms, which have their own characteristics captured by classroom-level variables. 
Schools may also form the smaller groups contained in school districts (Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002: xix).  
In this chapter we are interested in understanding how teacher characteristics influence student 
performance. As described above, students are grouped within classrooms which in turn are 
grouped within schools. In education the context in which students are educated is immensely 
influential in determining their performance. In other words, characteristics of the school 
classroom significantly influence the level of learning that takes place for individual students 
and therefore their performance on standardised tests (Luke, 2004: 1). Relationships and 
occurrences at the higher level of analysis affect what happens at the lower level of analysis. 
In South Africa the context in which learning takes place differs dramatically across the school 
system and so the variables describing characteristics at the classroom and school level reflect 
large differences between schools within the country. We are interested in how these 
differences at the higher level impact on lower level performance (Luke, 2004: 4-5). For 
example, how do differences in school management characteristics translate into differences in 
the performance of students on standardised mathematics and language tests? How does 
teacher training impact on student performance in mathematics and language tests?  
The strongest motivation for making use of hierarchical linear modelling has to do with 
inaccuracies in the measurement of standard errors. If multi-level data are analysed solely at 
the level of the individual, two problems arise. The first of these is that the individual error 
term contains all the contextual information that has not been modelled (Duncan, Jones & 
Moon, 1998: 98). One of the basic assumptions of multiple regression is that there is no 
correlation between the error terms of individual observations – an assumption which is 
violated if individuals (students) share the same context (classroom or school) and the 
characteristics of this context are not modelled (Luke, 2004: 7). Students who attend the same 
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school or who are taught in the same classroom will probably be more similar to one another 
than if they were selected at random. Secondly, if the context in which individuals find 
themselves is not explicitly acknowledged and modelled, regression coefficients is assumed to 
be equally relevant for all contexts (Duncan et al., 1998: 98). This would indicate that variables 
affect one another in the same way in all schools in the South African education system, for 
example – a notion that we know to be false. 
How then does estimation in HLM differ from that in OLS? Furthermore, do the estimates and 
standard errors obtained using OLS and HLM differ substantially enough to warrant the use of 
HLM over OLS? It may be argued that making use of fixed effects in OLS circumvents the 
need for HLM. Chaplin (2008: 7) explains that fixed effects models in OLS are models in 
which the covariance between the error term and some of the explanatory variables is not 
constrained to be 0. Fixed effects may then control for the effects of characteristics not captured 
by explanatory variables (i.e. unobserved effects). Using fixed effects in OLS modelling would 
therefore allow the researcher to claim that the relationship of interest was not biased by 
unobservable characteristics in the data. For example, in order to observe the relationship 
between SES and student performance at an individual level and to be sure that the result 
obtained was not biased by unobservable characteristics at the level of the school, a fixed 
effects model would include individual school dummies to control for the impact of 
unobservable characteristics at the level of the school. Fixed effects do not, however, control 
for the strong possibility that students within a particular school are more similar to one another 
than students who have been randomly selected.  
HLM is therefore often suggested as a safeguard against school effects biasing results obtained 
for individual level effects. However, this is only the case if multilevel models are actually 
modelled in the way in which they are presented: as multi-stage models (Chaplin, 2008: 8). 
Estimating HLM in this way would require first running the individual level model for each 
school individually, followed by an estimation of second stage equations to investigate the 
impact of school-level factors on the relationship between individual-level characteristics. This 
two-stage estimation strategy would allow researchers to claim legitimately that their 
estimation of the relationship between individual level characteristics is not biased by school 
level factors (Chaplin, 2008: 8). However, HLM is not estimated in two stages. Coefficients 
are estimated using both within- and between-school variation and so any omitted variables at 
the level of the school will bias estimates of the relationship between variables at the level of 
the individual. HLM assumes zero covariance between explanatory variables and error terms, 
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while OLS estimation using fixed effects allows for non-zero covariance. HLM estimates may 
therefore be biased (Chaplin, 2008: 8).  
One possible way in which to avoid this bias is by centring second level variables (Raudenbush 
and Bryk, 2002: 23). Centring variables allows the researcher to investigate how the dependent 
variable responds when the value of explanatory variables change. By centring variables, the 
researcher is able to see what a standard deviation change in the explanatory variable does to 
the dependent variable. Centring involves subtracting the group mean (the average value within 
the group) from the individual values of the variable in order to capture the variation while 
getting rid of the “group effect”. Goldberger (1991: 42) points out that group centring is one 
way in which fixed effects modelling is conducted in OLS. Chaplin (2008: 9) explains that the 
HLM estimates arrived at when group-mean centring is used are unbiased. Therefore, despite 
the fact that HLM controls for the possibility that students selected from the same school are 
more similar to one another than would be the case had they been selected at random, the fact 
that HLM models are not estimated in two stages means that variables must first be centred in 
order to ensure that the estimates obtained using HLM are unbiased.   
A question often asked when considering whether to use HLM is whether similar results may 
not be achieved in OLS by making use of interaction effects. Newman, Newman and Salzman 
(2010: 5) point out that interaction terms are usually used to investigate the effect within a 
certain group of a given variable already included in the model over and above the main effect 
of that variable on the outcome of interest. That is, interaction effects are used to ascertain 
whether the effect of a particular variable on the outcome variable in one group differs 
significantly from its overall effect in the entire sample. They explain this as the “differential 
effect” across groups. HLM investigates the differential effects across groups. The second level 
of an HLM model therefore provides insights into differences between groups (slope 
differentials, for example). Interaction terms provide information on the differences over and 
above the main effect of the explanatory variable in question. Including interaction terms in an 
OLS model is therefore not the same as explicitly modelling multiple levels of data – the overall 
objective of HLM.   
In summary then, estimates obtained using HLM are only unbiased if variables are. 
Furthermore, fixed effects estimation in OLS, while remedying the problem of biased estimates 
resulting from unobservable characteristics at the level of the school, do not control for the 
likelihood that students attending the same school are more similar than students selected at 
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random. Finally, estimates produced using interaction terms in OLS are different from those 
obtained using HLM, as interaction effects capture “altered” effects within groups. In the case 
of HLM, different estimates are obtained for each group. Estimates obtained using HLM and 
OLS are likely to be similar, however. The estimates presented in this chapter were obtained 
using HLM, given that it appears to control for more of the complications associated with 
modelling multilevel data. However, as a robustness check and for the sake of completeness, 
models were estimated by using OLS and controlling for cluster effects at the level of the 
classroom. These estimates are presented in Appendix C. The results are similar in size and 
significance to those obtained using HLM.  
3.1 Hierarchical linear modelling: The analytical method 
 
Hierarchical linear modelling is a method that effectively runs regressions of regressions. As 
explained above, multilevel modelling aims to predict outcomes based on variables from 
multiple levels (Luke, 2004: 9). In this chapter we investigate student performance in 
mathematics as a function of both student characteristics (e.g. age, gender, socioeconomic 
status) and characteristics of teachers (e.g. levels of educational attainment, experience, age). 
Students are therefore nested within classes32. The structure of the model is presented in 
equations 1 and 2 below. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 1:        𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 𝑋𝑖𝑗 +  𝑟𝑖𝑗       (1a) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 2:        𝛽0𝑗 =  𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝑊𝑗 +  𝑢0𝑗      (1b) 
                      𝛽1𝑗 =  𝛾10 + 𝛾11𝑊𝑗 +  𝑢1𝑗      (1c) 
The subscript j in the equation for level 1 indicates that the model is being estimated j times, 
once for each of the j groups in the sample (Luke, 2004: 10). It is therefore possible (and indeed 
likely) that each of the j groups will have a different mean mathematics score (𝛽0𝑗) and that the 
effects of individual level characteristics (for example, student socioeconomic status) on the 
outcome variable (𝛽1𝑗) will differ for students taught by different teachers.  
In equation 1 the intercept (𝛽0𝑗) and slope (𝛽1𝑗) as outcomes in the group model is 
straightforward. In equation 1b, the value of 𝛽0 for group j is a function of the overall mean for 
                                                          
32 Students are organised into classrooms, each of which is taught by a particular teacher. For the sake of this 
analysis, within-classroom differences in fact refer to within-teacher differences. The remainder of the paper will 
refer to within-classroom elements for the sake of brevity. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
115 
 
the sample (𝛾00) and the effect of the group-level characteristic 𝑊𝑗 on the group average (𝛾01). 
The additional variability in the average of group j is captured in the error term 𝑢0𝑗. Similarly, 
the value of 𝛽1in group j is modelled as a function of the overall mean impact of individual 
level characteristic (𝑋𝑖𝑗) on student outcomes (𝛾10) and the effect of the group-level 
characteristic 𝑊𝑗 on this relationship (𝛾11). The variability in this relationship not accounted 
for in the model is captured by the error term 𝑢1𝑗 (Luke, 2004: 10).  
Equation 2 condenses the system of equations presented above into one prediction equation. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  [𝛾00 + 𝛾10𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾01𝑊𝑗 + 𝛾11𝑊𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗] + [𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗]   (2) 
Equation 2 indicates that the level 1 parameters (𝛽0𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽1𝑗) are estimated indirectly through 
level 2, and the effects are given by the 𝛾𝑠 (Luke, 2004: 11). Equation 2 also indicates how the 
model is broken into fixed effects (the first set of brackets) and random effects (the second set 
of brackets). The random effects in multi-level modelling can be thought of as the variability 
that remains after level 1 and level 2 characteristics have been controlled for. This variation is 
comprised of classic individual level error (𝑟𝑖𝑗) as well as two error terms resulting specifically 
from the multi-level nature of the model. The first of these, 𝑢0𝑗, captures differences in the 
mean outcome between level 2 groups, and the second of these, 𝑢1𝑗, captures differences in the 
relationship coefficient between the level 1 characteristic and the outcome between level 2 
groups (Luke, 2004: 11).  
3.2 Means-as-outcome regression 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the hierarchical linear model that will be used is one which 
models the intercept term, or the average mathematics performance of students as a function 
of teacher characteristics. As mentioned before, this chapter aims to investigate the impact of 
teacher characteristics on student performance. Mean student performance within a school is 
therefore modelled at the second level. Relationships between student-level characteristics and 
the outcome variable will not be modelled as being functions of teacher-level characteristics. 
In terms of the model format presented in equation 1 above, then, the second level of the model 
is organised as shown in equations 3a to 3d below. 
                               𝛽0𝑗 =  𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝑊1𝑗 + 𝛾02𝑊2𝑗+ . . . +𝛾0𝑆𝑊𝑆𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗   (3a)  
                                                            𝛽1𝑗 =  𝛾10       (3b) 
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                                                            𝛽2𝑗 =  𝛾20       (3c) 
     .   . 
     .   . 
     .   .                                                          
                                                            𝛽𝑄𝑗 =  𝛾𝑄0       (3d) 
Where S = [1, 2, . . . , S] denotes the number of teacher-level characteristics included in the 
second level of the model. The combined model therefore takes the form of equation 4. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾00 + 𝛾10 + 𝛾20+. . . +𝛾𝑄0 + 𝛾01𝑊1𝑗 + 𝛾02𝑊2𝑗+ . . . +𝛾0𝑆𝑊𝑆𝑗 +  𝑢0𝑗 (4) 
Where Q = [1, 2, . . . , Q] is the number of student level characteristics controlled for in the first 
level of the model.  
 
4. Modelling the impact of teacher characteristics on student performance 
 
Contextualising the research conducted in this paper in the model explained above requires 
first that we present the student-level or “within-classroom” model. This is the level 1 model 
explained in equation 1 above. This is presented in equation 5 below. Table 1 contains a 
description of the variables included in this equation. 
ZMATij =  𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗(𝑆𝐸𝑆) + 𝛽2𝑗(𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽3𝑗(𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽4𝑗(𝑀𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐) +
𝛽5𝑗(𝐹𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐) +  𝛽6𝑗(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 1) + 𝛽7𝑗(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) +
𝛽8𝑗(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) + 𝛽9𝑗(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 3 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠) + 𝛽10𝑗(𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠) +
𝛽11𝑗(𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒) + 𝛽12𝑗(𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠) + 𝛽13𝑗(𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒) +
𝛽14𝑗(𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽15𝑗(𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽16𝑗(𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 6) +
𝛽17𝑗(𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎 𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝑟𝑖𝑗        (5) 
Education production function theory suggests that student education outcomes are a function 
of both school-level (or “policy-controlled”) characteristics and family- and peer-level (or 
“non-controlled”) characteristics (Hanushek, 2007: 3). Family characteristics largely refer to 
socio-demographic characteristics and in equation 5 include socioeconomic status (SES), 
Overage, Female, Mother matric and Father matric. The relationship between SES and student 
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performance is well-documented, particularly in the case of South Africa (Van der Berg et al., 
2011). SES is included as a student-level explanatory variable to control for this relationship 
and to ensure that estimates observed for other explanatory variables – many of which are 
correlated with socioeconomic status – reflect the impact of those variables independently of 
the impact of SES. Overage and Female control for the possibility that children who are older 
than their appropriate age for their grade perform differently to those who are either the correct 
age for grade 6 or younger, and for the possibility that girls and boys perform differently. 
Students older than the grade-appropriate age seem likely to perform at a lower level than their 
peers given the possibility that they have repeated grades. However, dummy variables 
controlling for whether students have repeated a grade once, twice or three times and whether 
they are repeating their current grade (grade 6) are included to control for this possibility. As 
the results in section 6 indicate, the effect of being overage appears to work separately from 
the effect of repetition. Parental education is often included in the SES term in education 
production functions. The SES term in the SACMEQ III data was created using questions about 
assets in students’ homes and did not include information on parental education. Parental 
education is an important socio-demographic indicator and whether or not a student’s mother 
and father have attained matric are entered separately to investigate whether or not they have 
separate effects on student performance. As pointed out in section 2, testing in SACMEQ III 
in South Africa was conducted in English and Afrikaans. For the majority of South African 
students, neither of these is a first or home language. The frequency with which students speak 
English controls to some extent for this (English sometimes, English most of the time, English 
always), but the same variable does not exist for Afrikaans. Extra tuition controls for students 
receiving extra tuition but may well capture students with lower levels of ability rather than the 
effect of receiving instruction additional to that which they receive in the classroom. The 
number of years of preschool education is captured by four variables (Preschool – less than 1 
year, Preschool – 1 year, Preschool – 2 years and Preschool – 3 years plus) in order to 
investigate whether investment in “school-readiness” has a significant impact on student 
performance. 
The study investigates whether 𝛽0𝑗 differs across teachers. The combined model of 
characteristics of both students and teachers is presented in equation 6.  
ZMATij =  𝛾00 + 𝛾01(𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒)+𝛾02(30 𝑡𝑜 39 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑) +
𝛾03(40 𝑡𝑜 49 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑) + 𝛾04(50 𝑡𝑜 59 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑) + 𝛾05(60 𝑡𝑜 69 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑) +
𝛾06(𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) + 𝛾07(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝛾08(𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔)  +
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 𝛾09(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠) + 𝛾010(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑚𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠) +
𝛾011(𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛾012(𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +
𝛾013(𝐴 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠) + 𝛾014(𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) + 𝛾015(𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) +
𝛾016(1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) + 𝛾017(2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) +
𝛾018(3 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) + 𝛾019(𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 3 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) +
𝛾020(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) + 𝛾021(𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 2 𝑜𝑟 3 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠) +
𝛾022(𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 2 𝑜𝑟 3 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) + 𝛾023(𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑙𝑦) +
𝛾024(𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) + 𝛾025(𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙) + 𝛾026(𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑆𝐸𝑆) +
𝛾027(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝛽1𝑗(𝑆𝐸𝑆) + 𝛽2𝑗(𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽3𝑗(𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽4𝑗(𝑀𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐) +
𝛽5𝑗(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 1) + 𝛽6𝑗(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) + 𝛽7𝑗(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) +
𝛽8𝑗(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 3 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠) + 𝛽9𝑗(𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠) +
𝛽10𝑗(𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒) + 𝛽11𝑗(𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠) + 𝛽12𝑗(𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒) +
𝛽13𝑗(𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽14𝑗(𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽15𝑗(𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 6) +
𝛽16𝑗(𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎 𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗       (6) 
The research question is whether or not teacher characteristics impact significantly on student 
performance. The variables at the teacher level in equation 6 are grouped according to four 
categories: demographic characteristics, education and experience characteristics, effort 
characteristics and school/classroom characteristics.  
Demographic characteristics: Teacher gender may be important in explaining student 
performance if male and female teachers differ significantly from each other in terms of their 
ability to teach. Teacher female is included to control for whether a teacher is female and 
whether this has a statistically significant effect on mean student mathematics performance. 
Teacher age is controlled for using dummy variables for 10 year bands and the impact of 
teachers’ age is measured relative to the youngest group of teachers (19 to 29 year olds). 
Significant coefficients on these variables may indicate either inherent differences in the ability 
of teachers to improve student performance associated with teacher age, or potentially 
differences in the training received by teachers trained at different times in South Africa.  
Education and experience: Experience33 is included to capture the number of years that 
teachers have been teaching. Literature on teacher experience suggests that beyond the initial 
                                                          
33 Teaching experience and teacher age may have conflating effects on student performance. However, the model 
was run without controlling for teaching experience and this made very little difference to the age coefficients. 
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years of teacher experience, the impact of having taught for longer periods of time becomes 
smaller. Teaching experience is rarely found to be statistically significant in its impact on 
student performance (Koedel, 2007). It is included in this analysis as dummy variables 
capturing experience in 5 year bands. Dummy variables capturing teachers’ level of educational 
attainment are included to ascertain whether a certain level of education impact student 
performance significantly. Given the restructuring of teacher training with the closing of 
teacher training colleges in 2000, it is important to investigate the extent to which the 
attainment of a university degree impacts on student performance.  
Days of training captures the time teachers spent participating in in-service training courses. 
In-service training programmes are perceived by researchers to be largely ineffective in 
affecting student performance (NEEDU, 2013: 15).  
Teacher training is captured by dummy variables reflecting whether teachers received less than 
1 year, 1 year, 2 years or 3 years of teacher training. In the South African education system, 
teachers may qualify via various channels, an explanation of which is included in Appendix D. 
It is important to investigate the extent to which different avenues to teacher training impact 
on student performance.  
Teacher maths score34 is included to control for teachers’ own mathematical content 
knowledge. The model is run including teacher maths score as well as excluding it. This is 
done in order to ensure that the impact of teacher training variables is separated from teachers’ 
own performance in mathematics. Finally, dummy variables controlling for whether teachers 
are trained to teach (i.e. pedagogical training) and whether they are trained specifically to teach 
maths are included.   
Effort characteristics: Parents sign homework is included as a dummy variable to capture the 
extent to which teachers ensure that students complete their assigned work. The variable is 
intended to proxy for teachers’ interest in students’ progress. Dummy variables controlling for 
the frequency of testing are included to measure teacher “engagement” with students’ progress. 
Marking of tests is time-consuming and often tedious work for teachers. It is assumed that 
higher frequencies of testing indicate higher levels of effort. Important to note is that both 
                                                          
Experience and age were asked separately in the teacher questionnaire. Both have been retained as they control 
for different characteristics, and both are necessary for the sake of this analysis.  
34 Teacher maths score is missing for 98 teachers in the SACMEQ III dataset. Where possible, missing data were 
replaced with the mean mathematics score of teachers within the same school. Teachers from schools in which no 
teachers wrote the mathematics tests were excluded from the model in which teacher maths score was included 
as an explanatory variables. This meant that 29 teachers were dropped from this sample.  
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variables are self-reported by teachers. It is likely therefore that the extent to which these 
activities occur is over-stated.  
School and classroom characteristics: A number of variables included in the teacher-level 
model are in fact school-level characteristics, but in the case of the SACMEQ data in a 
significant number of schools only one classroom was sampled. The classroom is therefore 
completely identified by the school and so for these variables (with the exception of Classroom 
SES) no variation occurs at the level of the school. The school-level variables, namely Rural, 
Private school and Average class size are therefore included to control for differences that are 
observed between students attending schools with these characteristics and those attending 
schools in which these characteristics are absent. 
5. Results 
 
The multi-level nature of education data necessitates hierarchical or multi-level modelling. The 
overall variation in student performance can be at the level of the student and the teacher. In 
other words, there are characteristics of both students and their teachers that influence student 
performance. A first step in performing hierarchical linear modelling is to ascertain whether or 
not any variation occurs at the higher level. The extent to which student performance is 
attributable to teacher characteristics therefore needs to be tested.  
Formally partitioning the variance into the components that occur at the level of the student 
and the teacher is achieved by running a fully unconditional model in which students’ 
mathematics performance is allowed to vary without including controls for any level 1 (student) 
or level 2 (teacher) characteristics. This is presented in equation 7 below. 
𝑌𝒊𝒋 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗 
where                                                           𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗    (7) 
The variance component associated with level 1 (i.e. the student level), 𝑟𝑖𝑗 ( 𝜎
2), is estimated 
at 0.452, while that associated with level 2 (i.e. the level of the teacher), 𝑢𝑖𝑗(𝜏00), is estimated 
at 0.747. The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) is the variance at the level of the teacher 
as a proportion of overall variance. The ICC (ρ) is therefore calculated according to equation 
8. 
𝜌 =  
𝜏00
𝜎2+𝜏00
=  
0.738
0.451+0.738
= 0.621       (8) 
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The variances presented above result in ρ = 0.621, indicating that just over 62% of the variation 
in students’ mathematics performance is explained at the level of the teacher or school. There 
therefore seems to be a case for using multi-level modelling to explain the factors influencing 
student performance. The reliability estimate of the intercept term,35 which measures the ratio 
of the variance of the parameter estimate to that of the sample mean for the intercept term, is 
0.957, indicating that a large proportion of the variance in mean mathematics performance 
across teachers may potentially be explained at the level of the teacher.  
This analysis of variance is conducted without including controls at either level. This may be 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it is possible that group-level predictors impact 
substantially on the outcome variable but that two variables have opposite effects with the 
result that they cancel each other out (Chaplin, 2008: 11). In this case, it may appear that no 
variation occurs at the level of the group when in fact group-level characteristics are significant 
in determining the outcome. Secondly, individual and group-level characteristics may offset 
each other, again masking sources of variation in the outcome variable and making it seem as 
if multi-level modelling is unnecessary when in fact significant variation occurs at the level of 
the group (Chaplin, 2008: 12). In both cases then the danger is that group-level variation is 
being masked. As shown below, it is unlikely that this is a problem in South Africa given the 
large proportion of variation in student mathematics explained at the level of the classroom.  
The within-classroom model is presented in table 6 below.  
 
TABLE 6: Student-level model 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
 Coefficients Standard Errors 
Intercept 0.105*** 0.036 
Student SES 0.132*** 0.015 
Overage -0.130*** 0.025 
Female -0.004 0.018 
Mother completed matric 0.099*** 0.020 
Father completed matric 0.051*** 0.049 
Less than 1 year preschool 0.015 0.042 
1 year of preschool 0.036 0.024 
2 years of preschool 0.060** 0.028 
3 or more years of preschool 0.109*** 0.029 
                                                          
35 The reliability estimate is calculated as 𝜆𝑗 =
𝜏00
𝜏00+
𝜎2
𝑛
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Speaks English sometimes 0.166*** 0.026 
Speaks English most of the time 0.188*** 0.042 
Speaks English always 0.310*** 0.059 
Repeated a grade once -0.215*** 0.027 
Repeated a grade twice -0.210*** 0.039 
Repeated a grade three times -0.250*** 0.050 
Repeated grade 6 -0.033 0.032 
Receives extra tuition -0.159*** 0.044 
Estimated Random Effects 
 Standard Deviation Variance Chi-Squared 
Intercept 0.685 0.469 7711.760 
Within-classroom 0.653 0.426  
Reliability of teacher-level random effects 
 Mean score 0.937  
Source: Own calculations from SACMEQ III (SACMEQ, 2007). 
 
The results presented in table 6 above indicate that, predictably, socioeconomic status has a 
positive and significant impact on student mathematics performance. The coefficient in the 
table indicates that if student socioeconomic status increased by 1 standard deviation and the 
values of all other variables were held constant, student mathematics performance would 
improve by 0.130 standard deviations. Overage students perform 0.130 below their peers who 
are not overage (i.e. who are either the correct age for their grade or younger than the correct 
age for their grade) while students whose mothers completed matric outperform those whose 
mothers did not by 0.099 standard deviations. The impact of fathers having completed matric 
is positive and significant, but smaller than that observed for mothers at 0.051. This is in line 
with what is observed internationally. Students who have received 1, 2 and 3 years of 
preschooling outperform those who have had no preschooling by 0.035, 0.060 and 0.109 
standard deviations respectively, while students who speak English outside the classroom 
sometimes, often and always outperform those who do not speak English outside the classroom 
by 0.166, 0.188 and 0.309 standard deviations respectively. Students who have repeated a grade 
once, twice or three times perform 0.22, 0.21 and 0.25 standard deviations below students who 
have not repeated a grade, respectively, indicating that there is no real difference in the 
performance amongst students who have repeated grades.36 The coefficient for students 
repeating grade 6 is not statistically significantly different from that of students who are not 
                                                          
36 An F-test confirms this. 
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repeating grade 6, suggesting that students repeating grade 6 do not perform differently from 
students repeating other grades37. Students receiving extra tuition are outperformed by their 
peers not receiving extra tuition by 0.159 standard deviations. This may well reflect a lower 
ability in the students receiving extra tuition rather than the extra tuition having a negative 
impact on their performance.  
Controlling for the student level characteristics decreases the within-classroom variance by 
roughly 37% from 0.747 to 0.469. The fact that level 1 characteristics explain so little of the 
variance of the mean highlight the fact that a substantial portion of the variation in student 
performance is explained at a higher level or not at all. Most educational performance data for 
South Africa contain neither pre-test scores nor racial classification – both of which are highly 
correlated with educational performance. This is obvious in the case of pre-test scores. In the 
case of race, performance in the South African education system is still significantly correlated 
with performance of the system under apartheid, with the part of the schooling system 
historically serving South Africa’s white population far outperforming the part of the schooling 
system historically serving South Africa’s black population. The historically white part of the 
schooling system is now substantially more representative of South Africa’s population than 
in previous years, while the historically black portion remains almost entirely black. Most white 
children find themselves in the historically white part of the schooling system and for this 
reason race is a significant determinant of schooling performance.  
In addition, the variables included in the within-classroom model control for the home 
background and variables pertaining to previous education performance. Unobservable 
characteristics such as intelligence or ambition play a significant role in school performance. 
However, it is impossible to measure and control for them.  
In order to investigate the extent to which teacher-level characteristics impact on student 
performance, level 2 variables are added to the model. Table 7 below presents the results from 
the full multilevel model. Model 1 contains the results for the full teacher model including 
teacher maths score, while model 2 excludes teacher maths score.  
 
 
                                                          
37 An F-test confirms this. 
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TABLE 7: Full hierarchical linear model 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient Std deviation Coefficient Std deviation 
Intercept 0.231 0.208 0.278 0.286 
TEACHER DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS  
   Female 0.071 0.046 0.063 0.045 
   30 to 39 years of age -0.345*** 0.130 -0.378*** 0.131 
   40 to 49 years of age -0.389*** 0.132 -0.474*** 0.132 
   50 to 59 years of age -0.522*** 0.160 -0.618*** 0.161 
   60 years and older -0.325*** 0.296 -0.360* 0.301 
TEACHER EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE  
   Teacher maths score 0.105*** 0.024   
   Experience: 6 to 10 years 0.150* 0.084 0.181** 0.084 
   Experience: 11 to 15 years 0.031 0.064 0.086 0.062 
   Experience: 16 to 20 years -0.033 0.077 -0.022 0.075 
   Experience: 21 to 25 years -0.027 0.083 -0.038 0.083 
   Experience: 26 to 30 years 0.170 0.141 0.226 0.138 
   Experience: 31 to 35 years 0.267* 0.162 0.323** 0.164 
   Experience: 36 to 40 years 0.042 0.266 0.071 0.270 
   Experience: 41 plus years -0.412 0.624 -0.434 0.637 
   Number of days training  
received 
-0.000 0.001 0.000 0.00 
   Trained in mathematics 0.093 0.303 0.086 0.308 
   Trained to teach 
mathematics 
-0.213 0.302 -0.184 0.306 
   Completed jr secondary    
education 
-0.029 0.164 0.006 0.166 
   Completed sr secondary 
education 
0.058 0.086 0.064 0.087 
   Completed A-levels 0.002 0.072 0.033 0.071 
   Completed a degree 0.097* 0.059 0.111* 0.058 
   Received less than 1 year 
training 
0.923 0.644 0.579 0.453 
   Received 1 year of training 0.029 0.306 0.011 0.308 
   Received 2 years of training 0.254 0.293 0.191 0.297 
   Received 3 years of training 0.169 0.280 0.112 0.284 
   Received 3 years plus of 
training 
0.215 0.281 0.180 0.285 
TEACHER EFFORT  
   Parents sign students’ 
homework 
0.032 0.048 0.023 0.048 
   Test 2 to 3 times per term 0.020 0.075 0.034 0.076 
   Tests 2 to 3 times per 
month 
0.025 0.080 0.015 0.081 
   Tests at least once per week 0.088 0.087 0.082 0.088 
SCHOOL AND CLASSROOM CHARACTERISTICS  
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   Rural -0.007 0.055 -0.001 0.054 
   Classroom SES 0.568*** 0.040 0.683*** 0.036 
   Private school 0.002 0.107 -0.024 0.108 
   Average class size (of the 
school) 
-0.006*** 0.002 -0.006*** 0.002 
STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS    
SES 0.063*** 0.013 0.062*** 0.012 
Overage -0.096*** 0.022 -0.101*** 0.021 
Female -0.007 0.015 -0.003 0.014 
Mother completed matric 0.074*** 0.017 0.072*** 0.017 
Father completed matric 0.048*** 0.017 0.045*** 0.017 
Less than 1 year preschool 0.018 0.037 0.024 0.03 
1 year of preschool 0.033 0.020 0.026 0.020 
2 years of preschool 0.035 0.025 0.040 0.025 
3 or more years of preschool 0.093*** 0.024 0.094*** 0.024 
Speaks English sometimes 0.157*** 0.020 0.157*** 0.020 
Speaks English most of the 
time 
0.160*** 0.034 0.158*** 0.032 
Speaks English always 0.271*** 0.039 0.249*** 0.038 
Repeated a grade once -0.204*** 0.022 -0.206*** 0.021 
Repeated a grade twice -0.229*** 0.038 -0.211*** 0.036 
Repeated a grade three times -0.249*** 0.050 -0.218*** 0.046 
Repeated grade 6 -0.043 0.032 -0.052* 0.030 
Receives extra tuition -0.147*** 0.034 -0.137*** 0.032 
 Estimated Random Effects  
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Variance Chi-Squared 
 
Intercept 0.416  0.173 3 468.531  
Within-classroom 0.651  0.424   
 Reliability of teacher-level random effects  
 Mean score  0.852   
Source: Own calculations from SACMEQ III (SACMEQ, 2007). 
 
The results obtained from the full model are discussed for the model excluding teacher 
mathematics score as this model is run for a greater number of observations. The results 
obtained for both specifications are largely similar, however. Coefficients which differ 
markedly from each other will be discussed where relevant. For the most part, however, they 
are largely similar. 
Teacher demographic characteristics: Whether a teacher is female does not have a statistically 
significant impact on student performance. An interesting result obtained is the effect of teacher 
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age on mean student performance. The coefficients on age indicate that relative to the reference 
group (teacher age 19 to 29 years old – the youngest group of teachers in the sample), the mean 
mathematics score of students taught by teachers from all other age groups is lower. 
Furthermore, with the exception of the coefficients on SES and less than 1 year of teacher 
training, the coefficients on teacher age groups are the largest amongst the teacher level 
characteristics. Indeed the mean mathematics score of students taught by teachers who are 30 
to 39 years old, 40 to 49 years old, 50 to 59 years old and older than 60 are respectively 0.378, 
0.474, 0.618 and 0.360 standard deviations below that of students taught by teachers belonging 
to the youngest age group.38 The size of the coefficient for the group of teachers aged 50 to 59 
years old is slightly higher than for the other age groups, but other than this coefficients for 
different age groups seem consistent.39 This may say something about teacher training, given 
the movement away from teacher training colleges in 2000. This is discussed in greater depth 
later. 
Teacher education and experience: Some interesting results are observed for variables 
capturing teacher qualifications. The mean performance of students being taught by teachers 
who have obtained a university degree is 0.111 standard deviations higher than that of students 
taught by a teacher who has not obtained a university degree. Important to acknowledge at this 
stage is that the positive association between teachers having a university degree and student 
performance is likely driven to some extent by the fact that better educated teachers are able to 
secure employment in well-performing schools. This selection effect means it is likely that 
variables controlling for SES – a key predictor of school performance – do not capture all 
aspects of schools’ socioeconomic context.  
In terms of teaching experience, coefficients for two of the dummy variables are statistically 
significant – Experience 6 to 10 years and Experience 31 to 35 years. The coefficients on these 
variables indicate that relative to students being taught by teachers with 5 or less years of 
teaching experience, students being taught by a teacher with 6 to 10 years of teaching 
                                                          
38 A possible explanation for the difference in the ability of younger teachers to elicit superior performance from 
their students is the fact that they themselves have a better grasp of the mathematical content which they are 
required to teach. An important part of understanding the differences illustrated by the coefficients above is 
investigating whether younger teachers are better at maths or whether they are better teachers. This is tested by 
interacting teacher test score with the dummy variables controlling for age. However, the coefficients are small 
and statistically insignificant. It does not appear therefore that this effect works through superior mathematical 
content knowledge amongst younger teachers.  
39 The model was re-run with different cohorts of teachers as the reference group. The results indicate that although 
the differences in the coefficients are smaller in size amongst groups older than the youngest group, the ability to 
elicit stronger performance from students does differ by teacher age, with younger teachers out-performing their 
older colleagues. This is confirmed by an F-test.  
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experience perform on average 0.181 standard deviations better, and students being taught by 
teachers with between 31 and 35 years of teaching experience perform 0.323 standard 
deviations above other students. Interestingly, in model 1 (which controls for teachers’ 
performance on their mathematics tests), teachers’ mathematics test performance results are 
statistically significantly positively related to mean student mathematics performance. As 
teachers’ maths scores are z-scored, the coefficient of 0.105 indicates that an improvement of 
1 standard deviation in teacher maths performance results in an improvement of 0.105 standard 
deviations in mean mathematics performance amongst students.  
Teacher effort: None of the teacher effort variables included in the model appears to impact 
on mean mathematics performance in a significant way. This may be due to the fact that these 
variables are self-reported by teachers. The frequency of testing as well as whether parents are 
required to sign homework may well be over-reported.  
School and classroom characteristics: The large and statistically significant coefficient 
observed for classroom SES is to be expected. The coefficient of 0.627 indicates that a 1 
standard deviation increase in classroom SES is associated with a 0.627 standard deviation 
increase in mean mathematics performance. The statistically significant negative coefficient 
for Average class size (of the school) is intuitive, suggesting that larger classes are associated 
with weaker performance. The size of the coefficient is very small, however. Increasing class 
size by one student decreases mean student performance by 0.006 of a standard deviation. 
Despite the fact that it is statistically significant, it is not economically significant. It is too 
small to indicate any real relationship between the variables.  
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
The results presented above are important in the context of South Africa’s education system. 
Teachers are an important resource in education and it is necessary to understand how best to 
utilise the resource.  
The results for the hierarchical linear model reveal that younger teachers are better able to 
increase the mean performance of students. In order to test whether this is a trend observed 
amongst teachers across different countries or whether this is a trend particular to South Africa, 
the identical HLM model was run for 3 other countries in the SACMEQ III dataset – two of 
South Africa’s neighbouring countries, Botswana and Zimbabwe, and a high-performing East 
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African country, Kenya. The coefficients on the teacher age variables are presented in table 8 
below. 
TABLE 8: HLM coefficients on teacher age variables for 4 SACMEQ countries 
Teacher age Botswana Kenya Zimbabwe South Africa 
30 to 39 years old 
-0.075 
(0.078) 
0.062 
(0.109) 
0.005 
(0.103) 
-0.378*** 
(0.131) 
40 to 49 years old 
-0.029 
(0.103) 
-0.232 
(0.142) 
-0.115 
(0.130) 
-0.474*** 
(0.132) 
50 to 59 years old 
0.199 
(0.152) 
-0.561*** 
(0.191) 
-0.287 
(0.201) 
-0.618*** 
(0.161) 
60 to 69 years old - - 
-0.318 
(0.588) 
-0.360* 
(0.301) 
Number of students 3 842 4 272 2 983 8 917 
Number of teachers 342 259 273 498 
Source: Own calculations from SACMEQ III (SACMEQ, 2007). 
 
The pattern for lower mean mathematics performance amongst students being taught by older 
teachers appears in Kenya. The magnitude of these coefficients is comparable with those 
observed in South Africa. In fact in Kenya, the coefficient for teachers aged 50 to 59 years old 
is almost double that of South Africa’s. However, this is the only coefficient which is 
statistically significant whereas in the case of South Africa, the coefficients for all teacher age 
groups are statistically significant relative to the reference group of teachers aged 19 to 29 years 
old.40  
This discussion investigates why this may be the case. As described earlier, the studies 
conducted by SACMEQ in 2000 and 2007 included teacher tests. Due to union objections to 
teachers being tested, South African teachers participated only in the teacher test conducted in 
2007 and were allowed to opt out of being tested. Interestingly, teacher performance on the 
mathematics test appears to differ according to age in the same way that teachers’ ability to 
elicit test performance from their students does. Figure 23 below presents the distribution of 
teacher performance on mathematics tests for teachers of different ages.  
 
                                                          
40 The coefficient for South African teachers aged 60 and older is not statistically significant. However, this 
group is comprised of just 4 teachers. 
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FIGURE 23: Teacher mathematics score by age group 
 
Source: SACMEQIII, 2007. 
 
The kernel density curves drawn in figure 23 demonstrate that younger teachers perform at a 
significantly higher level in the mathematics test than teachers in older age groups. Similar 
results are obtained with regards to teacher performance on language tests. Figure 24 presents 
the distribution of language performance results amongst teachers in different age groups. As 
seen in the mathematics test, teachers in the age group 19 to 29 perform better than their 
counterparts in older age groups in the language test. 
 
FIGURE 24: Teacher language score by age group  
 
Source: SACMEQIII, 2007. 
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Kernel densities for Botswana, Kenya and Zimbabwe were drawn for teacher performance in 
mathematics tests in figures 25, 26 and 27 below and for teacher performance in language tests 
in figures 28, 29 and 30.  
 
FIGURE 25: Teacher mathematics score by age (Botswana) 
 
Source: SACMEQIII, 2007 
 
FIGURE 26: Teacher mathematics score by age (Kenya) 
 
Source: SACMEQIII, 2007 
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FIGURE 27: Teacher mathematics score by age (Zimbabwe) 
 
Source: SACMEQIII, 2007 
 
FIGURE 28: Teacher language score by age (Botswana) 
 
Source: SACMEQIII, 2007 
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FIGURE 29: Teacher language score by age (Kenya) 
 
Source: SACMEQIII, 2007 
 
 
FIGURE 30: Teacher language score by age (Zimbabwe) 
 
Source: SACMEQIII, 2007 
 
The differences in the performance of teachers of different ages in Botswana, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe are not as marked as they are in South Africa. It seems therefore that this is a 
phenomenon particular to South Africa.  
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A basic OLS regression was run to investigate whether the difference in performance between 
teachers is statistically significant. The results are presented in table 9 below.  
TABLE 9: Regression of teacher test performance on teacher age  
 Coefficient and standard deviation 
Variable Mathematics Language 
30 to 39 years old -0.997* 
(0.555) 
-0.715*** 
(0.269) 
40 to 49 years old -1.586*** 
(0.552) 
-0.701*** 
(0.269) 
50 to 59 years old -1.237** 
(0.596) 
-0.738*** 
(0.286) 
60 years and older -1.452 
(1.243) 
-0.330 
(0.408) 
Constant 0.416 
(0.530) 
0.734*** 
(0.256) 
Sample size 497 415 
R-squared 0.03 0.01 
Source: Own calculations from SACMEQ III (SACMEQ, 2007). 
 
It therefore appears that older teachers are outperformed by younger teachers in both 
mathematics and language. Younger mathematics teachers also seem better able to elicit better 
performance from their students. It is important to investigate the possible reasons for this 
pattern. Similar estimates were found by using data from PIRLS 2006 on reading and literacy 
amongst students of a similar age. Shepherd (2013: 31) used weighted least squares regression 
to investigate the determinants of student reading and literacy and found a large, positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for teachers who are 30 years old or younger. Interestingly, 
this is only observed amongst teachers of students who wrote the PIRLS test in an African 
language and who were therefore in the historically black part of the schooling system. 
Amongst students writing the test in English of Afrikaans, the coefficient was somewhat 
smaller, negative and statistically insignificant (Shepherd, 2013: 31). Interestingly, when the 
model is run for quintiles 1 to 4 for South Africa in the SACMEQ III dataset, the coefficients 
diminish in size and although still statistically significant, they are significant at a lower level. 
The results are presented in Appendix C.   
More than one explanation may exist for the differential ability of younger teachers to elicit 
stronger performance from their students. Younger teachers may relate better to their students 
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because they are closer in age than their older counterparts. Another possibility is that changes 
to teacher training may have left teachers trained under a new system better equipped to teach. 
We are able to test these hypotheses using data from the second SACMEQ survey conducted 
in 2000. As mentioned above, no teacher tests were conducted for South African teachers in 
2000. Other than that, the questionnaires were almost identical, making it possible to compare 
the two surveys and so the same model can be run for SACMEQ II data. If younger teacher are 
inherently better at teaching (and not as a result of different teacher training) we expect to see 
similar coefficients to those observed using the SACMEQ III data for teacher age variables in 
similar models from different time periods.  
The full HLM model was run using SACMEQ II data. The full results are presented in 
Appendix B. Table 10 presents the coefficients on the teacher age variables obtained when data 
from the 2000 study were used.  
 
TABLE 10: HLM coefficients on teacher age variables using SACMEQ II (2000) 
Teacher age 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
30 to 39 years old 
0.003 
(0.120) 
40 to 49 years old 
0.315* 
(0.189) 
50 years and older 
0.671** 
(0.232) 
Number of students 3 135 
Number of teachers 187 
Source: Own calculations from SACMEQ II (SACMEQ, 2000). 
 
The coefficients in table 10 are quite different from those obtained from the 2007 data of the 
SACMEQ III survey. In fact, only the teachers aged 50 to 59 differ significantly from the 
youngest group of teachers and in this case, they seem to elicit better performance from their 
students. According to this data then, the statistically significant negative coefficients observed 
for teachers older than the 29 years of age (relative to the youngest group) are not explained by 
an inherent ability of younger teachers to positively influence mean student performance. It is 
possible then that differences in teacher training explain the differences in the student 
performance according to the age of their teacher.  
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As explained in the next subsection, teacher training is one of the few characteristics that may 
render younger teachers better able to impact positively on their students’ performance. 
Changes in teacher training in the South African education system occurred in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s – the time in which the youngest cohort of teachers were trained. The following 
section discusses these changes.   
6.1 Differences in teacher training41 
 
An obvious avenue to pursue in understanding the differences that are observed in the 
performance of teachers of different ages is to investigate the extent to which the training 
received by teachers differed across years. A potential source of differences in teacher training 
is the shift from teacher training colleges as the institutions responsible for training teachers to 
the incorporation of teacher training within universities. Chisholm (2009: 9) explains that 
teacher training colleges expanded predominantly in the 1960s. The apartheid state located the 
majority of teacher training colleges in the “homeland” areas with the objective of staffing the 
colleges with the graduates. Chisholm (2009: 14) explains that enrolment in the teacher 
colleges was high due to the fact that opportunities in the formal economy were restricted for 
non-white South Africans, and entering a teacher training college was one of the very few ways 
in which people living in the homelands could enter higher education.  
Teacher training colleges were expensive to run and were heavily subsidised by the state 
(Chisholm, 2009: 16). Because of a movement towards decreasing unit costs and enhancing 
productivity within the higher education sector, teacher colleges were offered the option of 
remaining open as independent institutions if they were able to enrol 2 000 full-time students 
in 1999, or becoming integrated as part of universities or universities of technology. Teacher 
training colleges were formally incorporated into universities and universities of technology 
from January 2001 (Chisholm, 2009: 16). Irving (2012: 389) explains that changes to teacher 
training in South Africa have been abrupt and dramatic. The closure of teacher colleges and 
the relocation of teacher training to universities was a considerable change and required 
adjustment.  
Teachers trained after the incorporation of teacher training colleges into universities or 
universities of technology would therefore have been 25 years old in 2007 when SACMEQ III 
                                                          
41 A brief explanation of the minimum requirements for the education of teachers is contained in Appendix C.  
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was conducted42 and allowing for some violations of the assumptions explained in footnote 1 
below, the age group of 19 to 29 years old (the reference group in the analysis conducted above) 
captures teachers who are likely to have completed their teacher training at universities or 
universities of technology.43  
If we assume that teacher training does in fact influence teacher performance, then it appears 
that teachers trained at universities and universities of technology are better able to teach than 
are teachers trained at teacher training colleges. If this is the correct interpretation of the results 
obtained in table 4, it has important implications for the teacher training landscape in South 
Africa. South African teacher unions have since 2002 called for the reopening of teacher 
training colleges (Chisholm, 2009: 17). The South African Democratic Teachers Union 
(SADTU), the biggest union as it represents two thirds of teachers (Wills: 2014: 4), is of the 
opinion that teacher shortages (particularly in the areas of mother tongue and foundation phase 
education) result in excessively large class sizes which interfere significantly with the ability 
of their members to provide quality education. Indeed, at SADTU’s 2006 National Conference, 
there was a recommendation for setting a maximum acceptable class size of 30 students – a 
number which requires substantial increases in teacher supply in order to be achieved 
(Chisholm, 2009: 17). This resulted in SADTU’s 2007/08 call for the reopening of teacher 
training colleges.  
A second argument in favour of reopening teacher training colleges has to do with the quality 
of teacher training provided by universities and universities of technology. Patterson and 
Arends (2008: 85) are of the opinion that primary and secondary school teaching are not given 
the attention they require in the higher education system. They consider university fees for 
studying to teach primary education high enough to exclude candidates from the teaching 
profession. Finally, university education is considered by teachers already teaching in schools 
to be excessively theoretical and abstract relative to what is required to teach primary school 
(Patterson and Arends, 2008: 86). Teachers and lecturers trained in teacher training colleges 
feel that universities and universities of technology lack the “hands on” practical guidance that 
was provided by colleges. They are of the opinion that principals and experienced teachers do 
                                                          
42 With the data available there is no way of knowing at what age teachers were trained. The age of 25 is based 
on the assumptions that teachers started higher education directly after finishing secondary school, and that 
teachers left secondary school at the grade appropriate age of 18, therefore turning 19 in their first year of tertiary 
education. In many instances these assumptions are most definitely violated. It is likely for example that 
individuals took longer than the prescribed amount of time to complete tertiary education, and that individuals 
started teacher training after having completed other courses of study.  
43 73% of the teachers in this age group are younger than 25 years old.  
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not have the same opportunities for involvement in training future teachers as had been 
available in teacher training colleges (Chisholm, 2009: 17). 
For various reasons, therefore, there is a strong belief that re-opening teacher training colleges 
may improve the quality (and quantity) of teachers in general, and primary teachers in 
particular. The evidence above suggests that this may not be the case.  
6.2 Other sources of differentials by teacher age 
 
Other explanations for differences in the performance of older and younger teachers have less 
to do with the structures within which teacher training takes place and more with the nature of 
teaching itself. Anecdotal evidence from teachers suggests that younger teachers are better able 
to engage and build rapport with their students because they are closer in age to students and 
because successful teaching requires high levels of energy. Younger teachers are also likely to 
be more familiar with the current curriculum and may therefore be more familiar with the 
content they are required to teach to students (Education Forum, 2006). An unflattering view 
of the performance gap between older and younger teachers is the tendency or willingness of 
younger teachers to “cheat” or teach to the test in order to appear to be performing well, 
compared to older teachers who would probably be more intent on ensuring that students 
receive a broader, more complete education rather than to focus on what is prescribed by the 
curriculum (Education Forum, 2006). Literature on differences in performance of teachers by 
age is scarce in the area of primary education. Very little empirical evidence exists of such 
disparities, which renders the results obtained in this paper quite important.  
The most important finding from this chapter then has been that younger teachers are better 
able to elicit performance from students in mathematics at a grade 6 level. Similar results are 
found by Shepherd (2013) using different data, also at a grade 6 level but for performance in 
reading literacy. More must be done to fully understand this finding and to further investigate 
the reasons for differences in the ability of teachers of different ages to affect student 
performance. Differences in the training received by teachers in universities and universities 
of technology and that received by teachers trained at teacher training colleges need to be 
understood. How exactly do these differences translate into student learning? Are there 
unobservable characteristics according to which teachers differ that are correlated with age? If 
so, what should be done to ensure that student have access to teachers with these 
characteristics?  
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Conclusion 
How attractive is the teaching profession and which 
teachers are considered most effective? 
 
 
This thesis provides an economic perspective on teachers in the South African education 
system. The challenges facing education in South Africa are vast and complicated and require 
research from different perspectives and disciplines to arrive at appropriate policy responses. 
Indeed, even the challenges surrounding one aspect of the education system (teachers) require 
a broad spectrum of expertise. Economics is, however, well placed to analyse particular aspects 
of the teachers and the teaching profession and may contribute to understanding how the 
profession is viewed by prospective teachers. Furthermore, it enables us to quantify the effect 
of particular teacher characteristics on student performance. This is an admittedly “clinical” 
and one-dimensional approach to understanding a complex process, a process which in many 
ways is unique to the individual teacher. However, using econometric techniques to investigate 
this relationship can reveal important patterns that warrant further investigation and may 
therefore be thought of as an initial step in understanding the intricacies of the process of 
teaching.   
Attracting high quality teachers to the profession is one of the key challenges facing the South 
African education system. As reviewed in chapter 1 and to some extent in chapter 3 (although 
this literature focuses specifically on the teacher characteristics that most significantly affect 
student performance), considerable evidence exists on the importance of teacher behaviour in 
achieving desirable education outcomes. High quality teaching is paramount to achieving 
acceptable levels of student performance and may well mitigate some of the issues brought 
about by lack of access to other education resources.  
Internationally then it is important to convince highly able individuals to become teachers. A 
key consideration in career choice is remuneration. Individuals’ willingness to pursue a career 
is to some extent correlated with the wage return to their level of educational attainment, as 
well as the extent to which their remuneration is likely to grow as they accumulate more 
experience in their role. An age wage profile that rewards additional years in the profession is 
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likely to convince all teachers to remain in the profession longer but, more importantly, is likely 
to convince highly able teachers to remain in the profession. If the age-wage profile associated 
with teaching is unattractive (relative to those associated with other professions), the 
individuals most able to leave teaching and enter other professions (i.e. highly able teachers) 
are most likely to leave the profession.  
Chapter 1 investigated the attractiveness of the teaching profession from a wage perspective. 
The results suggest that the returns to higher levels of education for teachers are significantly 
lower for teachers than they are for all non-teachers with at least 12 years of educational 
attainment in the South African labour market. Importantly, the gap between the labour market 
returns to education for teachers and non-teachers increases at higher levels of education, 
suggesting that from a wage perspective, the teaching profession for highly educated 
individuals is not an attractive option. The age-wage profiles drawn for teachers appears to 
increase remarkably between 2007 and 2010, in that both the non-parametric local polynomial 
smoothed lines and the profile drawn from the Mincerian wage function indicate that the age-
wage profile for teachers has improved somewhat since 2007.  
Simulating the combinations of education and potential experience for which the wage returns 
to teaching are higher than they are for non-teaching occupations reveals that teaching is an 
attractive option only for individuals without degrees and lower experience. From a wage 
perspective teaching does not appeal to individuals with degrees or postgraduate qualifications. 
This finding aligns with the finding that the distribution of matric mathematics and language 
marks for those enrolled in the education faculty at the University of Stellenbosch are 
significantly weaker than those of students enrolled in other faculties. Furthermore, a lower 
proportion of education students took higher grade mathematics as a matric subject. It therefore 
appears that from the perspective of ability (in so far we assume that this is captured by matric 
performance), prospective teachers fall within the weaker part of the distribution of cognitive 
outcomes.  
As discussed earlier, attracting highly able individuals to the teaching profession is key to 
achieving high quality education. An ideal scenario would be to ensure that all those entering 
the teaching profession come from the upper end of the ability distribution. However, the 
evidence from the University of Stellenbosch (albeit not representative of South Africa as a 
whole) suggests that this is unlikely to be the case. It is necessary therefore to ensure that 
individuals who have already joined the profession perform to the best of their ability. Teacher 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
140 
 
incentives have proved effective internationally in improving student performance. 
Furthermore,  in addition to improving the performance of individuals already in the teaching 
profession, the introduction of incentives may induce those best able to elicit strong student 
performance (i.e. high quality teachers) to enter the profession since they stand to benefit from 
their implementation.  
Chapter 1 therefore “updates” what we currently know about the relative position of teachers 
in the wage distribution. The absence of wage data for 2008 and 2009 is unfortunate as it 
appears that important changes in favour of teachers took place between 2007 and 2010. This 
is an important finding and one that should be communicated to prospective teachers. In terms 
of attracting highly able candidates to the profession, this type of analysis may prove extremely 
useful both from the perspective of understanding how labour market participants view 
teaching from a remuneration perspective and also for the purpose of assessing whether the 
widely-held opinion of teaching as an underpaid profession is valid. 
Chapter 2 investigated teacher incentives in education. The potential for distortive behaviour 
on the part of teachers was highlighted by Holstrom and Milgrom’s multitasking model. The 
danger of individuals behaving in a way that improves performance measures without actually 
improving outcomes is not particular to teachers and education. It is prevalent across incentive 
systems and in the case of education could lead to a scenario in which student performance on 
standardised tests improves without any genuine learning taking place. Importantly and 
relevant in the context of South Africa is the hypothesis that if student performance is 
exceptionally weak, even distortive “teaching to the test” may represent an improvement in 
education outcomes since students will learn more than they would in the absence of such 
incentives. In other words, some learning is taking place in a situation where previously very 
little was taking place.  
Evidence of the use of incentives for teachers is presented from numerous countries. In the 
majority of cases, incentives improve student performance. However, the context of education 
in South Africa needs to be considered when investigating the possibility of implementing 
incentives. The level of inequality characterising the South African education system (and 
indeed many education system internationally, in both developed and developing countries) 
makes it difficult to implement any kind of incentive scheme in which teachers are ranked 
according to their performance (or the performance of their students) without inadvertently 
favouring teachers in schools with higher socioeconomic status. Incentive systems from two 
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countries, Chile and Brazil, are useful examples of circumventing some of the issues associated 
with high levels of inequality. In those countries schools are divided, ranked and rewarded 
according to region and socioeconomic group (in the case of Chile) and according to their level 
of performance (in the case of Pernambuco, Brazil), which deals to some extent with the 
unfairness inherent in comparing schools drawing children from highly different parts of the 
SES distribution  
Comparing teachers and schools with relevant peers does not, however, take care of the fact 
that teacher incentives are awarded on the basis of student performance on standardised tests. 
Numerous factors – a large number of which are outside the teacher’s control - affect student 
performance. An attractive aspect of teacher incentives in place in Chile and one that to some 
extent remedies the problem of awarding incentives on the basis of only one noisy measure of 
teacher performance is the multidimensional measure according to which teachers are 
rewarded. The fact that teachers are given multiple opportunities for evaluation as well as the 
fact that they are evaluated according to different criteria means that student performance is 
not the only measure dictating the awarding of incentives.  
In terms of incentives amongst South African teachers, the current monitoring of teacher 
performance (IQMS), very little exists in terms of formal systems put in place to elicit high 
levels of effort from teachers.  
Incentivising teacher performance is useful and effective if it does in fact result in increased 
effort and improved performance of teachers and ultimately their students. However, incentives 
may not prove as useful and desirable if they are not able to affect teacher behaviour. Hanushek 
(2011) puts forward an argument for “deselecting teachers”, arguing that low quality teachers 
cannot be turned into high quality teachers. Therefore, if the objective is a high quality teaching 
force, then high quality teachers must be drawn into the teaching force. “The idea is that 
policies be put in place to identify the most-ineffective teachers and to move them out of the 
classroom” (Hanushek, 2011: 174). According to Hanushek, unless the bottom 5 to 10 percent 
of teachers are permanently removed from the teaching force, there is little hope of attaining 
the illusive high quality teaching force (Hanushek, 2011: 174). Hanushek (2011: 175) points 
out that deselection of teachers (i.e. forcing weakly performing teachers out of the profession) 
may well result in higher ability individuals entering the teaching profession since more risk-
averse (and lower ability) people would be more likely to avoid the teaching profession while 
those more convinced of their ability to deliver good results may be more willing to be 
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evaluated and judged on their performance. Another impact of forcing weak teachers out of 
teaching may be higher levels of efficiency in professional development, for example. In the 
absence of evaluation of teacher performance, the quality and usefulness of professional 
development programs are of secondary importance. However, in the case where teacher 
effectiveness will be evaluated and in cases where this evaluation is high-stakes, teachers 
certainly have more incentive to participate in high quality professional development 
programmes in order to genuinely improve their performance (Hanushek, 2011: 175). This is 
an example of where the “sorting” effect of incentives may come into play by discouraging 
those unable to perform at the required level from joining the teaching profession. Whether this 
is feasible in South Africa is questionable, however. The dominance of trade unions in South 
African teacher labour relations makes it extremely difficult to remove underperforming 
teachers from schools. Unless there is a willingness amongst union leadership to improve the 
quality of teacher in South Africa and as is the case in Chile, to some extent take responsibility 
for and become involved in the process of improving teacher quality, it is unlikely that negative 
incentives (i.e. incentives that “punish” poor performance as opposed to rewarding good 
performance) will be effective in the South African education system.  
Having investigated the prospects for ensuring high ability individuals enter the profession as 
well as the prospects of improving the performance of people already in the profession, chapter 
3 investigated which teacher characteristics are associated with improved student performance. 
Analysis using hierarchical linear modelling to control for characteristics at the level of both 
the individual student and the teacher by whom they are taught reveals that younger teachers 
are significantly more efficient at eliciting stronger student performance. Interestingly, this 
result is not observed in other Sub-Saharan African countries. In order to test whether this result 
is observed for all South African teachers (as opposed to just the youngest cohort of teachers 
observed in the 2007 SACMEQ III study), identical models were run using an almost identical 
dataset from seven years earlier (SACMEQ II study, conducted in 2000). Interestingly, the 
result appears only in South Africa in SACMEQ III. Younger teachers in this study also 
perform better on the teachers’ mathematics test than did their older counterparts, another result 
that is observed only amongst South African mathematics teachers.44 Shepherd (2013) finds 
similar results using grade 6 reading literacy data. The source of this differentiation is important 
to determine. This is an extremely important result and one that needs to be investigated further 
                                                          
44 South African teachers did not take the teacher mathematics test in the SACMEQ II study. It is therefore not 
possible to see whether the pattern of younger teacher outperformed teacher in older cohorts was present in 2000. 
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in order to understand what drives this relationship. The fact that the positive effect of younger 
teachers can be quantified in the South African context and not in the other countries for which 
the model was run is very interesting and requires more focussed future work.   
A possible explanation for the differences in teachers’ ability to affect student performance is 
the shift in the institutions in which teachers were trained from teacher training colleges to 
universities and universities of technology. This explanation would account for the fact that the 
relationship between teacher age and student performance is not observed in earlier studies 
(SACMEQ II) and why it is not seen in other Sub-Saharan African countries. The availability 
of data from the SACMEQ IV study (scheduled for implementation between 2012 and 2014) 
will allow for the investigation of whether this cohort of teachers, now older, still outperforms 
their older counterparts and whether still younger cohorts appear to be better teachers than their 
older colleagues. If a change in teacher training is the correct explanation for the observed 
differences, it is important to understand it better as it is widely believed that the shifting of 
teacher training to universities and universities of technology was ill-suited to the needs of the 
education system. Further investigation into the nature of the training received by teachers and 
the impact that this has on student performance is required.  
This thesis used analytical tools from economics to investigate questions around teacher 
quality. The wage structure faced by teachers is relatively unattractive when compared to that 
of non-teaching professionals, but is still somewhat appealing when compared to that faced by 
non-teachers who would not be classified as professionals and those with lower levels of 
educational attainment. Furthermore, the age-wage profile for teachers is considerably less 
attractive than observed for all non-teachers in the labour market. It is hypothesised that this 
may serve to discourage highly able individuals from joining the teaching force – a hypothesis 
which seems to be supported by data from the University of Stellenbosch. In terms of incentives 
to improve teacher effort and ultimately student performance, very few (if any) explicit 
incentives are in place in South Africa. Although the infrastructure for such monitoring is in 
place in the form of the IQMS and to some extent the ANAs, these are both low stakes and are 
unlikely to elicit higher levels of teacher effort. Finally, students seem on average to perform 
better when being taught by younger teachers. A possible explanation for this observation is 
the change in the institutions responsible for training teachers that were concluded in 2000, 
with the closure of teacher training colleges and the incorporation of some of these into 
universities and universities of technology. However, this requires more investigation.  
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Chapter 1 looked at the wage prospects facing individuals when they decide whether or not to 
enter the teaching profession. In some way, this can be thought of one of the factors determining 
whether highly able individuals (who are assumed to be high quality teachers) will join the 
teaching profession and so may be thought of as the first step in ensuring a high quality teaching 
force. Chapter 2 then investigated the possibilities for using incentives to enhance teacher 
quality amongst those already in the system. The first two chapters therefore look at the issues 
of securing high quality teachers and enhancing the quality of teaching amongst those already 
in the profession. Chapter 3 then focused more on a question that is investigated using 
education production function type analysis, investigating the characteristics of teachers 
associated with high levels of student performance. Younger teachers appear to be better able 
to elicit strong performance from students. Furthermore, they appear to perform better on 
teacher tests than their older counterparts. A possible explanation for this is the changes that 
took place in teacher training during the late 1990s and early 2000s which saw the closing of 
teacher training colleges and the relocation of teacher training to universities and universities 
of technology.  
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Appendix A 
 
FIGURE A1: Boxplots of annual earnings (2000–2007)  
 
FIGURE A2: Boxplots of annual earnings (2010)  
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TABLE A1: Non-teaching professionals in the LFS (2000–2007) and QLFS (2010) 
NON-TEACHING PROFESSIONALS 
Business professionals 
Legal professionals 
Archivists, librarians and related information professionals 
Social science and related professionals 
Writers and creative or performing artists 
Religious professionals 
College, university and higher education teaching professionals 
Health professionals (except nursing) 
Life science professionals 
Physical sciences technologists 
Computing professionals 
Architects, engineers and related professionals 
Mathematicians, statisticians and related professionals 
Physicists, chemists and related professionals 
 
 
TABLE A2: Variables included in augmented Mincerian wage function 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
13 years of education A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker has 13 years of education and 0 otherwise.  
15 years of education A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker has 15 years of education and 0 otherwise.  
16 years of education A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker has 16 years of education and 0 otherwise.  
17 years of education A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker has 17 years of education and 0 otherwise.  
Educ A continuous variable reflecting the number of years of education an individual has completed. 
Educ2 A quadratic term (number of years of education squared) included to control for the possibility of 
non-linearities in the returns to education. 
Exp A continuous variable reflecting the number of years the worker has been employed in the labour 
market (calculated as [age – 6 – years of educational attainment]) 
Exp2 A quadratic term (number of years of experience squared) included to control for the possibility of 
non-linearities in the returns to experience. 
Union45 A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the workers is a union member and 0 otherwise. 
Female A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a worker is female and 0 otherwise. 
Tenure A continuous variable controlling for the number of years a worker has worked for their current 
employer. 
Teacher A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is a teacher and 0 otherwise. 
Black  A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is black and 0 otherwise. 
Coloured A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is coloured and 0 otherwise. 
Indian A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is Indian and 0 otherwise. 
White A dummy variable taking the value of 1if the worker is white and 0 otherwise. 
                                                          
45 Not available in the QLFS 2010 
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Agriculture A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in the agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and fishing industry and 0 otherwise. 
Mining and quarrying A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the workers is employed in the mining and quarrying 
industry and 0 otherwise. 
Manufacturing A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in the manufacturing industry and 
0 otherwise. 
Electricity, gas and water 
supply 
A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in the electricity, gas and water 
supply industry. 
Construction A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in the construction industry and 
0 if otherwise. 
Wholesale and retail A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in the wholesale and retail industry 
and 0 if otherwise. 
Transport, storage and 
communication 
A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in the transport, storage and 
communication industry and 0 if otherwise. 
Finance, insurance and 
business 
A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in the financial, insurance and 
business services industry and 0 otherwise. 
Community, social and 
personal services 
A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in the community, social and 
personal services industry. 
Private households A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in the private households industry. 
Western Cape A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in the Western Cape and 0 
otherwise. 
Eastern Cape A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in the Eastern Cape and 0 
otherwise. 
Northern Cape A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in the Northern Cape and 0 
otherwise. 
Free State A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in the Free State and 0 otherwise. 
KwaZulu-Natal A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in KwaZulu Natal and 0 otherwise. 
Northwest A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in Northwest and 0 otherwise. 
Gauteng A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in Gauteng and 0 otherwise. 
Mpumalanga A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in Mpumalanga and 0 otherwise. 
Limpopo A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is employed in Limpopo and 0 otherwise. 
Source: LFS 2000–2007, QLFS 2010 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
148 
 
TABLE A3: Means (and standard deviations) of variables used 
VARIABLE GROUP 
 Teachers 
 (N = 6 274) 
Non-Teachers 
 (N = 439 551) 
Teachers 
 (N = 3 225) 
Non-Teachers 
 (N = 47 037)46 
 2000 - 2007 2010 
Log Hourly Wage 3.35 
(1.18) 
1.93 
(0.63) 
3.04 
(0.450) 
2.71 
(0.564) 
Educ 13.71 
(1.45) 
9.55 
(3.91) 
13.73 
(1.321) 
12.66 
(1.185) 
Exp 20.37 
(8.51) 
20.86 
(12.59) 
23.47 
(9.289) 
16.86 
(9.689) 
Exp2 414.94 
(362.21) 
435.14 
(660.47) 
644.16 
(445.45) 
524.09 
(555.52) 
Union 0.80 
(0.472) 
0.35 
(0.478) 
- - 
Female 0.69 
(0.46) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.68 
(0.466) 
0.44 
(0.496) 
Tenure 12.29 
(8.916) 
6.47 
(7.014) 
12.35 
(8.645) 
6.62 
(7.256) 
Black 0.71 
(0.453) 
0.51 
(0.500) 
0.67 
(0.471) 
0.56 
(0.496) 
Coloured 0.08 
(0.266) 
0.11 
(0.313) 
0.08 
(0.275) 
0.12 
(0.324) 
Indian 0.03 
(0.171) 
0.06 
(0.243) 
0.04 
(0.187) 
0.06 
(0.273) 
White 0.18 
(0.384) 
0.31 
(0.463) 
0.21 
(0.411) 
0.26 
(0.438) 
Industry 1 0.00 
(0.023) 
0.02 
(0.142) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.03 
(0.168) 
Industry 2 0.00 
(0.000) 
0.03 
(0.181) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.367) 
Industry 3 0.00 
(0.014) 
0.16 
(0.366) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.01 
(0.109) 
Industry 4 0.00 
(0.024) 
0.01 
(0.114) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.05 
(0.216) 
Industry 5 0.00 
(0.000) 
0.03 
(0.180) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.21 
(0.405) 
Industry 6 0.00 
(0.013) 
0.20 
(0.402) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.06 
(0.243) 
Industry 7 0.00 
(0.033) 
0.06 
(0.240) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.20 
(0.398) 
Industry 8 0.00 
(0.009) 
0.18 
(0.383) 
1.00 
(0.000) 
0.28 
(0.450) 
Industry 9 0.99 
(0.050) 
0.29 
(0.454) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.027) 
Industry 10 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.070) 
- - 
Western Cape 0.08 
(0.268) 
0.15 
(0.359) 
0.10 
(0.295) 
0.15 
(0.352) 
Eastern Cape 0.16 
(0.368) 
0.08 
(0.271) 
0.15 
(0.362) 
0.08 
(0.278) 
Northern Cape 0.02 
(0.133) 
0.01 
(0.118) 
0.04 
(0.184) 
0.02 
(0.127) 
Free State 0.07 
(0.256) 
0.06 
(0.240) 
0.07 
(0.262) 
0.05 
(0.215) 
KwaZulu-Natal 0.20 
(0.403) 
0.18 
(0.388) 
0.21 
(0.408) 
0.18 
(0.308) 
Northwest 0.08 
(0.266) 
0.06 
(0.235) 
0.05 
(0.218) 
0.05 
(0.216) 
Gauteng 0.18 
(0.383) 
0.34 
(0.473) 
0.19 
(0.393) 
0.38 
(0.486) 
Mpumalanga 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 
                                                          
46 The ratio of teachers to non-teachers in the South African labour market appears to be different between the 
pooled sample of 2000 to 2007 and 2010. This is likely due to missing values for variables in the 2010 data.  
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(0.2233) (0.231) (0.273) (0.236) 
Limpopo 0.16 
(0.365) 
0.05 
(0.218) 
0.11 
(0.307) 
0.04 
(0.197) 
Note: Own calculations from LFS 2000–2007 and QLFS 2010, Stats SA 
TABLE A4: Regression estimates for augmented Mincerian wage function on log 
hourly wages (2000–2007)1 
Variable Sub-Sample 
 Teachers Non-teachers (all levels of education) Non-teachers (at least 10 years of 
education) 
Education 0.074 
(20.11)*** 
0.111 
(187.39)*** 
0.254 
(165.36)*** 
Experience 0.018 
(6.74)*** 
0.014 
(28.17)*** 
0.029 
(35.89)*** 
Experience2 0.000 
(-5.92)*** 
0.000 
(-7.09)*** 
0.000 
(-23.64)*** 
Female -0.066 
(-5.67)*** 
-0.162 
(-48.57)*** 
-0.152 
-35.46)*** 
Married 0.008 
(0.67) 
0.144 
(42.75)*** 
0.141 
(30.55)*** 
Union 0.259 
(18.06)*** 
0.276 
(76.11)*** 
0.227 
(48.52)*** 
Tenure 0.007 
(8.33)*** 
0.016 
(68.53)*** 
0.018 
(49.27)*** 
Constant 0.767 
(3.22)*** 
-0.039 
(-4.04)*** 
-1.817 
-78.74)*** 
 
0.1106 0.5421 0.4929 Adjusted R-
Squared 
No. Of 
Observations 
12142 252 697 139 040 
Source: Own calculations from LFS (March and September) 2000–2007, Stats SA. Race, province and industry are 
controlled for in these regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate that coefficients are 
significant at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
UNDER-REPORTING OF EARNINGS BY TEACHERS 
The previous section compares teacher earnings to those of their non-teaching counterparts in 
the South African labour market. As mentioned before, it makes use of data from the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS). The validity of any of the results therefore is dependent on the validity of 
the information contained in the LFS.  
The extent of underreporting of earnings by teachers in the LFS may be gauged by comparing 
the earnings data in LFS to what is actually paid to teachers by the Department of Basic 
Education. In order to do this, Persal data is used to compare reported earnings amongst teacher 
(in LFS) to wages paid to teachers (Persal). The comparison is conducted using the September 
2001 Persal download and the 2001 LFS.  
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Using cumulative density functions (CDFs), we are able to see the proportion of teachers 
reporting a given level of monthly earnings in the LFS and how this compares to the proportion 
of teachers recorded as earning that wage from Persal data. CDFs for all teachers, for black 
teachers and for white teachers are presented in figures A3, A4 and A5 below. 
Figure A3: Cumulative Density Functions: all teachers (2001) 
 
Source: Own calculations from Persal (September) 2001 and LFS (March and September) 2001 
Figure A4: Cumulative Density Function: black teachers (2001) 
 
Source: Own calculations from Persal (September) 2001 and LFS (March and September) 2001 
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Figure A5: Cumulative Density Function: white teachers (2001) 
 
Source: Own calculations from Persal (September) 2001 and LFS (March and September) 2001 
 
From the figures, it is clear that a fair amount of underreporting of earnings occurs amongst 
teachers in the LFS. The CDFs for teachers in the LFS lie above those of teachers in the Persal 
data at lower level of monthly wages, indicating that a higher proportion of teachers in the LFS 
report lower levels of earnings than what is recorded in the Persal data. Similarly, a lower 
proportion of teachers report higher levels of monthly earnings in the LFS than what is recorded 
in the Persal data. Interestingly, it appears that the extent of underreporting amongst white 
teachers is slightly higher than it is for black teachers.  
Given the evidence that reported earnings of teachers are lower than what is reflected in the 
Persal data, it is important to investigate the impact that this is likely to have on returns to 
education amongst teachers as well as on the age-wage profile of teachers. In order to 
investigate this impact, a Mincerian wage regression is run in which the log of monthly 
earnings is regressed against the level of teacher training obtained as well as a quadratic term 
for age. A dummy variable is included for teachers capture in the LFS and the age and training 
terms are interacted with the LFS dummy. The results are presented in table A5 below.  
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Table A5: Regression estimates for augmented Mincerian wage function on log monthly 
wages (2001) 
Variable  
Training 0.1602 
(69.03)*** 
Age 0.0324 
(11.92)*** 
Age 2 -0.0003 
(-8.70)*** 
Training x LFS -0.1013 
(-41.74)*** 
Age x LFS 0.0321 
(11.12)*** 
Age2 x LFS -0.0004 
(-11.17)*** 
LFS -0.4433 
(-7.61)*** 
Constant 7.3243 
(133.12)*** 
R-squared 0.1192 
No. of observations 316 724 
Source: Own calculations from Persal (September) 2001 and LFS (March and September) 2001. Race, province and gender 
are controlled for in these regressions. 
Interesting to note is that the LFS dummy variable is negative, indicating that teachers who are 
captured in the LFS report lower monthly wages on average than what is reported in Persal.  
In terms of the returns to training implied by the coefficients obtained in table A5, figure A6 
presents the returns to earnings for teachers captured in the LFS and those implied by the data 
contained in Persal. 
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Figure A6: Returns to training, 2001 
 
Source: Own calculations from Persal (September) 2001 and LFS (March and September) 2001 
Figure A4 indicates that according to the data recorded in Persal, monetary returns to training 
amongst teachers appear to be higher at higher levels of training than what is reported in LFS, 
suggesting that the teaching profession for individuals with relatively high levels of education 
is perhaps not as unattractive as is suggested by the earnings reported in the LFS.  
The age-wage profile associated with earnings reported in the LFS and the Persal data is 
presented in figure A7 below.  
Figure A7: Age-wage profile, 2001 
 
Source: Own calculations from Persal (September) 2001 and LFS (March and September) 2001 
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From figure A5, we see that although the profile is lower at all age for teachers captured in the 
LFS, is appears that the age-wage profile takes a similar shape for both the LFS and the Persal 
data, with the exception of the oldest teachers in the data. For these teachers, monthly earnings 
in the LFS appear to drop by a significantly greater amount after the age of roughly 61 or 62 
than they do in the Persal data. 
This brief analysis has therefore pointed out that there is evidence of underreporting of earnings 
amongst teachers in the LFS relative to what is recorded in the Persal dataset. It is important to 
bear in mind that the unattractiveness of the teaching profession implied in the previous section 
of this paper may thus be overstated. 
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Appendix B 
 
 
TABLE B1: OLS estimates obtained after clustering standard errors (SACMEQ III, 
2007) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient Std deviation Coefficient Std deviation 
Intercept -0.122 0.111 -0.185* 0.112 
TEACHER DEMOGRPAHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
 
   Female 0.095*** 0.016 0.101*** 0.017 
   30 to 39 years of age -0.488*** 0.054 -0.467*** 0.054 
   40 to 49 years of age -0.553*** 0.054 -0.483*** 0.055 
   50 to 59 years of age -0.669*** 0.065 -0.582*** 0.065 
   60 years and older -0.475*** 0.126 -0.444*** 0.126 
 
TEACHER EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE 
   
   Teacher maths score   0.101*** 0.011 
   Experience: 6 to 10 years 0.166*** 0.033 0.131*** 0.033 
   Experience: 11 to 15 years 0.121*** 0.023 0.071*** 0.024 
   Experience: 16 to 20 years -0.045 0.028 -0.095*** 0.030 
   Experience: 21 to 25 years 0.031 0.032 -0.031 0.033 
   Experience: 26 to 30 years 0.222*** 0.059 0.170*** 0.061 
   Experience: 31 to 35 years 0.290*** 0.061 0.234*** 0.062 
   Experience: 36 to 40 years 0.027** 0.108 -0.001 0.108 
   Experience: 41 plus years -0.395** 0.166 -0.383** 0.166 
   Number of days training  
received 
0.246* 0.153 0.162 0.154 
   Trained in mathematics -0.320** 0.152 -0.257* 0.153 
   Trained to teach 
mathematics 
0.023 0.062 -0.023 0.062 
   Completed jr secondary 
education 
0.023 0.031 0.008 0.031 
   Completed sr secondary 
education 
0.056** 0.027 0.014 0.029 
   Completed A-levels 0.069*** 0.022 0.049** 0.023 
   Completed a degree 0.924*** 0.184 1.034*** 0.266 
   Received less than 1 year of 
training 
0.447*** 0.115 0.452*** 0.116 
   Received 1 year of training 0.520*** 0.109 0.575*** 0.110 
   Received 2 years of training 0.413*** 0.105 0.471*** 0.105 
   Received 3 years of training 0.488*** 0.105 0.526*** 0.105 
   Received 3 years plus of 
training 
0.166*** 0.033 0.131*** 0.033 
 
TEACHER EFFORT 
   
   Parents sign students’ 
homework 
0.055*** 0.018 0.056*** 0.019 
   Test 2 to 3 times per term 0.054* 0.028 0.043 0.029 
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   Tests 2 to 3 times per month 0.016 0.031 0.028 0.031 
   Tests at least once per week 0.124*** 0.031 0.131*** 0.032 
 
SCHOOL AND CLASSROOM CHARACTERISTICS 
 
   Rural -0.031 0.021 -0.031 0.022 
   Classroom SES 0.522*** 0.021 0.474*** 0.023 
   Private school 0.017 0.038 0.023 0.038 
   Average class size (of the 
school) 
 
0.017 0.038 0.023 0.038 
STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS 
SES 0.047*** 0.017 0.050*** 0.017 
Overage -0.118*** 0.026 -0.109*** 0.027 
Female -0.009 0.019 -0.008 0.020 
Mother completed matric 0.092*** 0.022 0.096*** 0.023 
Father completed matric 0.071*** 0.021 0.075*** 0.022 
Less than 1 year preschool 0.008** 0.042 -0.006 0.043 
1 year of preschool 0.047*** 0.022 0.053** 0.024 
2 years of preschool 0.083*** 0.030 0.067** 0.032 
3 or more years of preschool 0.166*** 0.028 0.157*** 0.030 
Speaks English sometimes 0.165*** 0.022 0.165*** 0.023 
Speaks English most of the 
time 
0.196*** 0.038 0.180*** 0.040 
Speaks English always 0.320*** 0.050 0.316*** 0.051 
Repeated a grade once -0.188*** 0.027 -0.192*** 0.027 
Repeated a grade twice -0.243*** 0.043 -0.280*** 0.045 
Repeated a grade three times -0.281*** 0.050 -0.306*** 0.053 
Repeated grade 6 0.081** 0.036 -0.053 0.038 
Receives extra tuition -0.070** 0.031 -0.026 0.032 
R-squared 0.424  0.438  
Number of teachers 497  469  
Number of students 8 917  8336  
Source: Own calculations from SACMEQ III (SACMEQ, 2007). 
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TABLE B2: Full Hierarchical Linear Model (SACMEQ II, 2000) 
Variable Coefficient Std deviation 
Intercept 0.048 0.176 
TEACHER DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS  
Female 0.083 0.077 
30 to 39 years of age 0.003 0.120 
40 to 49 years of age 0.315* 0.189 
50 years and older 0.671** 0.232 
60 years and older -  
 
TEACHER EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE 
 
Teacher maths score -  
Experience: 6 to 10 years -0.17 0.118 
Experience: 11 to 15 
years 
-0.245* 0.139 
Experience: 16 to 20 
years 
-0.431* 0.229 
Experience: 21 to 25 
years 
-0.454** 0.194 
Experience: 26 to 30 
years 
-0.803*** 0.259 
Experience: 31 to 35 
years 
-0.952** 0.413 
Experience: 36 plus -0.603** 0.292 
Number of days training  
received 
-0.001** 0.001 
Trained in mathematics -  
Trained to teach 
mathematics 
-  
Completed jr secondary 
education 
-0.082 0.275 
Completed sr secondary 
education 
0.243 0.157 
Completed A-levels 0.473*** 0.115 
Completed a degree 0.403*** 0.126 
Received less than 1 year 
of training 
-  
Received 1 year of 
training 
-  
Received 2 years of 
training 
-0.588*** 0.179 
Received 3 years of 
training 
-0.351* 0.196 
Received 3 years plus of 
training 
-0.412*** 0.096 
 
TEACHER EFFORT 
 
Parents sign students’ 
homework 
0.014 0.095 
Test 2 to 3 times per term -  
Tests 2 to 3 times per 
month 
0.135 0.184 
Tests at least once per 
week 
0.111 0.099 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
158 
 
 
SCHOOL AND CLASSROOM CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Rural -0.061 0.096 
Classroom SES 0.506*** 0.062 
Private school 0.291 0.336 
Average class size (of the 
school) 
-0.003 -0.004 
 
STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS 
 
SES 0.065*** 0.019 
Overage -0.148*** 0.023 
Female -0.027 0.025 
Mother completed matric -0.024 0.026 
Father completed matric 0.061** 0.025 
Less than 1 year 
preschool 
-  
1 year of preschool -  
2 years of preschool -  
3 or more years of 
preschool 
-  
Speaks English 
sometimes 
0.115*** 0.036 
Speaks English most of 
the time 
0.221*** 0.050 
Speaks English always -  
Repeated a grade once -0.140*** 0.030 
Repeated a grade twice -0.148*** 0.043 
Repeated a grade three 
times 
-0.242*** 0.048 
Repeated grade 6 0.046 0.035 
Receives extra tuition 0.060* 0.033 
 Standard Deviation Variance  Chi-Squared 
Intercept 0.416 0.173  3 468.531 
Within-
classroom 
0.651 0.424 
 
 
 Reliability of teacher-level random effects 
 Mean score 0.852   
Source: Own calculations from SACMEQ III (SACMEQ, 2007). 
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Appendix C  
Minimum requirements for teacher education 
qualifications 
 
The Government Gazette No. 34467 of 2011 on Minimum Requirements for Teacher Education 
Qualifications lists the professional and academic qualifications selected for teacher education 
(DHET, 2011): 
i. Qualifications for initial teacher education (ITE): 
Bachelor of Education degree 
Advanced Diploma in Teaching 
 
ii. Qualifications for the continuing professional and academic development of 
teachers: 
Advanced Certificate in Teaching 
Advanced Diploma in Education 
Postgraduate Diploma in Education 
Bachelor of Education Honours degree 
Master of Education degree 
Doctoral degree 
 
 
iii. Qualification for grade R teaching: 
Diploma in grade R teaching 
Students enrolled in ITE programmes are students who may be considered part of the potential 
stock of future teachers. It is possible and probable that students enrolled in continuing 
professional and academic development may already belong to the teaching force, or that they 
have continued from initial teacher education.  
The gazette explains that “[t]he primary purpose of all Initial Teacher Education qualifications 
is to certify that the holder has specialized as a beginner teacher in a specific phase and/or 
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subject” (DHET, 2011). Student enrolled in initial teacher education may specialize in a phase, 
a subject or in a combination of these. Importantly, all students with ITE qualifications are 
expected to be proficient in at least one official language as a language of learning and teaching 
(LoLT) as well as being able to use at least one other official language sufficiently for 
conversational purposes (“partially proficient”) (DHET, 2011).  
 
Initial Teacher Education: Bachelor of Education 
As listed in point 1 above, a Bachelor of Education degree or an Advanced Diploma in 
Teaching (in addition to an undergraduate bachelor’s degree or an approved diploma). In the 
case of a Bachelor of Education degree, a graduate is expected to be functional as a classroom 
teacher with focused knowledge and practical skills in their given specialization (DHET, 2011). 
Students enrolled in a Bachelor of Education degree can specialize in Foundation Phase (FP) 
teaching, or in the teaching of subjects from four broad “fields of learning” in either the 
Intermediate Phase (IP), the Senior Phase (SP) or the Further Education and Training (FET) 
phase. Table A1 below provides a summary of the possible specializations available to teachers 
in ITE. 
TABLE C1: Teaching specialisation for initial teacher education qualifications 
PHASE 
 
SUBJECT DOMAINS 
 LEARNING 
SUPPORT 
SPECIALISATIONS 
Humanities 
 
Science and 
Technology 
 
Languages 
Business and 
Management 
 
FOUNDATION 
(GRADES R – 3) 
 
 
Integrated focus on Literacy, Numeracy and Life Skills 
 
 
INTERMEDIATE 
(GRADES 4 – 7) 
 
Life Skills 
 
Science and 
Technology 
 
Languages* 
  
 
Social Sciences 
 
  
Mathematics 
 
   
 
SENIOR 
(GRADES 7 – 9) 
 
Arts and Culture 
 
Natural Sciences 
 
Languages* 
 
Economic and 
Management 
Sciences 
 
 
School Librarianship 
Life Orientation Mathematics   Guidance Counselling 
and Specialised 
Learning Support 
 
Social Sciences 
 
Technology    
Physical Education 
 
FET (GRADES 10 
– 12) 
 
Dance Studies 
 
 
Agricultural 
Sciences 
 
 
Languages* 
 
Accounting 
 
ICT Support 
Dramatic Arts Geography  Business Studies  
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History 
 
Life Sciences  Economics  
Life Orientation Mathematics  Hospitality Studies 
 
 
Music Mathematical 
Literacy 
 
 Tourism  
Religion Studies Physical Sciences 
 
   
Visual Arts Computer 
Applications 
Technology 
 
   
 Agricultural 
Management 
Practices 
 
   
 Civil Technology 
 
   
 Electrical 
Technology 
 
   
 Engineering 
Graphics and 
Design 
 
   
 Information 
Technology 
 
   
 Mechanical 
Technology 
 
   
 Design 
 
   
 Consumer Studies    
Source: Department of Higher Education and Training (2011). Minimum Requirements for Teacher Education Qualifications.  
Teachers are qualified to teach the phase and/or subjects in which they specialised while 
studying for a Bachelor of Education degree. Of importance in the FP specialisation is that 
teachers must specialise in First Language teaching in at least one of the official languages, as 
well as in First Additional Language teaching. Certain stipulations exist regarding which 
languages teachers must choose. These can be found on page 23 of the Minimum Requirements 
for Teacher Education Qualifications. Students specialising in the IP must specialise in the 
teaching of at least four subjects indicated in the IP domain in table 1. Because the first year of 
senior phase is often taught with the intermediate phase, teachers who has specialised in the 
intermediate phase must be able to teacher grade 7. IP specialists employed to teach subjects 
at a grade 7 level may enrol for an Advanced Certificate (discussed later) in the SP subject in 
order to develop competence in the grade 7 subjects which they are to teach (DHET, 2011). In 
order to teach in secondary schools, teachers must have completed a combined SP and FET 
programme. Teachers must have completed a minimum of three specialisations: i) two SP 
subjects and one FET subject; ii) one SP subject and two FET subjects; or iii) one SP subject, 
one FET subject and one support role. At least one SP subject and as least one FET subject are 
therefore required for teachers specialising in this combination.  
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Initial Teacher Education: Advanced Diploma in Teaching 
The Advanced Diploma in Teaching “offers entry-level initial professional preparation for 
graduates and diplomats who wish to develop focused knowledge and skills as classroom 
teachers in a chosen phase(s) and/or subject(s)” (DHET, 2011). The Minimum Requirements 
for Teacher Education Qualifications stipulates that a Bachelor’s degree is the preferred 
minimum entry requirement for the Advanced Diploma in teaching and that it should include 
sufficient academic content knowledge of the school subjects in the phase that the student 
would like to teacher (DHET, 2011). A number of diplomas are also listed as being acceptable 
for entry into the Advanced Diploma in Teaching. These are presented in Appendix E on page 
56 of the Minimum Requirements for Teacher Education Qualifications.  
The requirements for the Advanced Diploma in Teaching for different phases are largely 
similar to those stipulated for the Bachelor of Education degree. However, in the case of SP 
and FET teaching, only two subject specialisations (only one SP subject and one FET subject) 
are required, whereas a minimum of three is required in the case of the Bachelor of Education. 
Furthermore, it is possible to specialise only in FET teaching in the case of an Advanced 
Diploma in Teaching. In this case, the subject in which the students specialises must have been 
a major subject in the Bachelor’s degree or diploma in the qualification through which the 
student entered the Advanced Diploma in Teaching.  
ITE in the form of a Bachelor of Education and Advanced Diploma in Teaching prepares 
students who have not yet entered the teaching force to do so. Graduates from these 
programmes may therefore be thought of as “potential teachers” as there is no guarantee that 
they will enter the teaching profession once they have completed these programmes. The higher 
education system also provides for teachers who already belong to the teaching force, but who 
are involved in Continuing Professional Development (CPD). For the sake of this report, the 
focus will fall on teachers enrolled in the Advanced Certificate in Teaching. It is true that an 
extensive list of CPD programmes exists, but it is only the Advanced Certificate in Teaching 
that can qualify teachers to teach in areas that they were previously not qualified to teach rather 
than enhancing the research or academic qualifications of teachers. The Advanced Certificate 
in Teaching is therefore the only means of quantifying the potential stock of teachers.  
Continuing Professional Development: Advanced Certificate in Teaching 
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The Advanced Certificate in Teaching is designed to prepare teachers to teach new subjects or 
phases, or to enhance their knowledge and competence in an existing subject or phase. The 
certificate was established to address the needs of three sets of teachers: 
1. Teachers seeking retraining: These are teachers who would like to specialise in 
teaching a subject for which they have not previously obtained a professional 
teaching qualification. 
2. Recognition of prior learning (RPL) upgrading: Teachers with prior professional 
teaching qualifications teaching FP or IP but who did not specialise in the phase. 
The Advanced Certificate in Teaching allows them to complete a formal 
qualification in either FP or IP, given that they have obtained the appropriate 
knowledge by teaching FP or IP. 
3. Teachers who completed a three-year diploma in education at a former college of 
education, or a National Professional Diploma in Education and who want to 
strengthen their specialisation in their particular subject or phase.  
The Minimum Requirements for Teacher Education Qualifications stipulates that “the 
Advanced Certificate may only be utilised for the retraining or upgrading of teachers who hold 
prior professional teaching qualifications in a subject and/or phase. It is not available for new 
roles in education” (DHET, 2011).  
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